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The present study examines organized
economic

life

labor's role in

American

political

and

during the Nixon years. In the 1960s, most observers regarded American

workers as economically secure and content. Events

at the close

undermined the image of the affluent worker. Workers' support

of the decade, however,
for conservative

candidates George Wallace and Richard Nixon during the 1968 presidential campaign

convinced many observers that blue-collar Americans had swung

to the right.

In the

election's aftermath, analysts of various political persuasions tried to explain "the blue-

collar blues."

According

to the

campus
— ghetto
breakdown of law and order— than about

concerned with social issues
the

mainstream press, white workers had become more
rioting,

unrest, widespread anti-war protest,

"traditional"

economic

Richard Nixon hoped to capitalize on the Social Issue to

fashion a

new Republican

woo

majority. But the relationship between the

issues.

white workers and

Nixon

Administration, a traditionally Democratic labor leadership, a radicalized student

vii

movement, and a

volatile rank

and

file

proved to be highly complex. Large-scale

strikes

against the General Electric and General Motors corporations in 1969
and 1970 showed
that

workers

still

considered economic issues to be of paramount concern. Workers and

their unions did not uniformly support U.S. policy in

years, unionists

became more outspoken

Vietnam; indeed, during the Nixon

in their opposition to the war.

even attempted a rapprochement with segments of the

denounced Nixon's attempts

to

combat the

New Left.

inflationary spiral the

Some

unions

Organized labor

Vietnam War had

triggered.

Nixon nevertheless won
election campaign.

He

substantial blue-collar support during his 1972 re-

did so not by playing the social issues but by neutralizing the

Vietnam War and economic concerns. Nixon's

victory proved to be short lived,

however. The economic recession of 973 took
1

The energy

crisis

its toll

on the workers and

their unions.

launched a devastating round of de-industrialization. By 1974. Nixon's

blue-collar support had collapsed. For

all their

members of the new Republican

majority.

American

their votes

society,

however, and

discontent, white workers had not

They were displeased with
were available

viii

become

their position in

for courting.
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Km

when

aioinul

mvolved

m

tins

en)t>y it/'

a '\slinking

eould do for ^Mhe

as a union leader

people rarely hekl eenler stage.

I

unionism was

organized labor. In the turbulent l%()s, the ei)neerns

ehange and

at

\..l feel

period, however, the itiealism thai tingetl Uryner's words

tiemonslrations. and the

throuj.»h the

had labeled the (iMAI), ^Xlottta Make Another Dollar."

able to stand up aiul speak up lor another guy

l

fastest line

sneh an approaeh took on the workers.

Rellecting on his role as nnion leader, hryner eonehuled:

whole stinking mess,

the (Jeneral
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Bryner^s view, the General Motors Assembly Division aimed
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rediietion,

liiilcd

over Iweiily inoiUhs. Us iiieinhers were employees

Motors (OM) assembly
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I

mess/' Uryner

guys.'"*

In the

post-WWll

was seklom assoeiated with

organized labor and working

liie

esealating antiwar

oeeiipied the lorelront ol social

"In a lime ol lh)wci cinldrcn burning ghettocs, ami

American values and

the world of the

aspirations," historian Robert /ieger

wage worker and

the trade unionist seeme<l remote

'studs Terkel, Workins^: People Talk About Whal Tlnr

Do AH

Ihiy

Ami How Tiny hWI

Ahoul W hal T/uy /)o(New York: Pantheon Hooks, \')7?l IK7-hM.

1

and even irrelevant."

American workers had come

members of consumer

content

society.

dissatisfaction associated with factory

lifestyle

once reserved

for the

middle

It

to be regarded as affluent and

was widely believed

work
class.

itself,

that, despite the

high wages enabled workers to enjoy a

American society had presumably become a

"middle-class society" in which the vast majority of the population participated as
equals.

At the close of the decade, however, the picture of the prosperous, suburban,
middle-class worker grew blurred.

keep pace with soaring

prices.

Unemployment

rose appreciably and wages failed to

Contrary to widespread

belief, the relative prosperity

the 195()s and 1960s had not turned workers into fully integrated

American

social

America was

and

political system,

'in 1968," S.

M. Miller

members of the

states,

"a

new group

in

3

identified first with horror, increasingly with compassion."'

the 1968 presidential election,

number of union members

George Wallace, a

to his cause.

racist

demagogue,

Such a rightward

At the onset of

attracted a large

political turn

among workers

shocked many Americans. Although most of the early Wallace supporters switched
Democratic Party candidate Hubert
election

was

of

11.

Humphrey

to

before the balloting, the presidential

crucial in bringing working-class concerns to the forefronl of public

controversy, i he "blue-collar blues" caused a lluriy of working-class studies that tried to

determine the economic and social problems of workers. The debate centered on the
alleged "middle-class" status, hawkishncss, and political conservatism of the American

worker.

^Robert /ac^ct, American Workers, American Unions, /920-/y(V5(Baltimore and London;

The
^S.

.lohns

M.

I

lopkins University, 1986), 169.

Miller, "Sharing the

Burden of Change," Ncm' Generation

2.

2

51, no. 2 (Spring 1969):

Conservative, reactionary, hawkish, or authoritarian were not the
worst names
that the

American working

"the unkindest cut of all"

million working

class

was

was

called.

"nonexistent."'* In 1969, however, there

men and women

in

political

The

strike

still

shared "a

Fortune anticipated that 1969 could turn out

between management and labor" as unionists were
acquisitive"

mood.

Deal Liberal coalition.
class

in

at

common
to

be

''a

increased

disparate points in the

situation

and

common

time of epic battle

an "angry, aggressive and

New

liberals

were trying

leftists, for their part,

and turning out on picket

to fashion a

new

version of the

were re-evaluating the

economic arena and the anti-war movement

in the

of labor historians, a discussion of organized labor

role of the

in electoral politics, the

1968-1974 period. To a large number
in the late

1960s and early 1970s

may

American labor movement collapsed with

the

Working Class, New Working Class," in Irving Howe,
Blue-Collar Worker {Ney\ York; Quadrangle Books, 1972), 135.

ed.,

To some

irrelevant.

scholars, the

''Michael Harrington, "Old

The World oj the

New

lines to support striking workers.

This study evaluates the role that labor unions played

sound

were

While the mainstream press played up working-class conservatism

and economic well being, some

working

were 77.902

wave of 1969-1970

and reminded distinguished scholars

spectrum that unionized workers

interests."

1972,

in

machinery, transportation equipment, contract

construction, and transportation services.^

visibility

it

in the non-agricultural labor force; 20.21 million

unionized and concentrated mainly

organized labor's

As Michael Harrington expressed

^Ibid., 137.

^Richard Amstrong, "Labor 1970: Angry, Aggressive, and Acquisitive," For/wwe,

October 1969, 95.

3

rise

1

of the

To

930s.

when

"New

Deal order" which contained the revitaUzed woricer mihtancy of
the

others, unions lost all political leverage in the

immediate postwar period

labor leaders failed to create industrial democracy;^ few historians
would argue that

labor unions could

by the

1

960s.

reflect their

still

make

a difference in America's socio-political and

In their evaluation

own

set

economic

life

of American trade unionism, labor scholars inevitably

of assumptions about the way

political

systems work and about the

best strategies for reform.

My

evaluation of the 1968-1974 period will also be based on a number of

premises. First, American

workingmen and women have used varied forms of resistance

and voiced their demands through styles of organization

and work cultures

at different historical

racial, ethnic

have best

fitted their

needs

moments. "Class" -in a Thompsonian sense, as

both economic and cultural creation- has informed

and intersected with

that

human

and gender issues

conflict in the United States

in crucial

ways. Workers have

multiple identities that they combine in different ways. This, in turn, defines the type of

On

the incorporation of labor unions into the corporate-liberal state, see

Mike

Davis,

Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S.
Working Class (London: Verso, 1986); for a legal examination of the New Deal Order,

and the
America, 1880-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

see Christopher Tomlins, The State

Organized Labor Movement

in

and The Unions: Labor

Relations, Law.

Press, 1986).
g

postwar America, see David Brody, Workers in Industrial
America: Essays on the Twentieth Century Struggle (New York: Knoft, 1969); see also
Nelson Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining,'T40-145, in Fraser
and Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton;

For an overview of labor

in

Princeton University Press, 1989).

^See Kevin Boyle, The

UAW and the Heyday ofAmerican Liberalism,

and London: Cornell University Press, 1995).

4

1945-1968. (Ithaca

collective action that they take. Second, the state

autonomous

entity

nor a mere

capitalist tool.

unionization does not inevitably

mean

is

neither an all-powerful and

Protective legislation that facilitates

co-optation. Third, any assessment of the

workers' failures and achievements cannot be isolated from either
structural constraints,

such as the nature of the American
the

political system, or historical

developments, such as

Cold War.
In the 1960s,

American

militant constituency that

workforce was

blue-collar workers did not form the

some

student radicals

in fact a diverse occupational

still

dreamed

of.

homogeneous and

The

blue-collar

group -factory workers, skilled workers,

transportation workers and non-farm laborers- further divided along racial, ethnic and

gender

lines.

Consequently, the role that their unions played in the national scene of the

1968-1974 period was extremely complex.

When

contemporary observers dismissed

labor as irrelevant, they missed this complexity. In 1971, Brendan and Patricia

Sexton

Cayo

stated:

We think the obituaries for workers and their unions have been premature, based
principally

on

superficial reading

drawn from short-term

of available materials and distorted inferences

trends.

The purpose of this work

the period and thus go

is to revisit

obituaries" and rushed conclusions about organized labor.

restricted to unionized

workers

the United Automobile

in the auto

and

Workers (UAW), the

My

analysis will be further

electrical industries;

International

beyond "premature

more

specifically, to

Union of Electrical Workers

(lUE), and the independent United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America

Cayo, "Labor's Decade - Maybe," in Irving Howe and Michael
Harrington, eds.. The Seventies: Problems and Proposals (New York, Evanston, San
Francisco, London: Harper Colophon Books, 1972), 283.

Brendan and

Patricia

5

1

Due

(UE).

membership and involvement

to their large

of the country,

I

economic and

in the

political life

believe that a study of these unions will be representative
of the

divisions, successes, failures, aspirations and contradictions
within the organized bluecollar

the

working

class.

In 1968, the

UAW,

the largest union in the country, withdrew from

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO). This

was

the culmination of a long feud between

CIO

President George Meany,

and programs. The lUE,
had been chartered

for

who had fundamental

its part,

in 1949, after the

explore the relationship between the
student

movement and

To
file's

the

UAW President Walter Reuther and AFL-

was

differences over principles, policies

the third largest union within the

AFL-CIO.

purge of the left-leaning UE. Moreover,

AFL-CIO

top echelons and the rank and

I

It

will

file,

the

Nixon Administration.

illuminate the relationship between labor leaders" initiatives and rank and

responses,

I

will

examine the way

combined and influenced

their stand

book America

Man (1984),

's

Working

on

in

which blue-collar workers' multiple

different issues throughout the period. In his

sociologist David Halle argues that the 'Mmage that

[workers] have of their position in the class structure

First, blue-collar

identities

is

workers forge an identity on the shop

based on three distinct
floor; as

identities."

an occupational group

they have experiences that set them apart from other sectors of society. Blue-collar

workers build a second identity outside work;
level

and standard of living. Workers'

this identity is directly related to

from living

third identity derives

in the

income
United

1

States;

it

stresses "a

common bond between

all

Americans."

Working Man: Work. Home and Politics among Blue Collar
Property Owners (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 203.
''David Halle, America

's

6

As

the 1960s

came

to a close, the U.S.

which

the "old" blue-collar

collar

workers were employed

them did jobs
assembly

working class was a thing

lines in auto plants

today and

it:

blue-

and transportation: most of

UAW

thinking. Boy.

1

did a great job

12
1

caif t wait to get back toinorrow/'

not paid as individuals, but as

members of a

discipline in the

immediate

interests.

neighborhoods

to the

Most unionized

many of those who worked on

"They [auto workers] don't come home

lloor.

to

m
i

endured a dehumanizing routine. As the president of

worker^s identity on the shop

their

oftlie past.

in manufacturing, construction

or/and dirty, routine and closely supervised.

common

a "post-industrial" society

that bore little intrinsic interest or reward;

1112 put

local

was not

that

By

suburbs contributed to

material Iramework outside

class."*^

its

1

larrington states: " They are

Blue collars are subjected

howeven workers

percent'^ blue collar.

participation in ^^classless"

work -income

physical, dangerous

to a

build collective institutions in defense

the late 1960s,

were "a hundred

is

I'hese elenients defuic the bluc^coliar

Moreover, as Michael

work process and

work

Blue-collar

level, life style,

ot^

did not necessarily return

The

movement of workers

consumer

society.

consumer goods-

at

The
times

blurred the differences between white-collar and blue-collar workers, hi view of this,

how

did workers define ''job satisfaction'"? Did unions help blue collars to achic\ e such

satisfaction?

These were thoroughly debated issues

in the early 1970s.

Blue-collar workers, as Halle says, also develop an identity as Americans,

i.e.

as

those born in the territory of the nation-state or admitted to citizenship by the federal

government. Nationalism revolves around a number of symbols and terms- such as the

'Verkek 193
13

Harrington, 138

flag, the national

anthem, the "people"- that can conjure up different meanings

Vietnam War

different times. In the

years, political

at

commentators often conflated

working-class hostility to radical students' tactics such as flag-burning
with workingclass feelings about the

hawkish.

war

uncommon
power

and thus portrayed American labor as out-and-out

Among blue-collar workers terms

American public" have

the

itself,

such as "the American people" and "the

also been used in a populist sense. In labor publications,

to find articles that presented the plight of the

structure

of America -big business,

politicians-

it

is

not

worker as a conflict between
and the

of the population.

rest

In 1969 and 1970, for instance, electrical workers and auto workers rallied support for
their strikes against

General Electric (GE) and

companies" "profiteering
unionists tried to

heart.

new

The

show

at the

GM,

respectively, by focusing

on these

expense of their employees and the public" Thus,

that labor militancy

blue-collar worker, however,

had the "general benefit" of Americans

was then more often viewed

at

symbol of the

as the

reactionary politics, rather than the symbol of the old radicalism.

Historically, the

ethnic and gender lines.

American working

class has

been deeply divided along

The self-conception of the worker, however, changes over

In other words, self-definition

is

not

static;

h

varies.

The

crucial question

various outlooks coexist in the workers' minds at various times in history.

Vietnam War
dominant

as well as the

issue.

By

impending economic

structure.

is

how

By

For those of us

workers" for social change, there

is

who have

time.

these

1968, the

crisis eclipsed race as a national

discussing the blue-collar blues, workers were described as

of a "class" that suffered specific problems due

economic

racial,

to their position in the

members

American socio-

believed in the "creative potential of the

nothing more challenging than examining organized

8

labor in the United States, "the nation where labor
seems most integrated into the
prevailing order and utterly lacking in any kind of revolutionary
consciousness.""* This
precisely the task

nation

I

have undertaken: unravel labor's participation

was experiencing a social

political

and economic

crisis, a

at a

I

start in

major

outcome and

its

increasingly

The weakening of the

aftermath.

and the subsequent defeat of the Democratic Party contributed

many

examine a selection of politically diverse

my

in

to the

analysis of the 1968 campaign,

literature that reveals a clear

middle American" could play

labor-

cases, fear led liberal politicians to take

blue-collar workers' grievances seriously. Following

role that "the

it

political coalition.

rediscovery of the American worker. In

I

the

chapter one by discussing union mobilization for Hubert H. Humphrey,

the 1968 presidential election

liberal alliance

when

period in which liberals,

trade unionists, insurgent students and aroused minority groups
found
difficult to consolidate a

time

is

American

politics.

concern with the

Mainstream magazines

reinforced the view of the U.S. as a "middle-class society," while politicians coined

catchy phrases such as "the troubled American," "the forgotten American," "the

man," or "the

By

little

silent majority."

using the term "Middle America," commentators lumped blue-collar workers

together with the middle class. Black

paramount concerns among workers,
Richard M.

Scammon and Ben

Real Majority

in 1970.

J.

Power and

the counterculture were presented as

totally effacing "the class issue." Political analysts

Wattenberg

started a debate with the publication

Scammon and Wattenberg

argued

that, to the

majority of

'^Michael Harrington, "American Society: Burdens, Problems, Solutions," in
Harrington, eds.. The Seventies, 37.

9

of The

Howe

and

American

voters, the Social Issue -i.e. concerns about

law and order, youth violence and

black power- superseded "old" economic issues, such as
unemployment, labor union
prerogatives or broad-based welfare proposals such as Social
Security.'^

Andrew Levison took

issue with

Scammon and

Majority

is

"typical"

American worker earned $ 9,500. This

his attempt to prove that the U.S.

Wattenberg. The Working Class

was not a middle-class

figure actually placed blue collars

closer to the working poor than to the affluent middle class.

of working-class economic well being, Levison turned
acquiescence. Throughout the

1

After debunking the myth

to workers' alleged apathy

and

960s, he pointed out, a rising discontent with working

and living conditions was evident
increasing

society. In 1970, the

in the

growth of rank-and-file militancy. The

number of strikes, Levison concluded, was an

had not yet superseded the Economic Issue. Rank and

indication that the Social Issue

filers

were particularly

restless in

the 1969-1970 period. Beginning with electrical manufacturers in October 1969, and

followed by trucking, meatpacking, rubber and automobiles, five great industries had to
reach

new

three-year contracts.

The

strike

wave of the 1969-1970 period provides

the context to assess unionized

blue-collar workers' affluence and acquiescence. Although industrial workers staged

several large-scale walkouts,

GE

in the winter

two captured

of 1969-1970 and the 400.000 autoworkers' walkout against

1970. In chapters three and four,

""^Richard

national attention: the 102-day strike against

M. Scammon and Ben

McCann and Geoghegan,

I

J.

probe these two

strikes in order to assess blue-collar

Wattenberg, The Real Majority

Inc., 1970),

GM in

(New York: Coward

35-43.

*^Andrew Levison, The Working Class Majority (New York: Coward, McCann and
Geoghegan, Inc., 1974), 229.
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8

8

workers" demands as well as labor unions' role in
working-class

life.

The

reflected not only rank-and-file dissatisfaction over
"the old fashioned'

GE

strike

economic issues

but also the workers' determination to reject unnegotiated
contracts and to strike for

longer periods of time. This labor campaign was also a valuable
opportunity for radical
students to build an alliance with workers.

I

assess the student-worker collaboration

during the campaign as well as the achievements of the thirteen-union
coalition -led by

lUE and UE-

that staged the strike.

The 1970 walkout
industrial

unionism

against

GM also brought the issue of labor militancy and

to the forefront

of political debate. To some observers, the

had been an expensive triumph. The

conflict

had cost the

UAW about $

GM strike

160 million and

almost bankrupted the union. The powerful multinational corporation also

lost millions

17

of dollars

in its attempt to resist the unions'

however, the company had allowed

itself to

To more

demands.
be struck

cynical analysts,

in order to protect

union leaders,

1

who

in turn

had sold the members a cheap settlement.

Were

strikes

and unions

still

necessary to humanize the shopfloor and improve the workers' living standards? Or were

walkouts

little

more than

"'a

blue-collar catharsis''?

My

analysis aims at determining

whether companies and unions had become "sweethearts," as

critics implied,

or whether

they remained adversaries.

'^B.

J.

Widick, ^^Sweethearts or Adversaries?" Nation 216, no. 25, 18 June 1973, 792.

1

In The

Company and the Union (New York:

Alfred Knopf, 1973), William Serrin

presents a scornful view of the "civilized relationship" between the auto companies and
the

UAW leaders.

'Villiam R. Droemer, "Blue-Collar Catharsis," Time, 19 March 1973,
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18.

In chapter five,

labor: the

I

explore the most divisive issue within the ranks of
organized

Vietnam War. Labor unions' support

fed into the view of the

American worker

for U.S.

involvement in Southeast Asia

as politically conservative or even reactionary.

The AFL-CIO"s unconditional backing of the Vietnam War gave substance

to the charges

of labor's "hawkishness." The hard-hat demonstrations of May 1970
apparently
confirmed the view of the white blue-collar worker as reactionary. The media
transformed the hard-hats into symbols of authoritarianism and patriotism. The "hard-hat

phenomenon," however, was not representative of working
conflict.

The number of dissenting unions and rank and

class sentiment towards the

had been increasing

filers

considerably since 1968.

As

historian Christian

Appy has thoroughly documented,

working-class war, a fact that was not acknowledged
those

who

fought in Southeast Asia

at

came from working

the time.

class

the

Vietnam War was a

About 80 percent of

and poor backgrounds.

Consequently, the feelings that the soldiers and their families had about the American
military intervention in Indochina and the largely middle-class anti-war

movement were

very complex. Workers might oppose an escalation of the war owe/ the student radicals'

"anti-American" demonstrations. In a 1973 essay on patriotism, John H. Shaar asserted,

"The

radicals of the 1960s did not persuade their fellow- Americans, high or low, that

they genuinely cared for and shared a country with them.

And no one who

has contempt

20

for others can

In the

public.

Was

hope

to teach those others.'

Vietnam

years, the issue of nationalism

became

a

dilemma

opposition to the conflict in Indochina un-American?

20

John H. Shaar, 'The Case

for Patriotism," ^wtr/cc/w

12

Review

to the

American

Were American boys

4, no.

17
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1973): 62,
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enough. More than enough."'^ The Watergate scandal
along with the economic
recession of 1973-74 heightened the national feeling of
exhaustion that had been
prevalent since the late 1960s.

The events of the

confidence in American institutions. In the

economic collapse as well as

its

early 1970s seriously shook citizens'

last chapter,

1

assess Nixon's political and

impact on labor-capital relations in the years

to

come, the

years of the conservative ascendancy.
In October 1996, leading

held a 'Teach-in with the Labor

same

issues that

twenty years

some

earlier:

disproportionate

liberals,

how

American

Movement

new

leftists

power of corporations

unions,

was hard

human

at

to predict in

rights groups

1996

in

American society and

in Seattle.

The mass media soon drew

the day that the

22

made

were

new

their

the headlines

thirty years ago.

parallels

coalition of

concerns about

all

over the world.

World Trade Organization was

battled head-on

between the 1968 Battle of Chicago and

The confrontations with

the 1999 Battle of Seattle.

fight for social justice

difficult today as they

and environmentalists would voice

30, 1999,

similar.

the

and trade unionists were discussing almost

that less than four years later, a

November

may have looked

activists

Columbia University. They addressed

global economic injustice in demonstrations that

was

and labor movement

could a revitalized labor movement challenge the

and economic security? The answers are as
It

intellectuals

the police and the "street theater"

There were, however, many differences. In Chicago, labor

21

AFL-CIO

Executive Council on President Nixon

Convention, October 1973,

to the

Tenth Constitutional

2.

22

David Montgomery, "Planning for Our Futures," in Steve Fraser and Joshua B.
Freeman, eds.. Audacious Democracy: Labor, Intellectuals and the Social Reconstruction
ofAmerica (Boston and New York: Houghton Miftlin Company, 1997), 68.

14

leaders and student demonstrators were on different
sides of the barricades. In Seattle,
the students and the workers

were unequivocally on the same

in Seattle, Steelworkers' President

"I

want

to say a

word

to the

George Becker referred

young people.

I

want

to

side.

to this

During a Pier 62

newly forged

welcome you. This

is

rally

alliance:

where you

23

belong, with the labor movement."

was an
labor

isolated

moment of militancy

It

remains to be seen whether the Battle of Seattle

or a real turning point in the history of the American

movement.

^"^David Sarasohn, ''New Alliances forged in Seattle," Stalen Island Advance, Internet,
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British journalists

l

ewis

(Micstcr, (unllVcy

proclucecl a thoroughly researched account

United States. They entitled

''a

it.

1

of the

1

locigson,

I<)68 presidential

An American Mchnhatna. By

dramatic piece characteri/ed by sensational incident and

emotions, but with a happy ending."'

I

he events that

Wwk

\

k

and Bruce Page

campaign

in the

dellnition, ''melodrama" is

iolent appeals to the

place in 1968 were

unprecedented: an ambitious president's withdrawal from the presidential race; the
assassination of his most bitter rival; the murder of the most ranu)us Ali ican-American of
the time; the successes of an overtly racist

thircl

party candidate; the split of the

Democratic Parly over the Vietnam War; the rupture of the American labor movement.

Did 1968 then come

to a

"happy ending," as melodramas do? Or

is

it

more appropriate

to

2

simply

call

it

"the year of the barricades"?

The events of 1968 were not just .sensational.

The year's deveU)pments signaled a turning point

in the history

of the United Stales; Ihey

.shook the foundations of the labor-liberal alliance that had sustained the

for

over

New

Deal order

thirty years.

The New Deal managed

to

accommodate

in ils coalition

such varied constituents

as .southerners, ethnic Catholics in the northeast and midwest, African-Americans, lower

Vewis Chester, et. al.. An American Mchnirama: Tlw
(New York; Viking Press, 1969), iii.

Prcsiiicnlial

(

'ampaii^n of 196H

The Year of the Barricades: A Journey Tlironi^h l^fnS (New York: Harper and Row,
1988), David Caute describes 1968 as "the most turbulent since the end of WWII." Yet,
he concludes that the legacy of the New Left has been entirely "cultural" as ils challenges
to the .state, the political .system and corporate capitalism were defeated.

^In
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nikldlc-class Jews, union mcnibcrs and blue-collar
workers. Since Ihe nuil-i9 M)s, ihe
alliance of liberal

Democrats and progressive labor leaders had provided American

workers with higher

real

incomes, greater economic security, increased protection
against

sickness and accident, and broadened educational opportunities.
In a l*)6S message to
the United

Automobile Workers, union president Walter Reuther summed up
between

intersection

Over

polities

the years

and trade unionism

in the

the crucial

following way:

we have

learned through the hanl les.sons ol histi^ry that collective
bargaining does not lake |>lace in a vacuum and there is, in Tact, a direct

relationship between the bread box and the ballot box.'

The 1968 presidential election campaign posed a serious challenge
labt)r.

I

he war

and-lllers.

ililTerenecs

I

in

Southeast Asia created deep

he debacle

at

among

pri)lesters

organi/ed

both labor leaders and rank-

the Democratic Tarty convention in

between the anti-war

ofKabor-Congress of

rills

lo

Chicago galvanized

the

and the president of the American bederation

Industrial Organizations (Al

b-CIO) (leorge Meany, who

as.sailed

them as 'dirty-necked, dirty-mouthed demonstrators."' Moreover, Cieorge Wallace,
racist

former Alabama governor, and Richard Nixon, the conservative Republican

candidate, were trying \o capture the blue-collar \i>te and apparentb succeeding.

politicians

come

the

to

made "law ami

mean many

oi tlcr" Ihe focal point

of

their

campaigns.

I

he phrase

lU>lh

hail

things from opposing crime in Ihe streets and ghetto rioting to unrest

over unfuHllled promi.ses, slums, .school desegregation and Ihe war on poverty. American
workers, some observers contended, were drawn to Wallace's and Nixon's law and order
appeals beeau.se they were more concerned about social

'"A Mes.sage l-rom Walter Reuther,"

blames A. Wechsler,

" The Scars

LJAll' Solidnrilw

i.ssues

than about economic ones.

No\ember 1%8,

5.

of diicago," The Proi^rcssivc, November l%S,

17

27,

To

stop a possible conservative ascendancy, union
leaders worked vigorously to promote

the election of vice-president Hubert H.

Humphrey and

thus to preserve the alliance that

had substantially increased organized labor's economic and

political

power

for over three

decades.

The alignment of the labor movement with
and limited

its

room

to

the Democratic Party both

maneuver. In the early 1930s, the

New Deal

empowered

protective legislation

allowed the newly-formed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) -which
rivaled the
long-standing American Federation of Labor
into

permanent labor unions

enormous power advantages

in

Under

to channel working-class activism

mass-production industries. American employers

that they

bargaining, but in exchange the labor

state.

(AFL>

had enjoyed

lost the

in the struggle over collective

movement conceded

its

independence from the

the landmark National Labor Relations Act, collective bargaining remained

free-the state did not mandate the terms of the capital-labor agreements- but the

framework of the negotiations came under the aegis of state
unionism also forged

institutional ties

1

Industrial

of representation, influence and negotiation with

the state, which considerably increased

In the early

regulation.

its

political leverage.

940s, as the country prepared for war, the federal government

devised a system of labor-management relations. Public

officials, labor leaders

corporate executives worked side by side in agencies such as the National

Board, the Office of Production Management, and the

46,

some observers believed

War Labor

Production Board. In 1945-

trade unions could build on their wartime experience to

fashion industrial democracy.

industry,

War

and

The CIO's

leadership aimed at tripartite governance of

which would give organized labor decision-making powers

18

in corporations'

production, investment and employment. The CIO's
project, however, never
materialized. Corporate leaders

who

emerged from the war with renewed

presided over key manufacturing industries

self-confidence.'

resulted in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act,

makers' revived

which curbed

faith in capitalism led to the

over the "regulatory"

state.

The

state

monetary powers rather than tighten

rising tide

of conservatism

among

unions. Policy-

solidarity

triumph of the "Keynesian" or

would stimulate

its

The

the

fiscal state

economy through

control over capitalist institutions.^

its fiscal

and

Economic

growth, most policy-makers came to believe in the war's aftermath, was the surest path

towards a more egalitarian society. By the end of World

War

II,

liberals rejected the

class analysis that permeated the political rhetoric of the 1930s and

of a

pluralist society

The

made up of special-interest

promoted the notion

groups.

coalition that labor unions forged with the Democratic Party also led to

unconditional support of the party's foreign policy. At the onset of the Cold War, the
labor

movement was gripped by an

internal crisis over

Communist

participation. In

1949, Communist-dominated unions were expelled from the CIO. Six years

AFL

and the

CIO

settled their

major differences and merged

later,

the

into a single organization

under the leadership of George Meany. Postwar labor leaders, as well as organized
workers, shared in the

fruits

of a

political

economy of growth and accommodated

easily

Steve Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise ofAmerican Labor (New
York: The Free Press, 1991); Nelson Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective
Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the United States,"
in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds.. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-

1980 (Princeton: Princeton University
^Alan Brinkley, "The

New Deal

The Rise and Fall of the

Press, 1989), 122-152.

and the Idea of the

New Deal

Order, 85-121.
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State," in Fraser

and Gerstle,

eds..

to the

New Deal

members and
politics at

formula. Labor unions negotiated the best possible
contracts for their

rallied support for

Democratic candidates. The combination of consensus

home and containment of communism abroad

organized labor's attempts to fundamentally

alter

power

thus seriously

relations in

compromised

American

society.

Despite the political and structural limitations, the more progressive
unions such
as Reuther's

UAW continued to promote a larger agenda which included the repeal of the

Taft-Hartley Act, the passage of civil rights legislation and the expansion of
the welfare
state.

When

President

Lyndon

B. Johnson launched his administration's attack on

UAW leadership became fully involved in the Great Society

poverty in 1964, the

programs. The federal government thus committed
better health

and better homes and better

itself to

training.. .to help

War on

squalor and misery and unemployment..."^ The

providing "better schools and

more Americans.. .escape from

Poverty, however,

from the beginning. The Great Society's programs were largely aimed

at

was flawed
urban African-

Americans and thus linked race and poverty. The expansion of the Great Society
ghettoes in

1

965 and

1

966 led

to a clash

between the

The growing African-American

organizations.

federal social programs,
8

Great Society. The

weakened

into the

UAW and black grassroots

militancy, coupled with the rising cost of

the reform coalition that had gathered around the

UAW leadership, though initially pleased by the LBJ

Administration's programs, grew frustrated as

it

became

clear that they

were too

narrowly defined.

7

Kevin Boyle, "Little More than Ashes: The UAW and American Reform in
the 1960s," in Kevin Boyle, ed.. Organized Labor and American Politics, 1984-1994.
The Labor Liberal Alliance (Albany: State University of New York, 1998), 224.

Quoted

^Ibid.,

in

217-238.
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As Kevin Boyle

states,

'The Johnson Administration never moved beyond

its

concern for the underclass to confront the problems of the
working class as a whole."^

By

the late 1960s, a faltering

economic security blue

economy was

collars

had

revealing the shaky foundations of the

won the

in

postwar

An

era.

number of

increasing

white workers thought that the Great Society programs were costing them
money, but not

Many

benefiting them.

Political debate

class led

seemed

felt that liberals

to center either

movements, such

as

women's

were unconcerned with

on

racial issues or

rights,

gay

rights,

would base
American

their

campaigns

for the presidency in

for them, their vote

The

AFL-CIO

was

in

on LBJ and

Nixon and Wallace

coalition.

1968 on the conviction

that the

had not undergone an

Deal formula did not seem to be working

Vietnam War

further fractured the labor-liberal alliance. In

highlighted the deep strains within the

in 1955,

his social

1968 available for courting.

escalation of the

it

New

Meany and

Reuther, the

last

AFL-CIO. Since

CIO's

president,

the

merger of the

had worked together

shape the labor movement's relationship with the Democratic Party. The two
dramatically different. In the 1940s and 1950s,

Meany had moved up

bureaucratic ladder, becoming the president of the merged

was

the quintessential labor bureaucrat

table,

who

AFL-CIO

could act as a negotiator

an administrator of the organization, and a labor lobbyist

^Boyle, "Little

More

interests.

and environmental protection.

electorate had shifted to the right. Workers, however,

ideological conversion. But because the

particular,

New Deal

needs and

on the demands of middle-

Dissatisfied blue collars appeared to be turning their backs

programs and thus seriously weakening the

their

than Ashes," 230.
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in

the

men were

AFL's

in 1955.

at

to

Meany

a bargaining

Congress. The

AFL-

CIO

president

strike.

Meany

was proud

to

have never walked a picket

line,

believed that organized labor could advance

organized a local or led a

its

interests through collective

bargaining as well as political and legislative action.'" In
foreign policy issues,

was

fully

committed

any attempt

at

to the

Meany

Cold War. He was a staunch anti-communist who regarded

detente with the Soviet

Union

as a sign of appeasement.

Reuther, for his part, had organized thousands of automobile workers
in the mid-

1930s and led the
unionism, the

UAW in a number of postwar strikes.

As an advocate of social

UAW leader expected the AFL-CIO merger to spark a massive organizing

drive, an interest that

Meany

did not share.'

voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt

in

A

'

former Socialist Party member, Reuther

1940 and 1944. Other militant

Emil Mazey and Victor Reuther preferred organized labor

to

UAW leaders such as

remain independent from

the Democratic Party and were committed to the creation of a labor party.

By

the time of

the 1948 presidential election, Reuther had abandoned any such hopes and embraced the

Democratic Party as a vehicle

for labor

and

liberal causes. In that year, the

UAW leader

repudiated the Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace and supported the Democratic

Party ticket.

Although Reuther did not share Meany' s virulent anticommunism, the

UAW leader accepted the emerging Cold War foreign policy consensus.

13

This did not

Vobert Zieger, "George Meany: Labor's Organization Man/' in Melvyn Dubovsky and
Warren Van Tine, eds.. Labor Leaders in America (Urbana and Chicago: University of
^

Illinois Press, 1987), 324.

'^Nelson Lichtenstein, "Walter Reuther and the Rise of Labor-Liberalism," in Labor

Leaders

'^Ibid.,

in

America, 295-296.

296.

"The impact of the Cold

War on

the labor

movement

22

is

further discussed in Chapter 5.

prevent Reuther from becoming, in Nelson Lichtenstein's
words, '^one ofthe founders of

mid-twentieth century liberalism and an architect ofthe
American welfare

mid-1960s, Reuther not only
the

most

liberal

The

set the

wing of organized

relationship between

started feuding as

parameters of collective bargaining but also defined

labor's political agenda.

Meany and Reuther was never

soon as the AFL-CIO merger was completed

Reuther had become increasingly frustrated with the
view, the

AFL-CIO was

Ralph

among

affiliates.

Meany "s conservatism and even blamed

movement's

stagnation. In 1962,

Ilelstein as a

state

amicable: the two leaders
in 1955.

By

1962,

ofthe labor movement. In his

neither organizing the unorganized nor vigorously fighting

corruption or racial discrimination
criticism of

state."'" In the

Reuther grew more outspoken
the

Meany and Reuther

member ofthe

AFL-CIO

in his

president for the

clashed over the nomination of

federation's Executive Board. Ilelstein

was

president ofthe Packinghouse Workers and a widely recognized liberal leader.

the

Meany

regarded the nomination as an act of defiance on the part of Reuther, and consequently
rejected

John

F.

it.

Reuther then considered pulling the

Kennedy persuaded him

to

remain

UAW out ofthe AFL-CIO, but President

in the federation until after the

1964

15

election.

Johnson's escalation ofthe Vietnam

CIO and

the

UAW.

War

exacerbated tensions between the

Throughout 1966 and 1967, American military and

had been extolling U.S. progress

in the war: the

AFL-

political leaders

National Liberation Front (NLF) and

its

14

Lichtenstein, 280.

Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968
and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 154-157.
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(Ithaca

North Vietnamese

allies,

they claimed, were on the verge of collapse.
Despite the

optimistic government reports, organized protest
against the Vietnam

dramatically, in the process straining the Democratic
Party.

War had grown

Doves pictured LB J

as too

quick to resort to force, denounced the destructiveness of his
military actions, and
insisted that the president greatly exaggerated Chinese influence
in

Vietnam and North

Vietnamese and Communist control of the National Liberation Front (NFL).
Some doves
called for a reduction of or end to the fighting; others called for
peace talks, including

negotiations with the

NLF. Although

the president insisted that the country could afford

both the war in Southeast Asia and the Great Society programs, his
country could not pay for both "guns'" and "butter."

One

critics

argued that the

indication of growing dissent

within the Democratic Party was Eugene McCarthy's decision to leave Congress and
enter the presidential

campaign as an antiwar candidate. The Minnesota Senator sought

the 1968 Democratic Presidential nomination only after popular antiwar politicians, such
as Robert F.

announced

Kennedy, had declined

that

to run.

On November

McCarthy

30, 1967,

he would enter the race as the voice of the movement

for a negotiated

settlement to the war in Vietnam. His announcement kindled the hopes of anti-war

college students

who would campaign

for

McCarthy by

Profound changes had been taking place

Vietnam and the anti-war movement grew.
Leadership Assembly for Peace convened

In

in

the thousands.

in liberal

November

Chicago

and labor

1

in the 20'^

war

in

967, the National Labor

to express unionists' uneasiness

over the Vietnamese conflict. The Assembly put Walter Reuther

'^David Wright, America

circles as the

in

an awkward position.

Century 1960-1969 (New York, Marshall Cavendish,

1995), 907.
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-

Though he was uncomfortable with
Vietnam

policy.

the escalation, he continued to support
Johnson's

However, Emil Mazey, the

UAW's

Reuther, Walter's brother and the Director of the

spoke

at the

along with

Secretary Treasurer, and Victor

UAW International Affairs Department,

Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace

in

Chicago. Reuther and Mazey

UAW officials Milfred Jeffrey, Nat Weinberg, Martin Gerber and Paul

Schrade- were members of the union's old socialist wing. They had
opposition to the Vietnam
in

War

in

1965,

when Johnson

Southeast Asia. During the 1967 assembly, the

first

voiced their

American involvement

escalated

UAW leaders shared the dais with

leading anti-war figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King,

Jr.,

economist John Kenneth

Galbraith and Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-MN).'^
After two days of meetings, 523 union leaders from

fifty international

unions

unanimously adopted a policy statement condemning the war as immoral. ''We believe,"
the unionists said, "there can be no justificafion for expending the precious lives of our

American youth and destroying ever
children."

its

numbers of Vietnamese men, women and

The Chicago Labor Leadership Assembly

underlying and deeply
play

larger

felt

for

Peace sought "to express the

peace sentiment of American workers" and exhorted labor to

part in bringing the

face of the pronouncements

war

to "swift

made by

and just conclusion."

the leading officials of the

I

he statement fiew

AFL-CIO, who affirmed

18

that labor's rank-and-file wholeheartedly supported the war.

"Labor Power," Trade Union Press, Folder 12. Box 74, Jay Lovestone Files,
International Affairs Department, George Meany Memorial Archives (Hereafter

GMMA).
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in the

A month later at the AFL-CIO convention in Bal Harbor, Florida, George Meany
counterattacked. There were no
officers

had resigned from

all

UAW delegates at the meeting since the autoworkers'

posts in the council and

its

sub-committees due to sharp

disagreements with the AFL-CIO's leadership. Commenting on the
Labor Leadership

Assembly

for

Peace in Chicago, Meany

That meeting was planned

stated:

Hanoi by a special committee that went there. I read
the Sunday Worker and I will tell you that I have seen that resolution,
every term
of it, every line of it in the Sunday Worker two weeks before the meeting was
in

held in Chicago.

Emil Mazey responded

to

Meany's charges

in a scathing letter

accusing the AFL^

CIO's president of having "equated dissent with disloyalty" and of "twisting

Mazey was outraged

at

Meany *s "fancy arithmetic"

members approved of the Vietnam War by
demanded

that

Meany

that

made him conclude

a margin of six hundred to one.

apologize to the millions of union members

American involvement

in

Vietnam was wrong.^" Mazey 's

letter

who

was

of the sharpening tensions between the Meany administration and the

By

the end of 1967, the

American labor movement was

of the most progressive unions

AFL-CIO

in the

at

the facts."

that

union

Mazey

thought that the

additional evidence

UAW leadership.

a crossroads.

As head of one

United States, Reuther had repeatedly accused the

leadership of immobility, indifference, complacency and rigid
21

anticommunism.

The organization was undoubtedly

far

from Reuther' s

ideal

of a

vital

19

AFL-CIO Convention, Daily Proceedings, 11
George Meany Files, Office of the President, GMMA.

President Meany's speech to the

December 1967, 49-50,
20

UAW,

Correspondence Disaffiliation, AFL-CIO, George Meany

President,

GMMA.

21

Lichtenstein, 280.

26

Files, Office

of the

and socially progressive labor movement. Yet faced
with a deep
escalating antiwar sentiment, Reuther himself was
unsure

The Democrats and
"As

how

their labor allies thus entered the

political crisis

to respond.

1968 campaign

the architect of one of the least popular wars in U.S.
history,"

"Lyndon Johnson

and

Newsweek

in disarray.

said,

faces the year as one of the least popular incumbents in
memory.'^^

After four years, the grand promises of the Great Society programs
remained largely
unfulfilled.

Political observers said that the president

would probably seek a middle-of-

the-road formula. His economic program would be "more modestly priced than
earlier
23

administration offerings."

stick to his

"

War

Johnson, the quintessential Cold

liberal,

promise of building a Great Society while pursuing the war

The Republicans, meanwhile, entered

in

intended to

Vietnam.

the 1968 presidential race with the

smoothest-running and best-funded campaign machine

As

in years.

the political year

opened, Richard Nixon appeared to be the front-runner. After his defeats

in the

1960

presidential elections and in his 1962 California gubernatorial bid, he had gained a

reputation as a political loser. In 1968, his strategy

great unifier, an experienced politician

his congressional days,

had worked

to create a

Nixon was a

who was

fierce

was

to present himself as the

acceptable to

all

Nixon." The Republican candidate's prospects

^^"Politics '68,"

that

196()s

he

for himself. In preparation for the

presidential race, he underwent a public re-engineering that the

1968 primary, were so favorable

factions of the party. In

anti-Communist but since the early

more fair-minded image

GOP's

for victory in

media called "the

New

New

Hampshire, the

first

Governor George Romney of Michigan withdrew

Newsweek, 8 January 1968,

17,

^^Ibid., 18,

27

from the

race.

Governors Nelson Rockefeller of New York and Ronald
Reagan of

California were Nixon's major opponents. Yet

When

opinion surveys showed that Nixon had

Nixon

easily

at least as

candidate to win the presidential election, his nomination

won most

good a chance
at the

of the primaries.
as any other

Republican convention

24

was

secured.

Nixon's was, as Hodgson and his co-authors pointed

out, "a laborious

25

enterprise of resurrection."

Throughout

who
the

his

campaign, Nixon

he claimed were angry

at the

Vietnam War, disappointed

at

skillfully

appealed to the "Middle Americans,"

excesses of antiwar protest and ghetto violence, tired of
the results of the Great Society programs and

discontented with the deteriorating economy. In his acceptance speech
Party convention,

In a time

Nixon

when

at

the Republican

stated:

the national focus

is

concentrated upon the unemployed, the

impoverished and the dispossessed, the working Americans have become
forgotten Americans. In a time when the national rostrums and forums are given
over to shouters, and protesters and demonstrators, they have become the silent
Americans. Yet, they have a legitimate grievance that should be rectified and a
26

just cause that should prevail.

Encyclopedia Americana: Richard M. Nixon; Newsweek, 8 January 1968, 17-21; Jules
Witcover, "Richard M. Nixon: The Man Nobody Knows," The Progressive, January
1969, 13-16.
25

Chester,

et. al,

258.

26

Quoted in Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes: The
Houghton Mifflin, 1 970), 287.
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Crisis

of the Self-Made

Man (Boston:

As an AFL-CIO News

editor pointed out, 'iaw and order"

Republican candidate's campaign because

George Wallace also

staple in the

offered "a sizable segment of the voting

it

public. .a convenient hook on which to hang
In 1968,

became a

its

discontent."^^

tried to cater to the "forgotten

Americans;' but

through a third party run. The former Democratic Alabama governor
became the focus

of national attention
unspeakable

in 1963.

racial hatred.

Three decisive acts enshrined him as a symbol of

In January, Wallace delivered his "Segregation for Ever!"

speech. In June, he blocked the enrollment of the

first

two African- American students

the last legally segregated state university. In September, Wallace belittled the

death of four black girls during church hours.

Alabama governor

ran successfully in a

Those experiences convinced Wallace

To

bombing

the shock of many Americans, the

number of Democratic

that there

at

Party primaries in 1964.

was a wellspring of resentment

against

28

the federal government that he could tap.

Wallace's strategy was less sophisticated than Nixon's. Critics regarded
Wallace's American Independent Party campaign as "a black-humor caricature" and

Wallace as an old-time Dixie demagogue. In his speeches, the former Alabama governor
repeatedly used catch phrases such as "law and order," "state rights," "property rights,"
29

and "support

for the police" that appealed to his white constituents* frustrations.

27

John M. Barry, "The Presidential Campaign. Test
October 1968,
28

for Liberalism,"

A^evi'^',

3.

Taylor Branch, "The Democratic Father of Modem Republicanism," The Washington

Monthly, October 1995, 48-49.
29

Newsweek,

8 January 1968, 17.

29

Wallace's campaign, some politicians claimed, could
become a rallying cry for a vote of
bigotry, fear and protest, especially

among Southern

whites. His key

message was

neither the Democrats nor the Republicans offered the
voters a real choice.

candidate's speeches went like

You
and

this,

that

The Alabama

according to columnist Jules Witcover:

Lyndon Baines Johnson, and that Hubert Horatio Alger Humphrey,
Gene McCarthy, and you put them in a sack. And then you take that

take that
that

Richard Milhous Nixon, and that Earl Warren.. .And then you put in that
Socialist,
Nelson Rockyfeller, and that left-winger George Romney and that Clifford Case
of New Jersey and that Wild Bill Scranton of Pennsylvania and that radical
Jacob
Javits of Noo Yawk, and you shake "em all up. And you turn that sack
up side
down, and the first one that falls out, you pick him up by the back of the neck and

'

drop him right back

in again,

because there's not a dime's worth of difference in

any of 'em.

Although most of his

drew from

political

opponents dismissed Wallace's crude simplifications, they

the audiences not only

amused chuckles but

also

knowing nods. There was no

doubt that the American Independent Party could draw significant support from the Deep
South. Wallace, however,

working class wards of the

was

also intent

on eroding the Democratic vote

that supporting

1968 would be the best strategy for organized labor

LBJ's bid

to follow.

If conservative forces took over the presidency, the Senate

undermine the workers' hard won

Johnson was a safe choice.

and the House, anti-labor

still

ascendancy would deal a hard blow to the American working
close relationship with the liberal

believed that a Republican

class.

wing of the Democratic Party and

"George Wallace's Potential

19.

30

for re-election in

gains. Despite Reuther's frustration

with the limited nature of the Great Society programs, he

Jules Witcover,

white

industrial north.

Both Meany and Reuther believed

legislation could

in the

for Mischief,"

The AFL-CIO had a
since the

New Deal

The Progressive, July 1968,

years had treated Democratic candidates as labor's
own. Reuther thus did not want to
disturb organized labor unity, even if

it

meant supporting LBJ's Vietnam

policy.

Trade-union anti-war groups faced a similar dilemma: were they
prepared to
translate their opposition to Johnson's

re-election?

One

was

alternative

efforts into electing "peace

Vietnam policy

to sit out the national election

and channel labor anti-war

and pro-labor" congressmen. The United

(UE) would eventually adopt
Labor Leadership Assembly

this position.

for

UE's

Electrical

Workers

representatives had participated in the

Peace on equal footing with other delegates, a dramatic

step for a union that had been purged from the

unwavering anti-war position was reflected

recommend

into opposition to the president's

CIO

in its

a choice of presidential candidates:

twenty years

earlier.

UE's

convention's resolution not to

"Our union must make

a major

contribution to the nation by campaigning vigorously for congressional candidates with a

record of devotion to peace and domestic progress..."^' The

major

parties' presidential

nominees

NLF

guerrillas

and

their

neither of the

to be "peace candidates."

The Tet Offensive heightened
thousand

UE considered

the tensions within organized labor. Eighty five

North Vietnamese

allies

launched their devastating

offensive on January 30, 1968. They attacked thirty-six of forty-four provincial capitals,

five of six

lunar

New

major

cities

and the U.S. embassy

in

Saigon. The Tet festival celebrates the

Year. The Vietnamese believe that the

determine family fortunes for the

rest

'"The 1968 Elecfions Resolution,"

first

of the year. In

1

week of the
968,

it

UENews, 23 September

31

New

Year

will

did just that: not only did

1968,

5.

it

determine Vietnamese fortunes, but Americans' fortunes
as well.''
vitality

of the

NLF

By exposing

the

and the North Vietnamese, the Tet Offensive demoralized
many

Americans. Within a week of the attack, the enemy had suffered
a serious

tactical defeat.

Yet they had scored an overwhelming psychological and

Support

political victory.

for

Johnson's handling of the war plummeted, the doves' challenge to the
administration

grew
Tet,

stronger, and divisions within the labor

George Gallup had noted: "The

Vietnam

politics

convention

in

movement deepened.

solid support given President

demonstrated by the heads of organized labor

Miami

is

'

A

few weeks before

Johnson and

at the

his

AFL-CIO

not in line with the views of rank-and-file union members."

Forty three percent of union families thought that the United States" decision to get
34

mvolvcd

in

fears that

Americans were hopelessly trapped

Vietnam had been a mistake.

The Tet Offensive confirmed many workers'
in

Indochina and that the president was

unable to break the stalemate.

Eugene McCarthy's
primary, on

sentiment.

March

1

2 in

surprisingly strong

New

showing

Hampshire, seemed to prove the depth of anti-war

By winning 20 of the 24 New Hampshire

delegates to the national

Democratic convention, the Minnesota senator revealed

^'james Olson,

ed.,

in the nation's first presidential

Dictionary of the Vietnam

that there

War (New York:

was widespread

Peter Bcdrick Books,

1987), 442.
33

George C. Herring, America
(Alfred A. Knopf:

New

's

Lon^^est War: The United States

and Vietnam. 1950-1975

York, 1979), 183-216.

'^George Gallup, "Union Members Split on Vietnam," Washington-Post, 3 January 1968,
Folder 12, Box 74, Jay Lovestone Files, AFL-CIO International Affairs Department,

GMMA.
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concern over Johnson's Vietnam policy. Despite the
efforts of the AFL-CIO's

Committee on PoHtical Education (COPE) on
one fourth of the vote

As

in labor districts.^^

the president's behalf,

historian

McCarthy received

George Herring

Hampshire primary "transformed what had seemed a quixotic crusade

says, the

New

major

into a

36

political challenge."

In fact,

McCarthy's

New

Hampshire performance

started the swift

rush of 1968 politics.

On March

16,

New

York Senator Robert

F.

Kennedy abandoned

his reluctance to

challenge President Johnson for the nomination and decided to enter the race. Kennedy's

unexpected

political

move

particular through the

candidate

who had

sent a shock

UAW leadership.

wave through

the ranks of organized labor, and in

RFK

With huge name recognition,

the potential to actually

win the nomination

in a

was

a viable

way McCarthy

did

not.

After the Tet Offensive, the union's doves had grown increasingly outspoken in

their

condemnation of both LBJ's Vietnam policy and Walter Reuther's unwillingness

criticize the administration.

union as

it

offered a

new

Kennedy's candidacy heightened the tensions within the

opportunity for the

Thus those who supported

to

RFK were really

powerful way, which put Reuther, an

ally

UAW's

doves

challenging

to challenge the president.

LBJ

in a very direct

and

of the president, in a very awkward position.

Jack Conway, Reuther's long-time administrative assistant and Executive Director of the

AFL-CIO
first

Industrial

Union Department, and Paul Schrade, West Coast

UAW leaders to join the Kennedy camp.

Schrade as a member of the Kennedy

35

Joseph C. Goulden,

Conway

36

Herring, 199.

33

were the

served as a campaign aide,

slate in the California primary.

Meany (New York: Atheneum,

Director,

1972),

359

Conway's decision

infuriated Walter Reuther. After intense debate,
however, the

UAW Executive Board

decided that union officials could support any candidate they
wanted. The
International

would not endorse any candidate

LBJ"s unexpected decision

to

who joined
liberals

RFK and his

few days

He had been

era.

UAW's ranks.

3

further

1

Reuther was torn between his

long-standing political sympathy for Hubert H. Humphrey,

the presidential race a

of the postwar

Democratic convention."

withdraw from the race on March

complicated political alignment within the
friendliness with

until after the

UAW

Humphrey was one of the foremost

later.

a leading Democrat in the U.S. Senate for

sixteen years and enjoyed a reputation as an abrasive "do-gooder."

As

vice-president, he

served as coordinator of the antipoverty program and chairman of the Civil Rights

Humphrey

Council.

also

Medicare. Although well

American

worked with Congress

known

to pass the Voting Rights

Act and

as a progressive politician, due to his defense of

participation in the Vietnamese conflict, antiwar activists vilified

as they did

LB J.

him

as

much

While Reuther was doubtful of Humphrey's candidacy, Meany

immediately threw the

full

support of his organization behind the vice-president. The

AFL-CIO

president regarded

public

and a supporter of the unions

Humphrey

"as a staunch friend of the worker throughout his
38

life

Peace

activists, for their part,

than a month,

LBJ had been

in

were

good times and bad/'
thrilled

toppled from power.

by the turn

As Todd

in the

campaign:

Gitlin put

it,

in less

"No sooner had

the euphoria settled than the political fever soared again/' Only four days after Johnson's

decision not to seek reelection, Martin Luther King

"^^Boyle,

The

Jr.

was

assassinated.

UAW and the Heyday ofAmerican Liberalism, 238-239.

38

AFL-CIO News, October

1968,

1.

34

The

civil rights'

leader

was

in

Memphis, Tennessee, supporting a

recognition, decent

riots

wages and

better

strike

of sanitation workers for union

working conditions. The night of the murder, eighty

broke out across the nation and federal troops were sent
to Baltimore, Chicago,
39

Washington, and Wilmington.

RFK joined

in the

march

that carried

Martin Luther King

Atlanta's Ebenezer Baptist Church to the cemetery. The black

warmly. Kennedy would need

their support.

Democratic nomination, Kennedy had

to

To

Jr.'s

body from

community received him

stand a change of winning the

win the upcoming primaries

in Indiana,

Nebraska, Oregon and California. Once Kennedy entered the Indiana primary, the

Democratic senator was careful

to

denounce violence when speaking

to white audiences:

the ghetto rioting that followed King's assassination had generated white fears that could

not be ignored. Kennedy's major difficulty in Indiana

American

racial minorities,

Indiana,

RFK

his relationship with

however, but his lack of solid labor union backing. The

senator could not count on the traditional

collar vote or to raise funds.

was not

AFL-CIO machinery

Kennedy nevertheless scored two

to consolidate the blue-

clear victories in

May.

took 42 percent of the Democratic vote, against 31 percent for Governor

Roger Branigin, a stand-in

for

Humphrey, and 27 percent

for

Eugene McCarthy.

In

Nebraska, Kennedy took 52 percent and McCarthy 31 percent. In Oregon, however,
40

McCarthy took 45 percent of the vote against Kennedy's 39 percent.

Todd

Gitlin,

The

Sixties:

Years of Hope, Days of Rage (Bantan Books:

1987), 305.

^Vaute, 126-127.
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New

York,

In

7

The Democratic race thus came

RFK depended largely

to a turning point in the June

on the support of the

state's

s

CaUfomia primary.

Mexican- American community and of

Cesar Chavez, the militant leader of the United Farm Workers
Association (UFWA).
Since 1965, the
recognition.

UFWA had been fighting for workers'

RFK

most basic

had repeatedly voiced his support of Chavez's

right,

union

fight for

farm workers'

bargaining rights. In 1966, his Senate Subcommittee on Migratory
Labor held hearings
in

Delano, a town of 14,000 that was

California's agro-business.

when

they needed

it,"

at the

"The simple

center of the

UFWA's

act of coming to the

Mexican-Americans' aid

the elections British reporters explained,

loyalty in the people of the Valley, and

Kennedy returned

struggle with

'iit

a durable flame of

the affection."^'

RFK

rekindled that flame during the California primary.
Early in 1968,

Kennedy

traveled to Delano to attend an ecumenical

Delano's city park, during which Chavez broke a twenty-five-day

fast.

Mass

in

RFK hailed

the

grape pickers' leader as "one of the heroic figures of our time" and congratulated those

who were

"locked with Cesar in the struggle for justice for the farm worker and the
42

struggle for justice for Spanish-speaking Americans."

for support. Paul Schrade,

since 1965, asked

Chavez

who had been committed

to serve

on the

list

Now Kennedy turned to Chavez

to the

farm workers' organization

of delegates pledged

to

Kennedy. Though

doing so would risk losing the support of the AFL-CIO, Chavez agreed to Schrade'

41

Chester,

et. al.,

315.

42

Dick Mesiter, "La Huelga Becomes La Causa," New York Times Magazine, 1
November 1968, reprinted in Melvyn Dubofsky, q^l., American Labor Since the

Deal (Chicago: Triangle Books, 1971), 273.
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New

request. Schrade, for his part,

UAW leadership.
By
foes.

The

had also jeopardized

his position

by openly defying the

43

the California campaign, the

Kennedy and McCarthy

candidates' positions on the Vietnam

War

forces had

become

bitter

differed only slightly. Neither

contender proposed an immediate withdrawal of American troops
from Southeast Asia.

McCarthy emphasized
of some kind"

the need for de-escalation and the creation of "a

in Saigon.

invited to participate in a

to any kind

coalition

The Minnesota senator

also argued that the

new South Vietnamese government:

of negotiations," he

insisted.

on the government of Saigon, a

NLF

had

to

be

"this [was] a prerequisite

Kennedy accused McCarthy "of forcing a
Communists even before we

coalition with the

begin negotiations." The National Liberation Front. Kennedy
role'* in the political future

new government

of South Vietnam, "but

that

said,

would play "some

would be determined by

the

44

negotiators."

Kennedy won

the California primary by the closest of margins, taking

percent of the vote to 42 percent for McCarthy.
victory, however.

He would

not be able to celebrate his

Kennedy's assassination on June 6 came

was now

Jr.

In the midst of the

confusion that Kennedy's murder caused, one thing became
sure to

last

as a shock to a nation that

had not yet recovered from the slaying of Martin Luther King,
political

46

clear:

Humphrey

win the Democratic nomination.

Throughout the primary season, Humphrey had been securing pledges of support

from the host of party regulars whose
lost the

Oregon primary

to

states did not hold primaries. After

McCarthy, the vice-president's chances of being nominated

43

Chester,

^^Ibid.,

et. al.,

Kennedy had

316.

339-340.

37

dramatically increased.
to

By

the time of Kennedy's murder.

having the commitments he needed

labor

was

lel

liberalism.

I

t

nomination. After RIX's death, organized

lumphrey had a perfect record of support

political career.

As

pledging to seek a

for the

war

in

Vietnam,

I

Meany and Reuther came

to

few months

an end

earlier,

On

the

AFL-CIO

to

by

Southeast Asia.^^

to end, the

AI L-CIO

DAW l<xecutive Board decided to leave the

Reuther had petitioned the

|

AFL-CIO Council

for a

labor leaders] could have a serious, a

meaningful discussion about the internal weaknesses

Movement, and

issue

long exchange of accusations between

.luly 1, the

when

in

seemed

special convention "to create an opportunity so that

frank, a

and had been an advocate

lumphrey simply skewed the

honorable and lasting peace"

''swift,

leadership broke into open conflict.

A

for labor

War

urban development and Social Security throughout his

the turmoil within the Democratic Party

AI L-CIO.

lumphrey was already close

with just one option: to back a candidate that was the
epitome of Cold

for federal aid to education,

As

lor

I

in the

American Labor

46

the things [they

have

|

ought

to

be doing."

The

failed in organizing the unorganized, in

bargaining program, and

in fighting for

I

)AW

leadership declared the

developing an eflective

equal opportunity and equal rights for

all

workers.

The

defection of the

AFL-CIO. Unions

HAW,

with

its

1

,600,000 members, was a severe blow

as diverse as the United Steel workers of America, the

to the

American

Federation of State, County and Municipal l-mployees, and the American Bakery and

AW Solidarity, October

"^^"Thc Issues and the Candidates," 11

1968, II.
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Statement of President Walter Reuther
Industrial

to the

Seventh Con.stitutional Convention of the

Union Department, Al L-CIO, Micro 82

of the President,

CJMMA.

.38

-

Reel

1

1,

(ieorge

Mcany

Files, Office

Confectionery Workers, urged the two organizations

brought about "the tragic

Reuther announced a
association

split."''

new

to resolve the differences that

had

A few weeks after the UAW's disaffiliation, however,

labor venture: the Alliance for Labor Action (ALA).

would bring together America's two

largest unions, the

The new

UAW and the

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, representing four
million workers.

"The American labor movement has a New Left wing today," declared Scripps-

Howard journalist

Stanley Levey in his appraisal of the

1

certamly "committed to a massive drive

between such disparate partners as the
"leftist."

The

at

ALA. The new

home and peace

organization

48

abroad."

Yet, the alliance

UAW and the Teamsters did not merit the name

ALA was not a merger and did not intend to rival the AFL-CIO.

was simply looking

for a

new forum

was

to organize the unorganized

Reuther

and carry out social

programs. The organizing drive was supposed to reach 36 million white-collar workers,
migratory workers, working poor and southern industrial workers.
In contrast to Reuther's "messianic" projects for a revitalized labor movement,

Frank Fitzsimmons, the Teamsters' acting president, was seeking some respectability
his union.

and

its

The Teamsters had been expelled from

president,

Jimmy

Hoffa,

The Teamsters were among

the

was serving an

the

AFL-CIO

in

for

1957 for corruption

eight-year prison term for jury tampering.

most conservative of American unions:

their leaders

seldom made pronouncements on foreign policy and confined themselves

to bread-and-

47

United Steelworkers of America Resolution, Micro 82-Reel
Office of the President,
48

1 1

,

George Meany

Files,

GMMA.

UAW Flap Labor's New Left Wing,'" Washington Daily
1969. Folder 6, Box 340, Walter Reuther Files, UAW President's Office.

Stanley Levey, "Teamsters,

News, 27

Wayne

May

State University Archives of

Labor and Urban Affairs (Hereafter

39

WSU A).

butter issues.

Hoping

Fitzsimmons stated

to

that

broaden the base of support for the

"any autonomous national or international union [could]

obviously choose to associate

itself

with this voluntary cooperative effort to help build

and strengthen the labor movement."'*^ Reuther

CIO

ALA, Reuther and

woo

tried to

the

most progressive AFL-

unions: District 65 of the Retail Workers, the Oil and Chemical
Workers, the

Meatcutters, the United

Farm Workers,

the

American Federation of State, County, and

Municipal Employees and the American Federation of Teachers.

Two

clearly

left-

leaning unions, the International Longshoremen and the Electrical Workers
(UE), were
also

on Reuther's

The

list

of possible

affiliates.

UE News triumphantly

asserted that, Reuther, "the

CIO," was making the same indictments of the federation
"At the time

UE

it

was based on

policy which had already reduced the

to

teetering

bound

CIO

to impotence."^°

As

organization.

in 1955:

the labor-liberal coalition

it

had

in 1955.

Many

political analysts

initiative; the

The unions

less

wondered whether

movement

be Reuther's greatest blunder. The odds were against the

was Reuther's

of the AFL-

"the continuation of the red-baiting

the rallying point for a socially conscious labor

to

had made

on the brink of collapse, Cold War ideology was becoming

Reuther than

become

that they

architect

declared that the merger did not represent real unity that would advance

the interests of the workers" since

was

CIO

compelling

the

or whether

ALA's

was
It

UAW staff or local activists were not involved in the

that

Reuther approached, moreover, were not interested

Walter Reuther and Frank E. Fitzsimmons'
Files.

it

success.

49

Walter Reuther

ALA could

letter to

Paul Jennings, Folder

UAW President's Office, WSUA.

50

Resolution on Labor Unity," UENews,l>

\

October 1968,

40

7.

7,

in

Box

338,

becoming

affiliates

of the

new organization. They had

little

to gain

doing so risked almost certain expulsion from the
AFL-CIO.
thirteen years of the

AFL

merger of the

It

from joining, while

seems clear

that in the

and the CIO, American trade unions had been

drifting inexorably towards the consolation

of business unionism.

By

1968, Reuther's

UAW was one of the few voices opposing "the pursuit of institutional security" as
unionism's main objective. Reuther's hopes for the
since the

New Deal

alliance

was on

ALA were unrealistic, however,

the verge of collapse and the Democratic Party

was

entangled in internal warfare over the Vietnam War.

The August Democratic convention
the

AFL-CIO. Newsweek' s

in

Chicago exacerbated the conflicts within

report of 'The Battle in Chicago" stated that the Democratic

Party convention had "held up a mirror to America." The city
brutal encounter

became

the stage for a

between anti-war demonstrators and the defenders of "law and order."

Mayor Richard Daley's

police charged against hippies, yippies, peace demonstrators and

onlookers in the parks and on the

streets.

the small groups of extremists, were no

The demonstrators, who

more than

clearly

outnumbered

10,000, less than half the

number of

^

Chicago police

officers.^

A pre-convention Gallup Poll revealed that Eugene McCarthy trailed Nixon by
52

five points, while

Humphrey was

These grim numbers had no

came

effect

on the course of the convention, however. Humphrey

Chicago with 1,450 delegates committed

to

victory

sixteen points behind the Republican candidate.

on the

first ballot.

Meany's

to his nomination,

role in the triumph of the

^'"The Battle of Chicago," Newsweek, 9 September 1968, 24,
52

Goulden, 364.
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enough

New Deal

to secure his

coalition -the

white South, labor, northern blacks, and the big city
machines- was crucial. The AFL-

CIO

president commissioned Al Barkan, head of the
Committee on Political Education

(COPE),

to attend policy-planning sessions of Humphrey's
inner circle.

had 22 1 delegates and alternates spread throughout forty-four
allowed
•

Meany

to

moves

to secure

keep an eye on every major

state

'

political

The

Humphrey's nomination.

The Federation

state delegations.

caucus and

to

make

This

the necessary

53

UAW leadership was as divided as the Democratic Party itself

between those who supported McCarthy and those who were

for

The

rift

Humphrey seemed

impossible to bridge. Ramparts reproduced a statement by Paul Schrade which, whether
real or fictional,

summarizes the

Workers: "Don't give us

hawk

all

the way."

conflict within the ranks of the United

that bullshit about a possible

The Ramparts

Automobile

compromise. Humphrey

will be a

reporter added that, although one could expect a

conversation between two union leaders to be "earthy and frank," this was Paul Schrade,

West Coast

director of the

UAW, talking to his boss,

president had promised his people that he would

Walter Reuther. The

work out

a

UAW

more "dovish" Vietnam

54

position with his candidate,

As one of the
outraged

first

at the role that

Humphrey luncheon

Humphrey.

major

UAW leaders to speak against the war, Schrade was

Meany 's hard

that

Meany had

liners

were playing

at

the convention.

hosted, Schrade offered a

To

rival a

McCarthy luncheon

at the

Essex Motor Inn. Schrade had been seriously injured during Robert Kennedy's
assassination and this

was

his first public appearance after leaving the hospital.

The

^^"The Decline and Fall of the Democratic Party," Ramparts, 28 September 1968, 35

'''ibid.,

34.
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*

event brought together important members of labor's
Hberal wing: the

UAWs Victor

Reuther and Jack Conway; the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers' Association president,

Frank Rosenbaum; the Teamsters' Harold Gibbons; and
Dave Livingston, head of New

York

District

liberal

# 65 of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union. Most of
these

union leaders had participated

in the National

Labor Leadership

for

Peace in

Chicago the year before. Dolores Huerta of California's Farm Workers'
Organizing

Committee was

also at the luncheon. She

of the convention:
into Chicago,

and

America when we

Meany,

"We have
I

had some high hopes

ask myself,

how

can

find ourselves in an

for his part,

sounded particularly disappointed

we

for the

at the tenor

farm workers. But then

I

came

expect anything for the brown people of

armed camp

in the city

of Chicago.""

had gathered the biggest single block of delegates

to the

Democratic convention. At the Humphrey luncheon, the AFL-CIO president spoke
cheering crowd and exhorted them to vote for Humphrey, the

to a

man who "sympathized"

with labor. Al Barkan counted on the support of twenty of the most influential labor

leaders to analyze convention delegations and discuss floor strategies.''^ Barkan

AFL-CIO

hard liners* "political captain"

who would

labor's

the

guarantee the nomination of

Humphrey, "the labor candidate." To Eugene McCarthy's young
"Meany's number one man" who "cracked

was

whip from

supporters, he

the front-line

was

command

57

post on the convention floor."

''ibid., 35.

^Victor Riesel, "Union Chiefs Fight To Elect

Box

436, Walter Reuther Files,

^''"The Decline

First

Labor President of U.S.," Folder

UAW President's Office, WSUA.

and Fall of the Democratic Party," 35.
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1,

The crux of the convention was

the

In less than three days, the vice-president

Vietnam War,

Humphrey was

as

met with twenty-three delegations

well aware.

in a

desperate attempt to keep them in line by preaching unity
against Republicans.

By

the

time of the Democratic convention, Humphrey's line on
Vietnam had hardened from
earlier in the year;

Although he

Vietnam

he

now

tried to sidestep the

in his

most contentious

issues,

Humphrey could

not avoid

meeting with California's uncommitted 174-vote delegation.

to describe the specific

the

completely supported Johnson's approach to the conflict.

ways

Vietnam War, Humphrey

in

I

asked

which he disagreed with President Johnson's position on

"Would you mind

retorted:

on Vietnam? Because the President of the U.S.
to repudiate the President.

When

want

that

made

is

if

I

just stated

not a candidate and

clear."

The

I

my own
did not

position

come

here

vice-president eventually

58

received only fourteen votes from California.

Newsw eek referred

to the debate

over the platform plank on the Vietnam

War

as

59

the convention's ''one interlude of impressive reason/'

party's various factions

honed

their positions.

Before the platform debate, the

Humphrey and

his supporters

had to

determine whether or not the candidate would cut himself loose from the Johnson
Administration. The peace forces had to work hard on their differences in order to reach
a compromise.

Vietnamese

Eugene McCarthy's proposal was

allies to

for the U.S. to urge

its

South

accept a coalition government that included elements of the National

Liberation Front. Senator George

McGovem and most of the

58

Newsweek, 9 September 1968, 30-31
59

Ibid., 32.
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late

Robert Kennedy's

supporters were adamant that the

NLF

not be included in a coalition government;
they

viewed McCarthy's position as a dictated settlement.

The
promised

dissidents agreed to

demand an end

to the

to continue full support for U.S. troops.

bombing of North Vietnam but

The peace delegates

committed

also

themselves to an immediate de-escalation of the war that might involve
an early

withdrawal of a significant number of American troops. The hawkish
majority offered a
conditional halt of the

involvement

in Southeast

responsibilities for the

hours.

As

bombing of North Vietnam. The U.S. would reduce
Asia as South Vietnamese forces were able

war

drew

the debate

The convention discussed

effort.

to a close,

to

in

McCarthy concluded: "Now,

Vietnam- the convention as a whole

The convention decided by
doves, however, managed to

roll

ratifying a plank

up 1,042

majority. Texas' solid bloc of 104

hawk

Va

"We

Shall

won

the pieces with "a

his party's nomination with 1,761

Chester,

and 67

et. al.,

'A for

it

necessary to

will decide."^^

run.

The

votes finally killed the minority plank. The
standing up, flashing

little

% votes, to 601

Rev. Channing E. Phillips.

537.

^Newsweek, 9 September 1968, 27-28.
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"V"

split the party in half,

help from his friends."

61

McGovem

larger

the lines are clearly

on which LBJ could have

Overcome." The Vietnam War had

Humphrey picked up

assume

votes for their proposals to 1,567 Va for the

New York and California delegations responded by
singing,

military

the opposing planks for

drawn between those who want more of the same and those who think
change our course

its

for

The

signs and

and

vice-president

McCarthy, 146

Vi for

Tliroughoiit Ihc convciilion,

but the divisions within

tlic

the doves what they wanted, an

made

open repudiation ofl.H.rs Vietnam

Humphrey concluded:

that his

hail

tomorrow
the time

I

"Iftherc

is

to the

lumphrey accepted

the support of

like

that

lor the

I

his

mjured dcnu)nslralors,
ol

world. Most importantly,

should have learned

is

that the

by the policies of yesterday."''^

By

newspaper headlines proclaimci!

the end of the convenliiMi, the vice-presiilcnt

McOovern and Oregon

Senator

McCarthy and most Kennedy men were conspicuously absent
on the podium.

During

policy.

every faction within the

we

the nomination,

a shambles."

doves

Communist

any one lesson

neeil not be limited

campaign was "in

won

to please

The vice-president expres.sed synjpathy

di.sarmament and of building bridges

By

appeased northern

uphokl law and order, promi.sed social justice, and talked

a jilcdgc lo

policies of

lie

of integrated Southern delegations, but he did not give

lumphrey made an attempt

I

FXMiiocratic Party.

liimphicy tried lo play the role of the peaceniakor,

Democratic Party ran too deep,

liberals by snpporting the seating

acceptance speech,

1

Wayne Morse

in the

but

show of party

unity

hc future was not bright for the Democratic nominee; Wallace and

Ni.xon were challenging the Democrats" hokl on the Dccfi South; his ticket a|)pcared

trouble in the large industrial states, except for

Republican

territory.

Democratic hopes
Chicago.

1

to

Only

in the

Northeast could

win the presidency

lumphrey had

little

t)f

the

I

\o\k\

aiul the

in l')68 .seemeil to

who

have died

a sure win.

46

I

in the streets

I

he

of

lumphrey coukl only offer

policies, both the AI'l,-CiO

Ibid.. 20,

like

to revive the party.

believeil that

Johnson Administration's

Midwest looked

lumphrey count on

more than two months

Despite the complaints of those

continuation

New

in

and the

a

UAW

worked strenuously

for the

Wallace and Nixon. After

Humphrey-Muskie
ail his talk

quintessential "practical liberal.""

political feuds.

Moreover,

ticket

of new understandings, Reuther remained the

He would

not

sit

total;

out a presidential election because of

UAW delegates met in fifteen regional and state conferences

and committed the union to support the Democratic

Humphrey and Muskie

and campaigned against both

received 2,319 votes in the

Richard Nixon and Spiro

Agnew won 27

ticket.

The

results are not surprising.

UAW conferences, 87.8 percent of the

votes,

one percent of the

total ballots.

Wallace, the candidate of the American Independent Party, received 271
votes, 10.2
percent of the votes.

Humphrey was,

supported President John

after all, the labor- friendly candidate.

Kennedy's decision

F.

payments by sixteen weeks, voted against a

to extend

bill to

cut

He had

unemployment compensation

minimum wages and

against an

attempt to deny workers protection of federal law. The Democratic platform proposed to
build upon the successful existing programs to expand educational opportunities, supply

needed housing and achieve

full

Humphrey proposed massive

employment.

On

the thorny "law

and order"

issue,

aid for local police forces but also programs to fight
64

poverty and attack the drug problem.

The unions'
In a pre-election

all-out effort for

message

Members of the

to the

Humphrey revolved around

UAW membership, Reuther insisted:

UAW should be under no illusion: what we do at the ballot box in

1968 will have a tremendous impact upon what we

Humphrey

bread-and-butter issues.

will be able to

referred to Reuther as a "practical liberal," quoted in

UAW Solidarity, October

1968, \\;

AFL-CIO News, October

47

at the

Nelson Lichtenstein's

"Walter Reuther and the Rise of Labor Liberalism," 297.
64

do

1968, 17.

bargaining table in 1970 and 1971

when our major

contracts are up for re-

negotiation.

The

UAW Community Action Department's campaign for Humphrey had none of

the "crusading tone" usually associated with Reuther's
progressive agenda.

reminded
and

how

its

Republicans in Ohio and Indiana

SUB

getting

members how important Supplemental Unemployment

campaign

Benefits

(SUB) were

thousands of laid-off workers from

Organized labor made consumer issues a central element

at all.^'

for the

''kept

UAW

The

in its

Democratic candidate. Pamphlets highlighted the Democrats'

sponsorship of strong legislation for adequate meat inspection,

fair

auto insurance, and

protection against garnishment and against high prices of the drug industry .^^ The

UAW's

campaign

literature rarely

mentioned Vietnam.

Labor leaders were certainly concerned about Nixon's possible "come-back"
1968, but they were shocked

ticket.

at the substantial

Both Reuther and Meany agreed

Alabama candidate was

the "spoiler"

states to prevent either party

Having accomplished

that,

that

who

in

response accorded to the Wallace-LeMay

Wallace was a

real

menace

to labor.

The

could not be elected but hoped to carry enough

from capturing a majority of Electoral College votes.

Wallace would be

in a position to strike a deal

with one

candidate over federal policies and appointments. Wallace had identified the discontents

UAW Solidarity, November
^^"Would you

trust the

President's Office,

1968,

5.

Republicans?" Folder

5,

Box

436, Walter Reuther Files,

UAW

Box

436, Walter Reuther Files,

UAW

WSUA.

67

"Protecting

You and Your

President's Office,

Family," Folder

5,

WSUA.
48

of a

political minority

and could deal the

blow

fatal

to

whatever was

left

of the old labor-

liberal coalition.

In

May

1968, the former

Alabama governor had

the support of only 7 percent of

the voters outside the South. According to a Gallup
survey, Wallace had the vote of 30

percent of the electorate in the thirteen states of the South
and the vote of 53 percent of
the electorate in the five states of Deep South. According
to polls, he
largest support outside the

farmers, and those

who

South from the same groups as

in the

described themselves as independents

was winning

his

South: manual workers,

in politics.^'"

To

the

Democrats' shock, by the end of July, the Wallace vote had reached 16 percent nationwide, and the percent of union families that supported the Alabama presidential candidate

had jumped from 9

I

69

to 17 percent.

Wallace,

it

seemed, was cutting deeply

into

lumphrey's core support.

Meeting
its olficial

who had

in

New York

on September

statement on the 1968 campaign.

^^no platform,

18, the general

board of the

AFL-CIO

issued

The board regarded Wallace as a candidate

no policies and no program

for

America - save racism and

70

hatred/'

Michigan's
later,

I'he

AFL-CIO

leadership had reason to be concerned.

On September

UAW local 326 wholeheartedly supported Wallace for president.

a group of Wallace backers interrupted a meeting

at

UAW Local 25

10, Flint,

Two weeks

in St. Louis,

68

Alee Gallup and CJeorge

(Jallup, eds..

Opinion, 1935-1975, Report

^'^Ibid.,

35,

Report N° 38, August 1968,

The ijcdlup Poll Cumulative Index: Public

May

1968, 14-16.

5.

70

Gary Fink,

ed.,

AFL-CIO

(Westport, Connecticut;

Executive Council Statements

Greenwood

and Reports.

Press, 1977), Vol. 4, 1786.
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1

956-1 975

Missouri,

when Walter Reuther mentioned

to "a handful

About

fifty

of local Wallace supporters

unionists

left

presidential candidate

who packed

Humphrey and

referred

a local meeting in Detroit..."

the hall shouting and waited for Reuther outside.

UAW

The

president had to leave through the back door to avoid
a confrontation. In mid-October,

Local 25 staged a straw poll to gauge the workers' support
for Wallace: 76 percent

backed the Alabama candidate. To the
local

members had voted

York Times called

Humphrey were

it,

in the straw poll.^'

10 percent of the

Yet, the "Wallace sickness," as the

New

clearly required a strong counterattack if the labor vote for
72

to

be preserved.

George Meany counted on the
sickness, but Barkan

was not alone

columnist Victor Riesel put

COPE,

UAW leadership's relief, only

it,

ability

of COPE's Al Barkan

in rallying the labor

to "cure" the

is

politics."^^

common

set

labor

AFL-CIO's

the Teamsters* Democratic-Republican Independent Voters" Education

and the lIAW's Community Action Program (CAP)

As

vote for the Democrats.

"feuds are feuds, but politics

Wallace

(DRIVE)

goals and blanketed

industrial districts with flyers highlighting the anti-labor records of both Wallace and

Nixon. As union publications
their families almost every

in thirty-three

key

states

reached 20 million unionists and

week, organized labor hoped

it

could

still

turn the tables.

71

Bob Mason's

Notes, no date. Folder

President's Office,

7,

Box

UAW

WSUA.

72

"The Wallace Sickness," reprinted

New

436, Walter Reuther Files,

York Times. October 1968,

in the

UAW Solidarity

permission from The

10.

73

Victor Riesel, "Inside Labor:

New

Party? Union Chiefs Fight to Elect First Labor

President of the U.S," 28 August 1968, Folder
President's Office,

WSUA.

50

1,

Box 436, Walter Reuther

Files,

UAW

In times of heightened racial tensions, the
former
articulated

some Americans' deepest

Jules Witcover,

who covered Wallace

explained: "If there's any politician

politician

seemed

is

fears, frustrations

George Wallace,

to attract blue-collar

anti-black, anti-youth

Alabama governor simply

and prejudices.

Political analyst

extensively in the South and on his national

who

self-styled

can make hay while the

champion of the

cities

bum,

iittle people.'"^^

trips,

that

The

issue that

workers to his ranks was "law and order," a combination of

and anti-dissident

feelings.

Labor leaders responded by

sidestepping a direct argument with Wallace on social issues and appealing
to workers'

economic

self-interest.

In a

Department ridiculed the
capita personal

number of publications,

man who

income rated

48"'

the

UAW Community Action

claimed to speak for "the

among

the states and

little

man." Alabama's per

was $900 below

the national

average; 39.1 percent of Alabama's families earned below $3,000 a year; Alabama's

unemployment

rates

were among the highest

in the nation, 4.3 percent,

compared with

the national rate of 3.5 percent; forty states had higher workinen's compensation benefits

than did Alabama. Finally, the

whose

states

rate for both

man who promised "law and

murder and aggravated

assault

was

order" governed a state

fourth highest

among

the fifty

and the District of Columbia.^^

The

UAW also poured funds into the Southern Committee on Political Ethics

(SCOPE). Fonner Arkansas Congressman Brooks Hays headed
membership included prominent Southern

editors

the organization

and professional

men and

whose

businessmen,

74

Jules Witcover,

"George Wallace's Potential

for Mischief,"

The Progressive, July 1968,

21.

^Vamphlets, Folders

5

and

7,

Box

436, Walter Reuther Files,

WSUA.
51

UAW President's Office,

In a personal letter.

Hays thanked Walter Reuther

generous contribution" that had enabled them

SCOPE

to

for "the United

Auto Workers'

launch "a very effective program."

did not define itself as an "anti-Wallace" group
but as an organization that sought

to elevate the tone

racial minorities.

of politics and ensure

However,

"A White Paper on George

SCOPE

full

participation in the political process by

documents such as "The Wallace Labor Record and

C. Wallace" provided unions with valuable data that
could be

used to dissuade workers from voting for the Alabaman.

Although

his speeches

were implicitly

racist,

Wallace did not speak openly

against African-Americans. Rather he targeted for attack the federal
government, the

bureaucrats, the "pointed-head pseudo-intellectuals," the media and the
Communists.

According

to a

September 1968 Gallup survey, when asked who they considered

the biggest threat to the country,

to

be

46 percent of Americans answered "big government,"
77

26 percent

^^big

labof and 12 percent,
^

^^big

business/'

In his

American Independent

Party platform, Wallace called for limited government and lower taxes. In Alabama,

however, he had accepted federal funds

beer, tobacco, drivers' licenses and auto tags,

people'' he claimed to champion.

slowly tumed

It is

became

many

when

revitalized as a candidate.

all

of which bore heavily on the

away from Wallace.

the presidential

Most

campaign tumed and Humphrey

political observers agree that the pivotal point

76

Elections 1968, Folder 3,

Box 436, Walter Reuther

Files,

UAW President's Office,

WSUA.
''''The

'iittle

The steady stream of mailings from union headquarters

blue-collar workers

hard to determine

of programs and increased taxes on

for a variety

Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N° 39, September 1968, 19-20.

52

came with

the speech that

Humphrey dehvercd

in

SaU Lake City on September

30.

The

address outlined the candidate's position on one
of the hottest issues, the Vietnam War.

Humphrey

said:

As

President,

would be willing

to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as
an
acceptable risk for peace, because believe that it could
lead io success in the
negotiations and a shorter war. This would be the best
protection for our troops.
I

I

However, he concluded,

would reserve the
radically

right to

Government ofNorth Vietnam were

o\'

some of the peace

hundred and

As

for

fifty

to

show bad

faith,

I

resume the bombing."^** Ilumphrey\s pledge did not depart

from President Johnson's position. Yet

the support

to a

^'ifthe

people,

who

his

promise was strong enough to gain

sent the candidate contributions amounting

thousand dollars. The Democratic candidate's vote began

Nixon, organized labor found

it

to rise.''^

easy to prove that he was not "labor-

friendly:" the Republican candidate had supported the postwar era's major anti-union
legislation, the laft-ilartley

CIO

and Landrum-Grillith Acts. The General Board of the AFL-

noted that the Republican platform attacked "crippling economic strikes" and

"government intervention"
administration, the AI

that resulted in

wage

increases.

During a Republican

L-CIO charged, workers could expect

wide bargaining and the adoption of "right-to-work"

the destruction of industry-

legislation.

The AFL-CIO executive

council also emphasized the fact that Republicans said nothing about unemployment,
80

workmen

s

compensation, occupational safely or

78

Chester,

^'^Ibid.,

et. al.,

649

650.

80

Fink, 1769.

53

situs picketing.

I

During

his

low-key campaign, Nixon adopted two main

and law and order. The Repuhlican candidate thus
expected

issues: small

to exploit the

Americans'" dissatisfaction with the Great Society programs
as well as
about widespread social unrest. Nixon stated that

in

government

"middle

their

concerns

order to reduce federal spending,

"Welfare and poverty programs [would] be drastically revised

to liberate the

poor from

the debilitating dependence that erodes self-respect and
discourages family unity and
81

.

responsibility;

Nixon's program offered

hope

to those

who

looked for vigorous

on behalf of the disadvantaged. At the same time Nixon said

federal action

solution to civil disorder

needed

little

was "decisive

action," by

to be applied with a heavier hand.

that the

which he meant existing police power

Nixon avoided

the

Vietnam War

issue by

arguing that he did not want to "jeopardi/e" the Paris Peace talks then under way.
the

American

electorate

was unable

to

measure

his intentions

toward the conllict

I'hus,

in

Southeast Asia.

In

October 1968, Business Week stated

campaigned as hard or on as many
labor leaders that

was

uncertain.

if

Humphrey

fronts

president,

"We

was

that a

in the closing

if

we

f iles,

could live

days of the campaign was therefore threefold:

the Democratic and Republican Party Platforms

Walter Reuther

AFL-

he's elected- and I'm sure he'll deal with

R

"How

most

Wallace victory was more

lived through eight years of President Fi.senhower, and

Organized labor's aim

clear to

could live with President Nixon," said the

with Nixon. We'll be able to deal with him
us."

It

[had] never

presidency, organized labor's future

George Meany, however, also admitted

"We

movement

on a presidential election."

lost the race for the

"disastrous" than a Nixon's victory:

CIO

that "the labor

UAW President's Office, WSUA.

54

Compare,"

f older 2,

Box

436,

rally support for

Humphrey,

discredit Wallace as a viable presidential
candidate and elect

labor-friendly candidates to the 91'* Congress.

82

A key element of organized labor's campaign for Humphrey was "the get-out-thevote-drive", what Joseph C.

the

AFL-CIO's

COPE

Goulden

and the

called "the time-honored labor stratagem."^^
Both

UAW's Community

register their friends, discuss the

key

Action Department urged workers to

and get them

issues,

emphasized the importance of getting labor members

Humphrey-Muskie organizations

and that we mine

the electoral gold

among 43

million

major

shift

to vote for

in October.

group

in this year's election,

with

among

who wouldn't

traditional voters,

normally

vote.'"*"*

Humphrey's almost miraculous

in

A November Gallup report

Pamphlets

to vote: "It's crucial that

get out the Democratic vote

Organized labor's campaign was a crucial factor

comeback

to the polls.

indicated that "organized labor

many

labor union

Humphrey near the end of the campaign."

members

was

a

leaving Wallace

85

Unionists' efforts, however, were

not enough to get the Democratic candidate elected.

The 1968

election retums offered political analysts a wealth of material for study.

Nixon's margin of victory was extremely slim: 43.4 percent of voters supported the
Republican to 43 percent for Humphrey. Wallace received the vote of 13.6 percent of the
electorate, his support having faded considerably

from his high- water mark of almost 20

82

"'Blue collar tightens against

Nixon

drive,''

Business Week, 26 October 1968, 55-56.

83

Goulden, 368.
84

Victory '68, Folder

3,

Box

436, Walter Reuther Files,

UAW President's Office, WSUA.

85

The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N° 41, November 1968,

55

4.

percent. According to nationwide data, 50
percent of blue-collar workers voted for
the

Democratic Party

ticket,

compared

to 41 percent

of white

collars,

professionals and businessmen and 39 percent of
farmers.''
built

The

34 percent of

The steam

that

Wallace had

up during the turbulent 1968 presidential campaign had
evaporated by election day.
third party candidate nevertheless claimed: ^"fhis

movement has

already won. Both

national parties have changed direction because of our
movement."'^ Before dismissing

Wallace's statement as merely the reaction of a defeated politician,
one should reconsider

whether or not the former Alabaman governor was "the most

influential loser in

88

twentieth-century American politics."

It is

important to note

that, despite the

mounting

the politics of 1968, both majority parties nominated

on the

political

system and

campaign treasury

for

TV

its

social unrest that characterized

men

of the center with a strong grip

bureaucracy. Nixon had the luxury of a $20 million

and radio propaganda and counted on the support of 85 percent

of company presidents who had shares

in the

New

York stock exchange.

of the Chicago convention, few

political analysts believed that

the presidential race as close as

it

tremendous

effort to

In the aftermath

Humphrey would make

turned out to be. The Democratic candidate

made a

reassemble the pieces of the Democratic coalition. Humphrey

Ibid., 3.

87

Newsweek,

1 1

November

1968, 34.

88

of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New
Conservatism and the Transformation of American politics (Simon and Shuster: New
York, 1995), 468. Carter's argument is that Wallace ^^southcrnized'^ American politics.

Dan

T. Carter, The Politics

56

counted on the support of the big-city

political

machines and labor leaders who were

determined to keep Nixon away from the White House.^'^
If organized labor contributed to

was because unions

fed into their

administration could

mean

Humphrey's almost miraculous comeback,

members'

fears

of what a Nixon or Wallace

to the ordinary worker. In

had suddenly picked up strength

blue-collar workers

its

evaluation of why

in the industrial districts,

of this support came from the disaffected Democratic

came from

who

finally

it

left

Humphrey

Newsweek concluded: "Some
while

much of the

rest

of it

decided to vote their pocketbooks instead of

90

Whatever the reasons, working-class voters had helped

their prejudices."

to transform a

sure Democratic defeat into a very narrow loss.

Nixon was

the

first

new

president since Zachary Taylor in 1848 to win the

presidency while the opposition party retained control of both houses of Congress.
shift

of

less than

75,000 votes

in Illinois

and Missouri," a labor columnist claimed,
91

"would have destroyed the Republican's
twelve states

came

electoral vote majority."

in the industrial east plus the District

states, the vice-president

of Columbia.

took four -Michigan, Texas,

close in the other four,

New Jersey,

the other regions, even the South, where

"A

Ohio,

New

Illinois

Humphrey

Humphrey captured

Of the

eight largest

York and Pennsylvania- and

and California. Nixon carried

ran third to Wallace. In 1960,

89

UAW Washington Report, Election Facts, p. 2, Folder 8, Box 436, Walter Reuther
Files, UAW President's Office, WSUA.
90

Newsweek,

1 1

November

1

968, 32.

91

John Barrry, "The 1968 Elections and Beyond,"' AFL-CIO American Federationist,

December 1968,

1.

57

all

Leonard Hall, the Republican campaign manager,
had
shift

of only fourteen thousand votes, and

have been the bums."

As
politics"

told

Nixon: "You know, Dick, a

we would have been

the heroes and they

would

92

In

1

968, there were no heroes.

UAW Solidarity reminded its readership, "the greatest tragedy

in

American

remained "the low voter turnout."'" Out of the 120 million
American citizens of

voting age living
poll, '^25 million

in the

United States, 48 million did not vote. According

could have voted

if

they had

made an

to a

Gallup

extra effort:" they were simply

disinterested, did not like the candidates or did not bother to register.
Nineteen million

voters said that

at

.some point during the campaign that they intended to vote for a

candidate other than the one they supported on the election day.

managed
In

None

ol the parties

had

94

to

overcome apathy among

voters.

broad terms, the political struggles of 1968 can be described as a contest

between the "pragmatic professionals" and the "ideologues." The "ideologues," whether
liberal or radical,

lo.st

their battle

on the Democratic convention

floor and in the streets of

Chicago. They had viewed politics as a vehicle for causes, such as peace

Once

in

Vietnam.

the presidential race started, the "pragmatic professionals" in both majority parties

dominated the struggle and avoided the causes

to look as

moderate as possible.

Organized labor joined the "pragmatists" and fought Humphrey's opponents by exposing
their records

on "bread-and-butter"

issues.

Their efforts almost paid off.

92

Quoted

in

Chester,

et. al.,

^\jAW Solidarity, May

746.

1969, 34

94

Gallup Poll

C

'umulutive Index, Report

N°

58

41,

November

1968, 6-7

was

It

the -tactical approach of business unionism,"
rather than a "revitaHzed

movement"

labor

that

almost took Humbert Humphrey to the White
House. In the

aftermath of the presidential election, the high
aspirations of the Alliance tbr Labor

Action

(ALA) seemed

"acquire a

new

increasingly difficult to

fulfill.

Could

movement

the labor

sense of renewal and rededication to social programs,"
as the

statement of purpose proposed?

Now

that the labor-liberal coalition

weakened, how would organized labor ^respond

to the realities

ALA's

had been seriously

of a swiftly changing

95

By

world?"
at best,

the end

uncertain.

ol~

the "year of the barricades," the future of

As Jonathan Rieder

put

it,

system without the channeling

1968,

it

was not

politics was,

"Millions of voters, pried loose from the

habitual loyalty to the Democratic Party, were

electoral

American

now

restraints

a volatile force, surging through the

of party

attachment.""^^'

yet clear whether the presidential election had been an

In

November

"American

melodrama" or an "American tragedy."

95

ALA's

Declaration of Purpose, Lolder

President's Office,

7,

Box 338, Walter Reuther

Files,

UAW

WSUA.

.lonathan Rieder, "1 he Rise of the "Silent Majority"," in Steve f raser and
eds..

The Rise and Fall of the

New

Jersey, 1989), 243.

New Deal Order
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Gary Gerstle,

(Princeton University Press: Princeton,

C

HAPTER 2

THE BLUE-COLLAR BLUES

The 1968

presidential

eampaign was

crueial in bringing working-class issues
lo

the forclront of public concern. George Wallace's
success in attracting a considerable

number of union members
Americans.

I

it"

at the

onset of the campaign shocked

many

them

to the

alHuent middle-class. Unioni/ed workers had supposedly

and were bent on just one thing: the defense of their hard-won economic gains.

When George

Wallace cried before working-class audiences, "Don't

away!" the "them" he had
to the

cause

he press then labeled trade unionists "snobs," "bigots",
"reactionaries" and

usually assigned

"made

to his

sweeping

in

mind were African-Americans,
of the .lohnson years,

social legislation

now

let

them take

it

the poor minority who, due

allegedly threatened white

workers' standard of living and economic security. The average blue-collar worker was

undoubtedly anxious about his job, income and commitments and often
his government.

felt

Both Wallace and Nixon reminded the American worker

been "forgotten." Although most of the early Wallace supporters switched
1

lumphrey before the November

working-class studies

from across the

he had

that

to

Hubert

balloting, the "blue-collar blues" caused a Hurry of

in the elections' aftermath,

political

ignored by

spectrum

tried to

.lournalists, intellectuals

and

activists

determine the economic and social problems of

the workers.

Voting analysts grappling with the 1968 election returns provided a number of
explanations for the apparent rightward turn in American

politics.

During the

presidential campaign, analysts "re-discovered" blue-collar workers as a volatile segment

60

of society whose vote might be crucial

Workers could

States.

their unions- advice

in

determining the next president of the United

either support a populist conservative such
as

and turn an anticipated Nixon landslide

Wallace or follow

into a very close election.

Conservatives viewed the "affluenf blue-collar workers
as potential members of a

Republican majority. Democrats -both conservative and
electoral defeat

the

New Left

and proposed ways

As

ongoing

political

campaign

crumbling

took a renewed interest in the rank-and

change.

In

to revive the

the 1960s

and

came

liberal-

file

to a close, the blue-collar

new

analyzed their Party's

New Deal

coalition.

Finally,

as potential agents for social

worker stood

at the center

of an

intellectual debate.

The Emerging Republican Majority {\969\ Kevin
aide, claimed that the Great Society

large segments of the white

Phillips, a

former Nixon

had provoked an angry reaction among

working and middle

classes. Issues

of race -affirmative

action, school busing, residential integration, and racial preferences in job selection

government contracting

— along with a

reaction against the antiwar

permissiveness and crime had fractured the

New Deal

movement,

coalition. Phillips

and

cultural

argued that

voting power was shifting from the Democratic stronghold of the northeast to the

southern and western states of the Sun Belt; top growth states such as California,

Arizona, Texas and Florida would play a crucial role in future elections. In

this

new

cycle in American politics, Phillips said, populist conservative Republicans would

replace an entrenched liberal Democratic

elite.

«
«

Kevin

P. Phillips.

Arlington House,

1

The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle,
969), 474.

61

New York:

'The long-range meaning of the poHtieal upheaval
of 1968,"
"rests

on the Republiean opportunity

Ameriean

Due

eleetorate

to the

whieh voted

poor Demoeratie and

welfare poliey and

in

to ejeet the

In

unstable.

the 57 pereent

1

ofthe

Demoeratie Parly from national power."^

liberal reeord in Indoehina, in

domestie eeonomies,
to

in

usher

in a

968. Phillips admitted that the 1968 presidential eleetion

raee, "as onee-dissident liberals rallietl behind

Demoeratie umon leaders whipped

line/'

among

law enforeement, Phillips argued, Nixon had been able

rightward politieal swing in

had beeome a elose

to fashion a majority

Phillips argued,

their

pro-Wallace rank and

lile

1

lumphrey and

back

to the party

sum, Wallaee's baeking among blue-eollar workers and poor whites was
highly

Many

working-elass voters remained loyal to the Demoeratie candidate, as they

feared that a Republican president might undcrnune Social Security,
Medicare, and

collective bargaining.

Richard M.

Scammon and Ren

.1.

a Democratic response to Phillips" book.

Wattenbcrg's The Real Majorily {1970} offered

I

hcse analysts contended that the ''middle

voters" were no longer worried about economic issues such as unemployment, labor

union

rights, or

broad based welfare proposals; such concerns had been superseded by

"the Social Issue." According to

to array

and Wattenberg, Americans were "beginning

themselves politically along the axes of certain social situations."

situations

^ibid.,

Scammon

became potent

politieal issues becau.se the great majority

461

"^bid.. 35.

''lbid.,464

62

I

of voters

hese

in

America

were "middle-aged, middle-class, middle-minded."'
The "Social
by the authors, pivoted on the electorate's increasing

campus

disruption, drug use

There were more

analysis

was much more

of crime,

fears

Scammon and

between

Phillips'

The Emerging

Wattenberg's The Real Majority. Yet

deterministic than

The authors of The Real Majority argued

win the allegiance of "Middle America" by co-opting

that the

all

said, "is a forty-seven-year old

whose husband

is

distressed because

LSD was

lost for

the law-and-order issue and

Scammon and

housewife from the outskirts of Dayton, Ohio,

a machinist." This prototypical "middle

the streets alone at night, had

was not

latter

Democratic Party could

avoiding measures that exacerbated racial conflict. The "middle voter,"

Wattenberg

Phillips"

was Scammon and Wattenberg's. The

believed that the political realignment was not yet complete and
that
the Democrats.

racial militance,

and the apparent decline of moral values.

similarities than differences

Republican Majority and

Issue," a term coined

American" was

mixed views about blacks and

civil rights,

afraid to

walk

and was deeply

found on his son's school campus.^ Blue-collar families

thus resembled the "middle class" in that the Social Issue had eclipsed economic

concerns.

The mainstream
worker. "Labor

September

1

Day

1969: Affluence and Quiet," read The

of that year.

automobile plant

Richard M.

press likewise asserted the "middle-class" status of the American

in Flint,

A photograph portrayed workers'
Michigan. The city that

Scammon and Ben

McCann and Geoghegan,

New

J.

in the

York Times headlines on

cars "streaming out" of an

1930's epitomized the strength

Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward,

Inc., 1970),

20-21.

^Ibid., 70.
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and militance of organized labor had become
complacent and "middle

no Labor Day parades or Labor Day speeches,
"playing golf or vacationing

There were

as workers preferred to spend the

at the lake resorts in the

Younger workers did not care about

class."

weekend

cool pine forests to the north."

the union because they had the benefits that
they

wanted. Their primary concerns were no longer workmen's
compensation or the union

shop but "suburban school taxes and the sanctity of the neighborhood."^

Mainstream magazines reinforced the view of American workers as
"middle
class," "generous"

and "optimistic." In a special report

entitled

"The Troubled

American," Newsweek thoroughly examined the "white middle-class majority"

that

included white-collar and blue-collar workers. The magazine's reporters
claimed
a malignant racial atmosphere, middle-class whites felt victimized and thus

that, in

were

increasingly willing to voice their prejudices and hostility against blacks.^ Middle

Americans were troubled by the squeeze of taxes and inOation, Newsweek contended, but
these were not their paramount concerns.

Above everything

else, the report

these Americans cherished "order" and wanted "everybody to just quiet

claimed,

down and

quit

threatening to destroy what they [had] worked so hard to build and preserve." Middle

Americans resented the poor

9

for being

on welfare and the

rich for not paying taxes.

Newsweek' s "troubled American" was Richard Nixon's "forgotten American,"
silent majority."

The middle American was

also

his "great

George Wallace's and Spiro Agnew's

7

New

York Times,

1

September 1969, 1,8.

"The Troubled American:

A

Special Report on the White Majority," Newsweek, 6

October 1969, 29.

^Ibid., 49.
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'iittle

man". To many

political analysts, the

Middle American was simply "the reacting

American."
Journalist Richard

Lemon expanded

the

Newsweek article

into

The Troubled

American, a book whose conclusions were based on
2,165 interviews of white adults
carried out

by the Gallup Organization. The author admitted

that the

middle Americans

were not "a monolithic group" since they were divided by income,
age, occupation,
education and ethnicity.'" Yet the core of his analysis lay in the
disturbing fact that the
"great

American middle

class,"

which formed the backbone of the country, was now

described as "alienated," "frightened," "uneasy," "forlorn," "angry," "resentful,"
"confused."'

'

By

appealing to "the silent majority,"

Lemon

argued, Nixon had

apparently offered the reassurance that the decade's conflicts had been exaggerated:

would seek out these
would

fall

forgotten, orderly

men and women, and

into perspective, because the people had

"He

the squabbles of the past

had enough of them."' ^ Lemon's

study attempted to prove just the opposite: the silent majority was not satisfied.
Similarly, in The Middle Americans:

Proud and Uncertain

psychiatrist Robert Coles attempted to identify the

attitudes

(1971), Harvard

common political

and cultural

of the "forgotten Americans." Based on interviews with a handful of

workingmen

-a

steam

fitter,

a policeman, a filling-station operator, a machinist, a

fireman, a welder, a druggist and a bank-loan officer- Coles offered a vindication of the

Richard Lemon, The Troubled American

Simon and

(New York: A

Schuster, 1969), 24-25.

"ibid. 19.

'^Ibid.
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Clarion

Book published by

"Silent Majority."

The middle Americans

that

Coles interviewed showed varying

degrees of hostility towards blacks, hippies, and
the educated. They needed to believe
that

American involvement

some bleak

aspects that the

in

Vietnam was justified and feared going

into debt. Despite

book presented. Time magazine found Coles'

"encouraging:" "Middle Americans

seem[ed] rare...They believe[d]

still

possess[edJ a

wisdom

in reticence, especially

portrait

now

(or virtue) that

about their private lives." The

study implied that middle Americans were more often than not
unwilling to talk about the
issues that concerned them. In his conclusion. Coles highlighted
a

words:

"I

make

things worse

when

I

talk

about them; and

I

woman

interviewee's

make myself seem

lonelier."'^

In a time of burning ghettoes, escalating antiwar demonstrations and
explosive university

campuses, many analysts cherished the middle Americans' alleged

By

"reticence."''*

calling white workers "middle Americans," sociologists, political analysts and

journalists alike reinforced the perception of the United States as a middle-class nation.

Studies of self-classification

"working class"

showed

that a majority

to describe their position in society. If asked to locate themselves

scale of upper, middle or lower class, the

"middle class."

On

"Middle

a five-class scale, however,

on which the working

class

identified themselves as

working
and secure

The use of terms

Robert Coles, The Middle American: Proud and Uncertain (Boston and Toronto:

Brown and Company,

a

was placed

class," then, did not necessarily refer to a majority of affiuent

individuals but simply to the social class between the rich and the poor.

'

on

overwhelming majority called themselves

between the poor and the middle-class, many more
class.

of workers did not use the term

1971), 180.

"*"Kitchen Matches in the Dark," Time, 28 June 1971, 78.
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Little,

such as "middle class" or "middle American"
to describe white and blue-collar
workers

was misleading

in the

sense that a wide disparity of life styles passed for
'^middle

15

class."

There

is

model of class

no doubt

that the

American working

class has never

structure as contending groups organized

fit

into the Marxist

and mobilized for struggle over

clashing economic interests. American sociologists, for
their part, have largely favored a

non-economic definition of social classes as "aggregates of persons or
families
in values

and behavior and forming a rank order of status

levels." Social classes

therefore have often been presented as "ranked subcultures."'^ Richard

Troubled American, with

its

differing

Lemon's The

emphasis on values and behavior, conforms

to this definition

of class.
Studies such as Kevin Phillips" The Emerging Republican Majority,

Scammon

and Wattenberg's The Real Majority, Lemon's The Troubled American, or Coles' The
Middle Americans stressed the existence of an American "Silent Majority" as well as the
validity

of a non-economic conception of social

class.

underestimate the role that economic inequalities play
aspirations and views. In fact, as sociologist Dennis

whose members'

This perception led analysts to

in

determining working people's

Wrong

states, "classes are

aspirations and opportunities, beliefs, and life-styles

-

far

groups

from

reflecting a coherent self-sustaining culture or subculture- are basically shaped by their

Michael Harrignton, 'X^ld Working Class,

New Working

Howe,
New York

Class/' in Irving

ed..

The World of the Bhw-Collar Worker (New York: Quadrangle Books, A
Times Company, 1972), 142; Richard Parker, The Myth of the Middle Class (New York:
Liveright, 1972), xx.

'^Dennis H. Wrong,

"How

Important

is

Social ClassT" in Irving

the Blue-Collar Worker, 303,
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Howe,

ed.,

The World of

8

market position

the

commodity,

in the national

credit,

economy, and

[...]

by

and labor markets."' The phrase "Middle America"
reduced a

vast group of Americans to a neatly labeled
lowest

concerns.

The

their differential "life-chances' in

common denominator of status

and

classification obviated the variations in the nature
of blue-collar work. In

1969, the nonagricultural labor force in the United States numbered
77.902 million: out

of these, 48.993 million Americans were employed
jobs.

The "old" working

in the country's industrial

in

production and non-supervisory

which was primarily blue

class,

economy, was

still

collar

and did physical work

a great force in America's political scene in

the late 1960s.

As conservative and
leftists

liberal analysts critiqued

workers as middle Americans, new

increasingly discovered the workers' revolutionary potential. This

surprising turn. Since

its

1962 convention

at

a labor

camp

in Port

was

a

Huron, Michigan, the

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)-at the time the student department of League
for Industrial

Democracy- had a stormy relationship with

the liberal-labor coalition.

reporter

Tom

the social-democratic left and

Hayden, a twenty-two year old student and a

on the University of Michigan newspaper, presented on

manifesto that attempted to summarize the position of the
the Convention, the

document exacerbated

students' camps, one led by

followers, and the other by

SDS

New

socialists Rachelle Horowitz,

Ibid.

Harrington, "Old Working Class,

student radicals. During

Tom Hayden,

17

1

that occasion a

the political differences between

president Al Haber,

York

new

New Working Class,"
68

137.

rising

Steve

two

leftist

Max and their

Tom Kahn and

Richard Roman, whose mentor was Michael
Harrington, a leader of the Student League
for Industrial

Democracy (SLID).

Those student

radicals

who

followed the lead of Hayden believed that the

fundamental problem of American society stemmed from
the glaring contradictions
existed between Americans' democratic ideals and

proposed

to bridge the

democracy," a
their

own

As

national experience.

system through which the people could take more control over

historian Allen

Matusow has

put

it,

"participatory

"obviously similar to the anarchist dream of inherently good

from hierarchic

Hayden

gap between theory and practice by fostering "participatory

political

lives.

its

that

institutions

and living

in decentralized

democracy" was

men and women

liberated

communities where the individual

19

counted."

documents

The

Accordmg
in

to the Port

American

Huron Statement, one of the most widely read

history, students

students" elders had

more

would be

faith in

the agents of social change.

organized labor. The SLID's old

such as Michael Harrington and Irving Howe, were loyal
the one-time Bolshevik and secretary of

to

produce his

Stalinist

own

to the ideas

Shachtman

proletariat.

In

Shachtman's view,

totalitarian clique.

By

Stalin's bureaucrats

his

rejected Trotsky's

bureaucracy as a degenerate caste temporarily ruling

in the

leftists,

of Max Shachtman,

Leon Trotsky who broke with

analysis of Stalinism.

radical

mentor

in

1939

view of the

name of the

formed a new permanent and

the time the student radicals convened in Port Huron, the

Shachtmanites had dropped their revolutionary rhetoric, joined the Socialist Party and
discarded the possibility of building an American version of the Labor Party.

19

Matusow, The Unraveling ofAmerica: A History oj Liberalism
(New York: Harper and Rov^, Publishers Inc., 1984), 313.
Allen

J.

69

in the

1960s

Shachtmanites hoped to advance their social democratic
ideals within the two-party
system: the aim was to turn the Democratic Party
into a coalition of left-liberals and

The labor movement was

socialists.

to play a crucial role in such a political

20

,.

realignment.

Harrington vehemently objected to Hayden's Port Huron
Statement
clash epitomized the differences between the Shactmanites
and the infant
his analysis of the birth of the

for he

was

the one person

New

Todd

Left,

than the students had expected.
the

leftists:

young

workers and

their

activists" rejection

democrats' identity. In the

social

America." To the

was not

new

SDS

radicals' manifesto

issues started the

rift

their disregard

of the

a defining feature of the postwar liberals" and social

new

problem

leftists'

view, "an unreasoning anticommunism [had]

for those

founders,

who

want[ed] to construct a more democratic

communism was

not monolithic and the Soviet Union

political life as "the

21

Sixties:

rhetoric only

To Harrington and

"Democracy is in the Streets: " From Port Huron
(New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1987), 74-75.
The

War

demands of "unity" and "oneness"

Miller,

Gitlin,

more harshly

between the old and the new

of anticommunism and

the declared danger" restricted any kind of debates.

Todd

pivotal,

across the generational divide."^'

a military threat to the United States. Furthermore, Cold

damaged American

James

was

In

unions as agents for social change.

Anticommunism was

become a major

Two

the

The

New Left.

Gitlin claims that ''Harrington

who might have mediated

The veteran Shachtmanite, however, judged

draft.

Years of Hope, Days of Rage

1987), 117.
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to the

in the face

of

to all those

Siege of Chicago

(New York: Bantam Books,

political activists with vivid

the

SDS

theorists

memories of Stalin's crimes and

the Hungarian Revolution,

were simply "soft" on communism.^^

The second

issue dividing the

Old and the

New Left was the new radicals'

evaluation of the labor movement. The Port Huron
Statement was contemptuous of

organized labor, "the historic institutional representative of
the exploited, the presumed

[my emphasis]"countervailing power"
unions were in a serious

crisis,

collar jobs, the unorganized

SDS

against the excesses of Big Business."^^ Industrial

argued: automation was causing a decrease in blue-

were not being organized, and labor leaders were turning

increasingly bureaucratic, materialistic and self-interested. Rank-and-filers
were not that
different:

many were

"indifferent unionists, uninterested in meetings, alienated from the

complexities of the labor-management negotiating apparatus, lulled to comfort by the
accessibility of luxury

radicals

who

and the opportunity of long-term contracts."

24

In

1

962, the young

adhered to the Port Huron Statement shared the mainstream view of

organized labor as economically affluent and politically conservative.

From

summer of

the draft of its pivotal

1969,

social change.

SDS

in

1962 to the organization's collapse

in the

leaders remained obsessed with the debate over the agents of

Although well meaning, the student radicals found

formulate a definite ideology.
necessary to

document

make American

Who would

it

increasingly hard to

lead the revolution that they

deemed

society truly democratic? College students alone, as the

22

The

Port

Huron Statement, Appendix

in

James Miller's Democracy

350.

"ibid., 343.

^"^Ibid.,

344.
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is

in the Streets,

Port Huron Statement seemed to imply? The
poor living

The

American

in the

-internal colony" of oppressed blacks? ThirdWorld peasants?

The "new working

class" of salaried professionals and highly trained
technical employees? In

SDS embraced

history,

strategies that

aimed

to

slums?

eities'

its

short

promote each of these groups as the

vanguard of political change.
In

its

SDS

early years,

leaders found in the

Marcuse an ideological foundation

in

which

work of CJerman philosopher

to root its radicalism.

1

lerbcrt

Marcuse's most

important bot)ks, Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man^ went to
great lengths

why

to explain

the beneficiaries of (he Aflluent Society

To Marcuse, and

many new

to

unfreedom prevail|ed|

in

industrial civili/ation..."

scarcity society, 'Mndependence of thought,

•

•

opposition

„

,

-

.

were things

so oppressed and alienated.

"a comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic

leftists,

advanced

felt

f urthermore, in a post-

autonomy, and the

right to political

25

,

ol the past.

The Marcusean

''Great ReliisaP" to

conform

to

"oppression and domination" legitimated the youth movement's confrontational
approach.

In

1%4, SDS

and

tried

failed to organize the

Fxonomic Research and Action

Movement

revitalized the

SDS

Projects.

chapter

poor

in the

On campus, Mario

at the

slums through

its

Savio's Free-Speech

University of California, Berkeley. Savio's

denunciation of the depersonalized and unresponsive university bureaucracy echoed the

Port Huron Statement. In 1965, the escalation of the Vietnam

New

Fefl and offered

SDS

War

further radicalized the

president Carl Oglesby the chance to link corporate liberalism

2"^
I

lerbert

Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies

Industrial Society (Boslon:

Beacon

in the

Press, 1991/1964),

72

1.

Ideology of Advanced

to U.S. imperialism. In

1966 and 1967, as the

anti-draft

movement grew,

radical students

not only denounced American imperialism but also
increasingly identified with Third

World

guerrillas

and

their

and Fidel Castro became heroes

By

Ho

Marxist leaders.

Chi Minh,

June 1968, Allen Matusow writes, "like the old

.26

...

enemies."

At

that year's

students divided into two camps.

tactics

SDS

On

working

class, not

Despite the division,

SDS

Party,

in East

who

before

it,

new

the

more than they hated

the one side were the

members of the Progressive Labor

industrial

their

Lansing, Michigan, radical

SDSers whose analysis and
were the Marxist-

side

believed that the American

Third World guerrillas, would topple the capitalist system.

still

A year later,

appeared to be "in good health" in 1968.

however, the organization cracked when
its

convention

left

were guided by Third World Marxism. On the other

Leninist

Tse Tung, Che Guevara

to emulate.

splintered into Marxist sects that often hated each other

capitalist

Mao

Worker Student Alliance caucus. As

SDS

expelled the Progressive Labor Party and

historian Peter

Levy

says,

"SDS

ultimately
27

collapsed in the process of debating the correct line on the working class."

Early in 1969, there were clear indications that the various

SDS

new

left

factions and

chapters were seriously revising their stand towards the American working class. In

January

1

969,

new

leftist

John Spritzler triumphantly announced

that

"Dartmouth

SDS

[had] been building a student-worker alliance and learning to apply a pro-working class

strategy to student struggles."

The Dartmouth decision

to build

an alliance with the

26

Matusow, 335.
27

Peter B. Levy, The

New Left and Labor

in the

oflllinois Press, 1994), 121."
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1960s (Urbana and Chicago: University

workers had grown out of an anti-Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC)
demonstration.

Initially, the

was 'incompatible with a

Dartmouth anti-ROTC

liberal arts education."

petition simply stated that

The

university's

denounced the document as an "ivory-tower" students" demand
the

Vietnam War: the working-class youth.

ROTC

SDS members

that

someone

else fight

28

Despite the introduction of a "worker friendly" strategy, the activism
of

Dartmouth

SDS

the connections

chapter

still

centered not on the grievances of American workers but on

between U.S. imperialism

in Southeast

Asia and the consequent

oppression of the Vietnamese revolution. SDS' task was to show American workers
that
the

at

same power

that subjected the peoples

of Vietnam could be used

home. SDS members' ultimate aim was, however,

anti-ROTC
leafleting

struggle.

New

leftists

and support of local

to

to break their strikes

win the workers" support

in their

argued that a student-worker alliance, especially

strikes,

had increased both on-campus and off-campus

29

support tor SDS.

In sum,

SDS" determination
1969. This

was

it

had diminished the isolation of the student movement.

to build a student-worker alliance increased in the spring

reflected in the

numerous

articles that the

New

Left Notes published

of

on

the issue. For instance, the leaders of the San Diego Workers for a Democratic Society

explained

working

why

class:

they, university drop-outs,

"We

had decided

to

do factory work and join the

organize workers because they are the only sector of the population

with the potential power to defeat the American ruling

class.

28

John
1969,

Spiilzler.

"Dartmouth builds student-worker

2.

29

Ibid.
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alliance,"

Students can annoy the

New Left Notes,

29 January

rulers;

workers can seize the means of production and shut
down the country ."^^ The

activists'

uhimate goal was to transform the workers' trade union
struggles

revolutionary battles.

essential,

The

strategy to follow, they admitted,

was not

into

yet clear.

It

was

however, that workers became aware of the connections
between the Vietnam

War, racism and the international class

San Diego Workers

for a

interests

of the workers. The organizers of the

Democratic Society had apparently abandoned the belief that

the students could lead a revolution and had placed

all their

hopes on the revolutionary

potential of blue-collar workers.

By

1969, then, a growing

number of new

leftists

had traveled the long distance

from Marcuse's pessimistic appraisal of industrial workers as

affluent, passive

and easily

manipulated, to the "optimistic" Marxist-Leninist view of blue collars as the only group
capable of overturning the capitalist system. In his analysis of the Old Left and the
Left, Paul Mattick

Jr.

provides an interesting

between 1962 and 1969:
resistance,

"It

from dialogue

New

summary of the metamorphosis of SDS

has moved, in the terms of its slogans, from protest to

to confrontation,

from organizing pressure groups

to base-

building, from peace to anti-imperialism, from civil rights to black liberation; perhaps

from participatory democracy
In January 1969,

members.

In the

PLP

to socialism."^'

leaders

made

a Work-in pamphlet available to

document, radical students admitted

that they

by neglecting the largest section of the population, the working

^^San Diego Workers for a Democratic Society,

"Why

all

SDS

had isolated themselves
class.

The increasing

Organize Workers?"

1

5 January

1969.

^Vaul Mattick

Jr.,

"The old

left

and the new

left,"

75

New Left Notes,

15 January 1969,

7.

level

of strikes,

SDS

acknowledged, debunked the myth of working-class
apathy

^^Workers ARI{ on the move;^ the

work-in aimed

at

breaking

down

political issues with blue collars

that

SDS members

^^an

l^irthermore, the

'Don^t

talk lo

They proposed a suininer

the barriers between students and workers,
talking about

and changing the image of the youth movement from

which the press had presented,

Work-in was

concluded.

riic

pamphlet stressed the

fact that the

Summer

opporlunily for students lo learn from workers [my emphasis]."

document warned students

workers

like

against patronizing the rank and

you know everything and they know nothing,

filers:

l-irst

ol alK it^s

32

not true (probably the reverse)."

Tlie 1969

the need to forge

SDS

work-in program indicates

some kind of student-worker

that,

while most student radicals saw

alliance,

many were

highly doctrinaire position of the Progressive Labor Party and

its

reluctant to adopt the

Worker-Student

Alliance caucus, 'fhese staunch Marxist-Leninists maintained that the working class, by
its

own

effort,

could develop trade union consciousness but not revolutionary

consciousness; the

intellectuals

latter

could only be brought

from without.

grounded on the assumption

The

SDS

concluded,

''an

movement by

sununer work-in pamphlet,

that students

of class struggle. 't)ne important

to the labor

result

in contrast,

could prollt from the workers'

of your job may

just be," the

appreciation of what workers are up against

revolutionary

own

SDS

in their fight

was
experiences

pamphlet

against the boss,

33

the government and sellout union leadership."

32

S.D.S. Student

Du

Summer Work-in,

iiois Library, University

pamphlet. Special (\)llections and Archives, W.E.B

of Massachusetts, Amherst.

33

Ibid.
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This student drive brought alarmed responses from
business associations, the

news media, and union

leaders.

The business community

manufacturing plants might agitate rank and

filers.

feared that

Industry Association of New

to

keep

SDS

activists off payrolls.

York sponsored

infiltration

of

Business associations held briefings

and sent out thousands of letters informing executives about
the

recommending screening procedures

SDS's

work-in plan and

The Commerce and

a meeting of businessmen to ''plan strategy

against a Students for a Democratic Society project to forge a
worker-student alliance."^"*

The

Illinois

Manufacturers Association published the student summer work-in plan

verbatim, describing

35
it

as 'Tood for serious thought.''

"Troublemakers^^ were expected

to flood into the plants.

Time denounced the

most of society's cherished

radical students

institutions/^

who, "having alienated themselves from

were now abandoning

create a revolutionary student-worker alliance.

ranged from coolness to

and

little

sympathy

work-in.

hat, leaving

had

hostility; blue collars

'^no

The drawing showed

to

summer

attitude.

vacation to

Time contended,

patience with revolutionary jargon

for comparatively privileged college students.'*

summarized what the magazine considered

summer

The workers'

their

A cartoon

be the workers' reaction towards the

SDS

a stout blue-collar worker, in overalls and hard

behind a small barking dog wearing sunglasses and waiving an

SDS

flag.

In a similar vein, The Wall Street Journal viewed any form of student- worker

alliance as highly unlikely.

The newspaper based

^^New York Times, 24 July 1969,

its

argument on the mainstream

1.

35

Manufacturers' Association Bulletin, 25 March 1969, Special Collections and
Archives. W.E.B. Du Bois Library, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Illinois
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a.s.s,Mnp(u>n

of

A.nmcan

labor's well hen,..

StalT rcporlo. Alan Adoison contc.ulal
that,

liom Iho "politically conservative mooil" of Iho

i"cl)"iii}>

worU.i},. class, the stiulciils-

revolutionary approach would strike most Americans
as nonsensical. Workers had joined
students in the

hi the

I

l%8 "May

Inileil States,

Revolt"

the situation

been integrated into the nuddle

Having moved

the recessions."

had adopted "the

!•

hom

r^iesel, a

close friend

dil lereut; the vast

economic

insecurity to

that traditi(Mially

SDS summer

ofAFI -(MO

I

abor" colunm, Riesel claimctl

provocateur work-in
lieirne, president

ol the

I

summer

would

leaders, the

econonuc

that labor leailers

I

a staunch

program.

wouki be sure

aiul

Inion, took preventive mea.sures.

to give "the

I

(

"harlcs

Imon

new

and e\|ilosive documents"

lor the

^Vlan Adelson, "Unlikely

Alliance," Wall Street .loiinuiL U)

SDS
W.li.B. Du

"llnii>ns Alert to

Collections and Archives,

uiias,

leftists.

To
lor

more

labor

summer

"violent

national convention.

.luly

1060,

I.

Plan,"

N^A("K,

Bois

ibrary. University ol Massaclursctts,

l

Amherst.
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head

chiefs, acconling

soKliers of a playful revolution." Student radicals were working on even

"victor Riesel,

I

work-in was much more than "a youthlul rehearsal

coming SDS

In his

Inion leailers such as .loe

not allow unioni/cil shops to be taken o\er bv

SDS summer

abor reporter

1

Meany's and

SDS summer

rebels a thorough workout.

I

ol

Neciiniv, workers

plan were varied.

of the C'onnnunicalions Workers ol America,

Inited Transportation

to RiescI,

insulated Irom the nupacl

goes with security."''

president Cleorge

deleniler of the organization, alerted the unions to the

"Insiile

majority of workers had

They were "well-paid,

class.

philosophy

political

ranee because iMcnch workers were poorly paid,

was very

Inion leaders' responses to the

I

Victor

in

N.Y.,

I

^

.lune I0(,^), Special

Gus

Tyler, assistant president of the International
Ladies

(ILGWU), had a much more welcoming

Garment Workers Union

attitude towards the radical students'
attempt to

bridge the differences between the American working
class and the
several other Democrats at the time, Tyler

and

liberals

radicals; consequently, the

Committee of SDS
creation of "a

for

what we

for its critique

was

need.. .Campaigns

leader applauded the

insularity.

movement of students, working

all

calling for collaboration

ILGWU

of student

New Left.

Like

between unions,

New York Labor

This Committee advocated the

people, and unemployed...fighting together

which turn black and white against each other or

students against working people are absolutely wrong. They are

doomed

to failure."

Tyler celebrated the committee's rediscovery of the working class as a crucial agent
of
historical

development. Nevertheless, Tyler questioned the

was supposed

SDS Summer Work-in

that

38

to ''sow the seeds

In Tyler^s view, the

of revolution

SDS's

*

^infiltration

among
'

workers.

of manufacturing plants was not

necessary for labor to become an agent of social change. Labor unions, Tyler argued, had
the capacity to go

more

beyond the purely economic concerns of their members and become

sensitive to other

dilemmas

rights, foreign affairs, full

income

re-distributors."

working class

to

become

in society

such as housing, education, taxation,

employment and poverty. Tyler regarded unions

Yet for effective redistribution
politically constructive,

to

civil

as "inveterate

be achieved and for the

programs had

to

be pursued "in tandem

with other progressive elements in society: blacks, youths, and intellectuals." If ignored,

workers

Gus

who

Tyler,

harbored resentment against not only the rich but also against politicians.

"The Working Class Rediscovered

79

" The

New Leader,

31 July 1969, 11-12.

militant blacks, radical students, liberals and
insensitive union leaders might turn into
a

negative force in American society/^

Labor reporter Riesel was

right in predicting that the

would be more "explosive and violent" than

When SDS convened

in

Chicago on June

national convention

SDS summer

the 1969

18, the

SDS

work-in program.

key question was which road the

country ^s largest radical organization would take. After heated
disputes over the best
revolutionary strategy,

SDS

contributor, explained:

'The American

theory of itself and

its

goals.

split into

various factions. Paul Mattick

New Left.. .has produced

What kind of revolution

organization are appropriate to the work

we want

to

are

veiy

we aiming

Jr.,

aNew Left Notes

little in

for?

the

What

do? What are or ought

to

way of

styles

of

be our

relations to other tendentially or potentially oppositional groups in society like blacks
and
40

workers?'

By

no clear answers

the time of the 1969 national convention, radical students had produced
to these crucial questions.

Rather,

factions, each seeking to organize radical activity in

During the national convention,

SDS

SDS
its

had divided into three major

own

direction.

expelled the Progressive Labor Party, a

self-

styled cadre of Marxist-Leninists that had been infiltrating the organization for over a

year.

was

The Worker-Student Alliance (WSA),

also purged. In

its

a faction that the

trade union program, the

PLP claimed

PLP had

built into

that "since the effects

the wars of aggression spread by the U.S. ruling class throughout the world

more heavily on

the workers here at

home, any force

SDS,

[fell]

of

ever

rebelling against that ruling class

policy [was] fighting in the direct class interest of the workers." The

PLP argued

that

39

Tyler, 13.
40

Paul Mattick

Jr.

"The old

left

and the new

left,"

80

New Left Notes,

15 January 1969, 7

there

was

a clear identity between the interests of
workers and students. Whether

radicals demonstrated against the

Vietnam War,

resisted the draft or

young

walked picket

lines

along with the workers, they were fighting "against the
same ruling class that
misdirect[cd] both of them."

Other

SDS

own

the importance of a worker-student alliance."

PLP

factions resented the

proletarian revolution."

students'

Hence

They condemned

for presenting itself as the

the

PLP's disregard of women's, blacks' and

organizational expressions within the revolutionary movement,

opponents asserted, embraced a vulgar Marxism

chauvinism

"vanguard of the

to

mere devices

on the misconception

to split

that only

PLP

working people. SDS' decision

that

fhe PLP,

reduced racism and male

and divide the working

class.

The

WSA was based

qualified cadres were capable of "organizing"

to put

an end to

PLP-WSA

politics within the

organization was largely based on two fundamental differences in principles between the

PLP and SDS.

First,

most

radical students supported the struggle for liberation launched

by black and Latin "colonies" within the U.S. and even recognized those "nations' rights"
to secession.

The PLP,

Second, mainstream

in contrast,

SDS members

people of Vietnam as well as
imperialism.

reactionary.

To

the

all

these revolutionary

movements

as racist.

supported the national liberation movement of the

similar

PLP, however,

A virtual

deemed

all

movements around

the world that fought U.S.

forms of nationalism were

to

be condemned as

ultimatum from the Black Panther Party and the Mcxican42

American Brown Berets

finally forced the

purge ot the

PLP from SDS.

41

Progressive Labor Trade Union Program, June 1968, 108, Special Collections and

Archives,

W.E.B Du Bois

Library, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

42

"SDS," Reprinted from

the Guardian, in

News From Nowhere, Summer

81

1969,

8.

1

liroadly speaking, the

agreed on the need

to build a

SDS members who

Revolutionary Youth

convention, however, this larger faction

Revolutionary Youth

pushed

split in

Movement 2(RYM

2).

for the expulsion

Movement (RYM).

ofthe

PM>

After the national

two: the Weathermen and the

Although these groups shared some

ideologieal foundations, they differed on issues such as
black liberation, nationalism, the

white working class and direct action

tactics."*^

The Weathermen described themselves as "not part-time students,
but full-time
revolutionaries."

I

his faction believed that white radicals

and Third World insurgents on

tactical as well as

must

link with black guerrillas

on ideological grounds. These young

revolutionaries were charged not only with absolute indifference towards the white

working class but also with indiscriminate violence.
with white youth revolution

at

home,

the

World revolution coupled

Third

Weathermen contended, would

bring about

11

Many

socialism.

that "they

became

had

years after the

Weathermen had disbanded, Tom layden remembered
I

started, characteristically, as idealist

and benign people. ..|but then|

a matter of whether or not you were a man, which

it

was measured by how

45

outrageously subversive you were willing to be."

The

revolution.

RYM

2,

Blacks,

meanwhile, viewed the proletariat as the main force

women

and students were the agents who, through

raised the consciousness ofthe white

working

class.

RYM

2

Ibid.

44

Sum/ay (Uohc, 30 November 1969,

37, 47.

45
I

layden interview,

in

James

Miller,

Democracy

82

is in

their struggles,

viewed African-Americans

4}

lioslon

in the socialist

ihc Streets, 3

1

as comprising a nation onto themselves,
oppressed as blacks and exploited as workers.

Because of this dual position, blacks'
socialist revolution in the

was a precondition

liberation

United States.

Women would

to

any kind of

contribute to the development of

"proletarian unity" and revolution by liberating
themselves from male supremacy.

Revolutionary students would be the catalysts of change."*^

The

divisions at

SDS Chicago

national convention and the subsequent split into

warring factions turned a worker-student alliance into mere wishful
thinking. The radical
students* "rediscovery of the

leftists

Howe and

such as

SDS,

class'" failed to materialize.

Harrington, as Maurice Isserman has said, the

have seemed sometimes a

Left."

American working

surrealistic

To

old

New Left

"must

parody of the worst ideological excesses of the Old

as the nation's largest radical organization,

continued to debate the labor question.

Young

had collapsed, but new

radicals, as individuals,

varied positions on the working-class struggles that were to

come

leftists

would adopt

in the

Nixon

years.

If trade unionists chastised the student radicals for their revolutionary dreams,

they were equally angered by the mainstream media misrepresentation of blue-collar
Steel Labor, the United Steel Workers" publication, took issue with the

and argued

that "the troubled

American" was

existence of "Middle America"

living

were not

part

was

in fact "the exploited

a myth: the majority of people

Newsweek report

American." The very

who worked

for a

of "'affluent America.'" Blue-collar family income was below the

modest but adequate standard defined by the government. To be above
did not necessarily

life.

mean

that

the poverty line

workers enjoyed economic and social well being.

46

"S.D.S," 8
47

Isserman, 122

83

Moreover, Steel Labor claimed, workers were "angry
the

Agnews, and

nothing in the

the

Nixons who

at

being exploited by the Wallaces,

cater[ed] to their fears and anxieties yet
offer[ed]

way of positive programs." White workers were

tired

of being stereotyped

as affluent and racist when, in fact, they themselves
were victims of class prejudice.^'
In a similar way, Frank Rosen, the International
Representative of the United
Electrical

Workers (UE),

blue-collar workers.

As

bitterly

the

American

TV

claimed, in movies or on

complained about the media's distorted portrayals of
ideal

was "white

the blue-collar worker

collar in the suburbs,"

was presented

Rosen

as either "the funny

nice guy" or as a racist, ignorant and vicious individual. "People

who work

in the plant,"

Rosen added, "work

in the dirt

and get

All

good reasons

in the heat, they

for factory

work

in the cold, they

work not having

work

the greatest status in the world."

hurt.

The

differences between the middle class and the working class had not vanished by the late

1960s. If the United Automobile Workers

Day,

it

was because they 'iooked middle
'

made

the

class, not

Bayard Rustin, the cochairman of the A.

New

York Times headlines on Labor

because they were middle

Phillip

Randolph

class.

Institute Joined trade

unionists in their criticism of both conservatives and radicals for their view of workers as
affluent and acquiescent

members of "Middle

attempt to portray the United States as a

The prominent

racial

and ethnic

America.'' Rustin

''classless'" society.

loyalties that divide

saw

this portrayal as

In 1971, Rustin argued:

American society have,

together with our democratic creed, obscured a fundamental reality -that
class society and,

engaged

though

we do

not often talk about such things, that

in a class struggle.

Steel Labor, September 1970, 9.

UENews,! A^n\

1969,

9.

84

an

we

we
are

are a

.

Because of Rustin's steadfast commitment

CIO

leaders such as

to the labor

George Meany- many argued

movement -and

that he

to

hawkish AFL-

was out of touch with

the

black community. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, his defense of organized labor as
the

most progressive force

right in arguing that

"Many of the
couched

on

their

it

was

in

American might have sounded exaggerated;

unfair to paint the trade union

movement

yet Rustin

was

as reactionary.

sophisticated right-wing attacks on labor," Rustin claimed, "are
frequently

in left-wing rhetoric."

There was a certain convergence of the

view of unions as anti-black

mterests of their members.

institutions that selfishly

Howe,

Irving

journal Dissent, agreed with Rustin.
collar workers in the following

otherwise they might raise a

He summed up

right

defended the economic

the founder of the quintessential

way: "You had

lot

and the

left

Old Left

the media's attitude towards blue-

better

pay attention

to these guys,

of hell, and many might even go over

to the racism

and

reaction of George Wallace." Rather than representing a genuine interest in the

American

blue-collar experience, they were "a prudential admonition as to the

consequences of neglecting them."^'
In the late

intellectuals

1

960s and early

and trade unionists

social democratic stand.

Even

1

970s, Dissent offered a forum to those old

who

left

appraised America from an anti-communist but

if there

were

significant differences in the political

analysis of the various contributors to the journal, most agreed on the importance of the

American working

class as an agent of social change and

'^Bayard Rustin, "The Blacks and the Unions,'" Harper

Magazine,

to refashion

May

1

a

97 1 8 1
.

Howe, The World of the Blue-Collar Worker (New York: Quadrangle Books,
York Times Company, 1972), 6.

^'irving

New

's

on the need

85

A

labor-liberal coalition.

IVeedoni from illusion,

our

As Maurice Isserman has
its

ability to face

what

1

described

(owe

it,

prided itself on

its

sheer terribleness

oi'

-/)/.s.sc77/

later called "the

„52

Durnig the Nixon Administration, Dissent opened
the debate on the

tuTie.

of the American working-class

life.

Dissent^

editors, as

Howe

realities

stated, attempted to

challenge the view of American workers as "brainwashed clods,
hopelessly "one-

dimcnsional," mere creatures of the belly

who

are manipulated by the I'stablishment and

53

the media."

In the

May-June 1069

activities for the

workers. Sexton

Inited

\

set

issue of

D/.v.sr;?/,

Brendan Sexton, director of education

Automobile Workers, discussed the "middle-class"

status

of

out to clarify "the assumption that blue-collar workers [werej
51

"middle class and
workers

sitting pretty."

"the aristocrats of labor"—

Labor had stated
of living." By

that $ 9,191

thai criterion.

lived moderately well.

and

still

In

1%6, Sexton
was $ 6,98

1

.

said, the

median income of skilled

for that year, the U.S. Department of

would provide a family of four with "a moderate standard
Sexton concluded, only one out of three American families

Second, millions of families combined two or even three incomes

earned less than $

5,()()().

Young workers were

the hardest hit. Sexton argued:

they received the lowest pay and were the most likely to be laid off.

Left

hird, working-class

7 had a Hammer... I he Death of the Old Left and
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1987), 76-77.

Maurice Isserman,

New

I

//

the Birth of the

53
I

lowc,

5.

Brendan Sexton, "Middle-Class Workers and the
(May-.lune 1969): 231.

86

New

Politics," Dissent 16, no. 3

children were "over-represented in the mass of
those excluded from college."" Thus,

they were not sheltered against the draft for four
years as were the middle-class youths

who

secured student deferments.
In Sexton's view, the

two reasons.

First,

many

myth of working-class

liberals

and new

affluence

leftists in

was widely sustained

for

college circles -out of touch with the

workers' every-day realities— believed that labor had become
"middle class." Secondly,
the success story of the unions' gains had led

workers "had made
advances

in

it

too."

To be

sure,

many Americans

that the

wages, working conditions and fringe benefits. But there was a long way

many

were often outraged by

strikes that upset the general public.

to

assume

Sexton asserted, unions had made important

go. Trade unions faced

seemed

to

show

as

limitations.

much contempt

for the

to

Middle-class liberals, Sexton pointed out,

working class as

New
for the

leftists, for their part,

union leaders

whom

they regarded as selfish and backward.^^

Andrew Levison echoed Sexton
In the late 1960s, the

working class

still

in his

book. The Working Class Majority

their

was not

data,

to close.

American worker constituted only 12

974).

he proved that

a middle-class society: over sixty percent of the population

hands as the decade came

1

constituted the majority of American society,

Levison contended. Through an impressive interpretation of census
the U.S.

(

Levison claimed

to 15 percent

Ibid, 233.

Sexton, 238.
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worked with

that the "typical" affluent

of labor, white and black. Eighty five

percent of workers were not "typical": the average
worker earned $ 9,500 in 1970, a
figure that placed

him

closer to poverty than to affluence

After debunking the

myth of working-class

"

affluence, Levison turned to

discussing labor's alleged apathy and conservatism.
Throughout the 1960s, he pointed
out, a rising discontent

with conditions of work and

rank-and-file militancy.

how

was evident

in the

growth of

The increasing number of strikes, Levison concluded, "exposed

shallow "the Social Issue" [was] as a description of what was going
on

class America." Far

economic

from being

strike against

many

irrelevant, as

issue, not the Social Issue, that

The 1969-1970
file

life

moved

politicians believed,

"it

in

working-

was

the

millions of workers in active protest."^^

General Electric, for instance, reflected not only rank-and-

dissatisfaction over the "old-fashioned"

economic issues but also the workers"

determination to reject un-negotiated contracts and to strike for longer periods despite -or

because of- the faltering economy.

Levison thus offered a sharp rejoinder

to the

mainstream press and the television

networks, which projected images of a middle-class America in which the blue-collar

worker was

either to be feared for his bigotry or dismissed for his irrelevance. Like

Levison, labor leaders and radical students called for a

class.

new understanding of the working

Unionists tried to debunk the myth of labor's affluence and smugness. Inflation

and the price squeeze clearly showed the

instability

of the workers' "middle-class"

status.

Radical students admitted that they had underestimated the role workers could play in

57

Andrew

Levison, The Working Class Majority

Geoghegan,

Inc., 1974), 33.

58

Ibid.,

229

88

(New York: Coward, McCann and

changing American society. Rank-and-file militancy,
new

leftists

now

be channeled into a radical transformation of
labor-capital relations

contended, could

at the

point of

production. While unions viewed collective bargaining
as "the blueprint for a better

tomorrow,

„59

SDS members

regarded

it

as a flawed system. Collective bargaining

certainly protected the workers' interests. Yet, radical
students argued,

the companies* right to

make huge

profits while paying

meager wages

it

also recognized

to workers

who

did not share in the widely publicized American prosperity.

For their

part,

workers were unlikely to view themselves as either agents of world-

transformation or victims of exploitation. Left-wing intellectuals had to abandon
their
abstract ideas about the union leadership and the rank-and file and look closely
at the

of the workers and the workings of unions. Union leaders had

lives

could

still

to

prove that they

obtain tangible advantages for their membership but also transcend their

pragmatism. In 1969, Fortune described organized labor as
acquisitive,"

and predicted

that "the

"'angry, aggressive,

coming year" would be "a time of epic

and

battle

60

between management and labor."

and union leaders

AFL-CIO News,

to

23

show what

May

1

This would be a great opportunity for intellectuals

they could do for the American worker.

970, 24.

^Vichard Amstrong, "Labor 1970: Angry, Aggressive, Acquisitwe,"' Fortune, October
1969, 95.
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CHAPTER 3
THE GE STRIKE

As Fortune

predicted, the winter of 1969-1970

between management and
started

labor/"'

The 102-day

on October 26, 1969, was the most

was indeed

strike against

at the

changes

time of epic battle

General Electric that

significant struggle of U.S. organized labor

since 1946. In order to explain this renewed militancy

necessary to look

'^a

that the U.S.

among

the ranks of labor,

economy was undergoing

it

is

in the late 1960s:

the history of American trade unionism cannot be divorced from the evolution
of

American capitalism. David Gordon, Michael Reich, and Richard Edwards have
developed a market segmentation schema that explains

how

organized labor has

the contours of nineteenth and twentieth century U.S. capitahsm.

based on the analyses of prevaihng

''social structures

fit

Their approach

into

is

of accumulation'" that the authors

define as "the constellations of institutions which condition growth and accumulation in a
3

given capitalist economy."

According

to

Gordon, Reich and Edwards, the U.S. entered "the stage of

contemporary capitalism''

at the

end of World

War

II

as a

new

social structure

of

Richard Amstrong, '^Labor 1970: Angry, Aggressive, Acquisitive/' For/WA?^, October
1969, 95.
2

See David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards, Michael Reich, Segmented Work Divided
Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States (New York:

Cambridge University

Press, 1982).

3

D. M. Gordon, 'Prosperity to stagnation in the postwar economy;' in Michael A.
Bemstein and David E. Adler, eds.. Understanding American Economic Decline (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 48.

90

accumulation arose. In

this

new phase of capitalist

depressions and managed aggregate

development, the government avoided

demand by using

fiscal

and monetary policies; the

country -s military and economic leadership guaranteed
a stable world market and "a
limited capital-labor accord" contained and institutionalized
conflict within a collective

bargaining system.

aggregate

As

the 1960s

demand management,

came

to a close,

Reich contends, 'Ihe system of

the structure of the international political

economy, and

the domestic limited capital-labor accord each were no longer
functioning to promote
prosperity..." This triggered "a shift from contained to disruptive class
conflict.""*

Between 1966 and 1973,

strike activity increased

40 percent over the

relatively

low

level

of the 1959-1966 period.^

By
was

the time Richard

Nixon took

office, a quarter century

in jeopardy. Increasingly competitive

of American prosperity

European and Japanese firms were

undermining the posidon of the United States as the world's dominant economic power.
Moreover, foreign liberation movements, such as the revolutionary

tide in

Vietnam, were

challenging the U.S.' hegemonic position. The military spending necessary to maintain

such a position was a major drain on the productive capacity of the country.

On the home

front, the limited truce

between corporations and organized labor began

promises of rising

wages, heightened job security and improved working conditions

were not met. The

real

shift

from economic boom

between 1948 and 1966, the

real

to stagnation

median family income had

had begun

to dissolve as the

in the

mid-1960s:

risen at a rate of 3.1;

between

4

Michael Reich, "Capitalist Development, Class Relations and Labor History," in J.
Carroll Moody and Alice Kessler-Harris, eds.. Perspectives on American Labor History.

The Problems of Synthesis (Dekalb: Northern
^Gordon, "Prosperity and Stagnation," 61.
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Illinois Press, 1990), 40.

1966 and 1973,

it

would

fall to 2.2.

'The

typical U.S. family,"

racing simply to stay in place. Prosperity had clearly
given
In 1969, the average

way

in cost-of-living seriously affected workers, since unions

real

wages;

claims,

"was

to eroding well-being."^

American worker was worse off than he had been four years

During the 1969-70 recession, consumer prices rose by

escalators in a

Gordon

number of contracts.

if rising prices

The

5.5 percent.^

earlier.

increase

had given up cost-of-living

In an age of inflation,

what mattered was the trend of

threatened to reduce real wages, workers would try to keep

abreast or ahead of inflation. Beginning with the electrical manufacturers in October

1969, followed by trucking, meatpacking, rubber and automobiles
industries

were scheduled

to negotiate

new

in

1970, five major

three-year contracts. Not only did organized

labor react vigorously against the decline in their members" real wages but

it

also dealt

with issues related to health and safety, intensification of the work pace, retirement, and
bargaining conditions. The 102-day walkout against General Electric not only indicated
the willingness of workers to strike for long periods of time but also revealed a reduced

corporate leverage over the workforce.

On

the one hand, unemployment, a traditional

source of capitalist leverage, was not a threat in 1969.

availability

of union

strike funds, social insurance

On

the other hand, the increased

and unemployment compensation

provided laid-off workers with a cushion. In October 1969,

GE

employees decided

to

take advantage of this reduced corporate leverage and use their most powerful weapon,

the strike.

Gordon, 45.

Irving Ross,

"How to

tell

when

the unions will be tough," Fortune, July 1975, 100.
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In the course of the

GE walkout,

147,000 workers in 34 states struck for more

than three months. Fifteen unions coordinated their

efforts,

while the

AFL-CIO

conducted a successful ftindraising campaign and mounted a
nationwide consumer

The

boycott.

hoped

GE

to forge

strike also offered a

golden opportunity to those militant students

an alliance with the rank and

file.

instances of cooperation between the student

moments
collars

the

During the walkout, there were

and the striking unions, but these

did not amount to a student-worker alliance. Instead, the strike proved that
blue

were neither acquiescent nor comfortably middle

assumed. In

own

left

who

fact,

rank and

filers

were turning

class, as

militant, but they

many

observers had

were doing so on

their

terms. Considering that the workers were striking one of the richest corporations in

US,

it

is

ironic that the Wall Street

by pointing out

pay."

that

The goal

its

certainly

was not mundane

and the

GE

International

GE's workers.

Radio and Machine Workers of America

Electrical,

Union of Electrical Workers (lUE). The

since 1946 and

AFL-CIO

to

national contracts with the corporation spearheaded the

campaign against GE: the United

called at

to tarnish labor's militancy

"prime goal" was "money;" "such mundane matters as workers'

The two unions holding

(UE) and the

Journal should attempt

affiliated

marked the end of bitter

rivalry

lUE. As historians Ronald L.

strike

was

the

first

between the independent

Filippelli

UE

and Mark McColloch

point out, "The Cold War's chilling effect on American society struck deep into the heart

of the American labor movement." In 1949 and 1950, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) expelled eleven of its

domination."

Due

to

its

affiliates for

being under "Communist

left-wing leaning and, at the time, unacceptable position on

Wall Street Journal, 8 December 1969, 22,

93

foreign policy, the
charter

UE was one of the casuahies in the purge.

was revoked,

CIO

the

machine

leaders were supported not only by the

among

Twenty years

later,

and a number of AFL-CIO
the 1969 strike, the

UE

industries. In its organizing drive, the

CIO

but also by the government, the Catholic

Church, the media, and the electrical corporations
exploit the division

after the

Executive Board established another union, the lUE,
with

jurisdiction in the electrical, radio and

lUE

Immediately

that did not

miss the opportunity to

their employees.^

the

GE

walkout transformed the relationship between the

affiliated unions.

UE

For almost six months before the onset of

UE and the lUE had been developing

an understanding on the

presentation of economic issues and on allied cooperation with other unions. "All agreed

that

come what may,"

be the key to success

When
economic and

unionists later recalled, "they

in negotiations with

Not only did rank and

they also attempted to deal a

relations. In his evaluation

"the issues which

Ronald

of the

blow

GE

to

That would

GE's

strike,

the rank and file the

1

969, the workers'

filers

demands were both

intend to obtain a

take-it-or-leave-it

wage

increase,

approach to labor

Michael Harrington rightly pointed out

that

most intransigent are those involving

Mark McColloch, Cold War in the Working Class: The Rise and
United Electrical Workers (Albany, NY: State University of New York

L. Filippelli and

Decline of the
Press, 1995),

'"james

make

fatal

stick together."'"

GE.

picket lines went up on October 26,

contractual.

would

J.

1,

167.

Matles and James Higgins, Them and Us: Struggles of a Rank-and-File Union

(Englewood

Cliffs,

New Jersey:

Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974), 262.
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whether they are treated as human beings or as cogs
perception

common

in a

in intellectual circles at the time,

not been superseded by

life

machine."

'

Contrary to the

by the mid-1960s,

life at

work had

outside work; there had not been a shift from the
"primacy of

labor" to the "primacy of consumption." In sociologist
David Halle's words, "Life at and
life

outside the workplace coexist as usually separate spheres,
sometimes in harmony,

more often

in various degrees

of class conflict

that

of tension.

And

can take several forms."

life at

GE

work remains an important source

workers struck because

their

wages

lagged behind rising prices, but they also struck against "Boulwarism," the
company's
paternalistic

approach to negotiations.

Lemuel R. Boulware,
"a formula"-which

came

the retired head of GE"s

to be

known

employee

as "Boulwarism"- to

relations,

had designed

weaken and destroy

the

unions representing the corporation's workers. GE's method of negotiation was a year-

round program of "employee communications," which portrayed the corporation as the
sole defender of the workers'

contractual proposals for

however,
to

economic

interests.

GE allowed the unions to present their

months before bargaining began. Before signing

GE would present a counterproposal

on a

a contract,

take-it-or-leave-it basis.

According

James Crompton, chairman of the AFL-CIO Coordinated Bargaining Committee,

the

Michael Harrington, "GE Strike Points Up Social Issues," Washington Star, 4
November 1969, newspaper clipping in GE Strike Files, Box 26, lUE Archives, Special
Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries (Hereafter RUL).
12

Working Man: Work, Home, and Politics among Blue-Collar
Property Owners (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 299.
David Halle, America

's
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company's technique rested "on the assumption
like all costs,

workers are primarily cost items and

that

something to be minimized by any means."'^

Unionists used "Boulwarism" as a pejorative term meaning
the refusal by

management

to

amend a

first

offer in labor negotiations. In the past, the

UE

and the lUE,

which represented seventy percent of GE's organized workers, had
negotiated separate
contracts with the

company. The smaller and

GE's employees were forced
According

to

UE

marking time,

that they

to accept

to bargain individually

with the local plant management.

leader James Matles: "Everyone understood that this

corporation unveiled

enough

isolated unions that represented the rest of

its

were waiting
offer in

its

until

own

GE handed terms to UE and lUE."'"*

time, once workers had

GE"s proposal. As soon

as the terms

enough

when

for the workers. Eventually,

no option but

By
the

GE created the

to take

GE

production industries.

among

On

October

as "a horrible

7,

said, "take

it

publicizing plant-by-

its

offer

or leave

it,"

was good

UE

and lUE had

the different unions,

1969,

GE

had managed

inferior to those

to

make

of other mass

GE made its first offer. lUE president Paul

example of deceptive packaging which gives with one

AFL-CIO American Federationist,
"*Ibid.,

By

impression that

wages and working conditions of its employees

it

become impatient

it.

fostering antagonism

Jennings described

The

had been announced, the company

tried to sign individual plant contracts as quickly as possible.

plant "'progress" in negotiations,

was no more than

July 1970,

251.
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1.

8

hand and takes away with the

Ahhough
offer to

the biggest

its

other, adding

money-maker

The company offered
little in

"better than nothing,"

UE News report,

first

GE history."''

the smallest

due

employee. But

to cost-of-living

practically nothing in pension, health, welfare, vacation

cost of living adjustments.

UE charged,

sick or injured

made

in

year, nothing proposed for the second

lost 12.9 percent in raises

but

GE

it

was "next

GE hospitalization plan was

The

to nothing."'^

workers got approximately

The company had not changed

regular wages.

one of the worst offers

to a 6 percent increase for the average

over the past three years, workers had

and holidays, and

to

in the country, the corporation

workers: twenty cents per hour the

and third years. This amounted

increases.

up

According

fifty

to a

1969

percent of their

the plan for over thirteen years^ although

health care costs had increased considerably.'^

According

to an

lUE News

editorial, the

GE

strike

was "a

fight for

economic

1

justice, on-the-job dignity

and true union recognition/'

Workers expected

to gain

wage

increases in each of the three years of the contract, a cost of Hving protection, additional

holidays and vacations, and a

substantial

improvements

fair sick

in pensions.

leave plan.

The

striking unions also sought

GE offered to raise the minimum pension from $

4.50 per month to $ 5.00 per month for each year of service; the unions were asking for a

15

'"GE's otter tar shorter ot worker needs,"

'^Interview with Steve Testor and his wife,

November

1969,

lUE News,

members of the

6.

^^UENews, 19 May 1969,3.
*

^lUE News,

1

8

December 1 969,

16 October 1969,

4.
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UE

3.

Local 703,

UE News,

17

minimum of $

7.50. Finally,

workers were fighting

for their right to take unresolved

grievances to arbitration as well as to engage in genuine
contract negotiation.'^

Many new
found

faith in the

Promises (1973)

leftists

saw

in the

GE

walkout an opportunity to

working class as an agent of social change. Stanley Aronowitz"
False
is

a good example of Herbert Marcuse"s popularity

as well as of their disenchantment with trade unionism and.

themselves. Like most radicals in the

late

to

at

among new

leftists

times, with the workers

1960s, Aronowitz regarded unions as totally

integrated and subordinated to the large corporations.

Aronowitz

new -

illustrate their

The 1969

GE

strike,

however, led

concede:

Despite the conservative ideology of labor leaders and legal constraints upon
them, rank-and-file pressure today is occasionally (my emphasis) able to force
unions to lead the fight against employer efforts to transfer the working class the

burdens of recessions or the dislocations of the labor force

that occur during

periods of technological change.

The Wall

Street Journal conservatives shared the

role that labor leadership played.

According

crusade against "Boulwarism" only because
political survival as

claimed,

GE

union

leaders.'*

found out what

its

new

to the journal,

this

GE

leftists'

union leaders launched a

policy threatened "their

own

Under "Boulwarism," The Wall Street Journal

employees wanted, sought information

through the unions, and balanced these desires against the company's

making

low opinion of the

directly

and

situation, thus

the best offer possible. Employees, the newspaper admitted, were

understandably concerned about inflation's inroads on their earnings. Substantial

^"^lUENews. 6 November 1969, 3
20

Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises: The Shaping ofAmerican Working Class
Consciousness (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), 223.
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increases, however,

slowdown. This

would be

rhetoric

was

inflationary

when

the

economy was sHpping

part of the barrage of anti-union propaganda
designed to

confuse the issues connected with wages, prices, profits
and

The

radical students'

inflation.^'

and the conservatives' appraisals, however, differed on a

fundamental point. To the mainstream press, labor leaders needed the

GE

guarantee their political survival.

To

by the rank-and-file

GE strike. One thing at least is clear:

workers and

their

into a

to support the

union leaders

-

the

new

leftists,

whatever their

labor leaders

ulterior motives-

strike to

had been compelled
both the

GE

viewed collective

bargaining as the most effective instrument in dealing with the corporation in the era
of

monopoly

capitalism.

The Wall Street Journal was not exceptional
the strike, the organizers of the Citizens

that

it

was "a sad commentary on

Committee

By

in its anti-union stand.

to Support the

the state of journalism in

GE

America"

Strikers claimed

that accounts

Michael Harrington and Bayard Rustin should have been "the only columns
the press in support of the strike." Rustin's appeal to support the strikers

in thirty-two

worker

were

African-American newspapers. He contended

to

by

appear in

was published

that ''the security

of every

America, black or white, and the future of the collective bargaining process"

in

at stake in the drive against

"all the

the end of

advantages

in a

GE. Harrington

boom of high

profits

stressed the fact that

GE

and then expect the unions

could not take

to be ascetics in

22

the

name

ot fighting inflation."

^'ibid.
22

"A New

Coalition for Justice...

Support the

GE

Strikers," 8-9,

A report on the activities of the Citizens Committee to

GE

Strike Files,
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Box

26,

lUE Archives, RUL.

As wages
were alarmed

had already

wage

failed to

at the rising

fallen

keep pace with soaring prices
family budget and

below the yearly average

at

in the late 1960s, labor analysts

the fact that workers' purchasing

Were

for 1965.

the unions'

power

demands

for

increases as inflationary as the corporations claimed?
In his Washington Star

column, Harrington provided a different explanation:

of all, war and defense spending generally are, among their other tragic
aspects, inflationary, since they pay people but do not provide
goods and services
on the domestic market. That is one more reason why, when the Vietnam
horror
First

ends,

23
it

so crucial to reduce military spending...

is

The AFL-CIO, however,
struggle," nor linked oppression

November

neither presented the strike as an instance of "class

by

GE to the

28, 1969, after the fourth

Meany made

war

week of the

24

General Electric products.''

twenty-one major
to turn off

strike,

to U.S. imperialism.

AFL-CIO

AFL-CIO

great reluctance but complete determination that

all

Vietnam or

cities across the

GE. "We need your

president George

president explained: "It

we announce

[...]

is

with

a consumer boycott

A union advertisement, which appeared in

US, outlined the

strike issues

and called on consumers

help," the ad stated, "and the help of every

American who

25

believes in fair play."

The 1969

national boycott of GE products

AFL-CIO. This was

not,

however, the

23

Harrington,

On

the decision to take the dispute into the marketplace, and thus to build a

broader base of support for the campaign. The

against

in

"GE

Strike Points

Up

first

the

first

ever to be called by the

time that American workers viewed

Social Issues.'

24

AFL-CIO News, 29 November

was

1969, 4.

25

Allied Industrial Worker, January 1970, 12.
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themselves collectively as consumers rather than
producers. As historian Dana Frank
says,

'The

politics

of consumption

[...]

have been central

to class conflict

and working-

class self-organization throughout U.S. history,
in periods of both expansion and

retrenchment."^^

By

the mid-1960s organized labor had adopted a

position toward consumption, but

it

could

still

more defensive

mount boycotts under

specific

circumstances. Cesar Chavez, the director of the United Farm Workers
Organizing

Committee had revived the boycott
fully

as a labor tactic in 1968.

supported Chavez' crusade to organize California farm workers, whose
yearly

wages were

far

below the $ 3,000 poverty

level.

The mass boycott of table grapes was

crucial in the drive to grant farm workers the legal rights that
held.

The AFL-CIO leadership

To most Americans,

it

was

most other workers already

clear that agribusiness exploited unorganized farm

workers.

The boycott of GE products was

a different affair.

The

GE

striking

workers were

not only organized but also considerably better off than the California migrant farm

workers. Yet inflation and the price squeeze clearly showed the instability of American
blue-collar workers' "middle-class status." During the drive against

GE,

the

did not draw exclusively upon working-class solidarity -as the Seattle Labor

had done

in the

AFL-CIO
movement

1920s- but on the widespread support of the American public. The

unions presented the

GE

strike

and boycott as a contest with a "greedy" corporation

that

26

See

Dana Frank 's Purchasing Power: Consumer

Labor Movement,
University Press,

]
1

91 9-1 929 (Cambridge,

New

and the Seattle
York, and Melbourne: Cambridge
Organizing, Gender,

994).

27

Dick Meister, "La Huelga Becomes La Causa," in Melvyn Dubofsky, ed. American
Labor since the New Deal (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 260-277.
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5

had a long record of contempt not only for collective
bargaining but also

for

consumer

protection laws.

The boycott
press. Full-page

of business by

strategy quickly

company ads

became a major

target

of criticism in the mainstream

stated that "everybody loses" in a boycott

GE would bring a loss of jobs.

the stores, labor critics claimed that "the line

and

that a loss

Regarding informational pickets outside

between "information'' and coercion

in

such

circumstances [was] extremely fme."^^ Most newspapers failed to
notice that the

company was
payments

also using coercion: General Electric had attempted to prevent
welfare

to strikers in

New York,

During the 102-day

strike,

Tennessee, Texas and other

GE

considerable community support. At

rank and

St.

filers

proved

states.^^

to

be capable of building

Michael's hall in Lynn, Massachusetts, the

union served between 500 and 600 meals a day. In Akron, Ohio, the Hudson's Lumber

Company gave workers
also count

on

the

Those with high

money

free

wood

to

keep them warm on the picket

line.

Strikers could

paid for picket-line duty and on donations from other workers.

skills living in industrialized areas

went on welfare or simply dipped

were able

into their savings.

workers any credit for the organizing

to find interim jobs; others

Newspapers, however, seldom gave

effort that the strike

and boycott against

GE

demanded.
Wall Street Journal reporter David Gumpert explained
struck "the

modem,

Gumpert argued,

painless way."

As

the workers had alternative sources of income,

"strikers did not suffer all that

28

Wall Street Journal, 28 November 1969, 12
29

Springfield Union,

1

December 1 969,

how GE workers had

1

102

much." The favorable

social

and

economic conditions
long. Buttressing the

in the U.S.

had made

it

possible for the workers to hold out for so

myth of the "middle-class"

blue-collar worker,

Gumpert

cited the

example of Robert Thompson, an 18-year veteran with
GE: "When things looked bleak

at

Christmas for the Thompson family, that symbol of
middle-class opulence -the Master

Charge

credit card-

came

to rescue."

The

reporter added that the

Thompsons had not

yet

received the bills for the $400 worth of goods they had bought.
America's prosperous,

middle-class society had taken care of the strikers.^^

The news coverage overlooked

weapon was

the strike fund.

the fact that the

James Matles, general

proposed a $1 a week contribution from

The

workers' most powerful

secretary-treasurer of the

union members

in support

of the

UE,

GE

strikers.

UAW pledged to contribute up to $ 5 million to the eleven striking AFL-CIO unions.

In a telegram to

was "the
in

all

GE

Meany,

UAW president Walter Reuther stated that winning the strike GE

task of the entire labor

Washington

DC

movement" and

and discuss the

details

of the

invited the

AFL-CIO

UAW proposal.^'

president to meet

Paul Jennings,

president of the lUE, found Reuther's "readiness to help meet the challenge of
historic struggle

of the

GE

worker and

his family

[...]

32

responded to Reuther' s telegram.
dollar contribution in the

In the end, the

heartening," but

[...]

the

Meany never

UAW simply deposited a million

name of the United Labor Defense Fund

to

Aid

GE

strikers.

30

Wall Street Journal, 5 February 1970,

^'waiter Reuther* s

lUE

Archives,

letter to

10.

George Meany, 9 November 1969,

Paul Jennings'

Archives,

Strike Files,

Box

26,

RUL.

32

lUE

GE

letter to

Walter Reuther, 14 November 1969,

RUL.
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GE

Strike Files,

Box

26,

The

UAW's

"guarded conciliatory gesture toward

Journal described

it,

received a cool response from the

to Reuther's estimate, the

have been able

AFL-CIO

leadership. According

AFL-CIO, which was nine times bigger than

to contribute

up

to $

however, contributions by

strike,

archrival," as the Wall Street

its

45 million to the

AFL-CIO

strike fund.^^

individual locals'

the

UAW, should

At the end of the

amounted

to

approximately

34

$ 2.8 million.

The

GE

November,

the

setting

strike also gathered support outside the ranks

League

for Industrial

up the Citizens Committee

to

Democracy (LID) took
Support the

GE

of organized labor. Late in

the

steps towards

first

Strikers. A. Philip

Randolph, the

legendary trade unionist and founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
helped
to

assemble the Committee's sponsors and

rights

movement,

the religious

otTicers.

community, the

responded to Randolph's appeal. Former

Prominent Americans from the

intellectual

Illinois

worid and the

civil

political scene

Senator Paul H. Douglas agreed to

serve as Chairman, Bayard Rustin as Vice Chairman, Father George B. Ford as treasurer,

and

Tom Kahn as
Kahn was

Coordinator.

also the Executive Director of LID, a staunch anti-Communist and a

long-time foe of SDS. In The Sixties, Todd Gitlin portrays
laborer from Brooklyn"

who was

disregarded both the labor

of class resentment of an

movement and

Charies B. Camp, "Reuther

Up to

"full

Vows

to

Kahn

SDS

the liberal establishment.

Seek Big Raises

$ 5 million," Wall Street Journal, 10

^''gE Strike Contributions as of 2/12/70,

as "the son of a

November

GE

in 970;

elite" that

To Kahn, SDS

UAW Offers GE Strikers

1969.

Strike Files,
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manual

Box

26,

lUE

Archives,

RUL.

regulars were "sort of playing a lot of intellectual
games."'' During the

welcomed

the creation of a

Youth Committee

to Support the

GE

GE

Strikers.

and Penn Kemble, the new committee's coordinators,
reminded students

- not

"supporting the unions

telling

them how

to run their strike,"^'

strike,

Max

Kahn

Green

that they

and insisted

were

that the

boycott of GE products was the area in which students
could be most effective.
Student radicals did not intend to "teach" workers
against

how to

GE, but many shared Stanley Aronowitz" view of the

opportunity for the Left." Aronowitz argued that the

GE

organize their drive

strike as

"a unique

was giving

struggle

radicals "a

chance to make the connections between corporate responsibility for imperialism
and war

and the malevolent hypocrisy of this corporate leader and the conspiracy against

American workers"
that

plagued

In fact,

some

SDS

living standards

and job conditions." Despite the factional divisions

at the time, radicals

found numerous ways of supporting the

organizers of the Citizens Committee to Support the

concerned about "the low level of activity on the part of the

GE

official

strikers

strikers.

were

(my emphasis) Youth

Committee."

New leftists contributed money
GE

goods and protested against

the

most militant

GE recruiters on campus.

in their support

...

35

Todd Gitlm, The

and food, walked on picket

Sixties: Years

of the

strikers.

lines,

boycotted

all

Massachusetts' students were

Anti-GE actions were staged

the

at

of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Books,

1987), 119.

'^Youth Committee
Files,

Box

26,

lUE

John Haynes"

to

Support the

Archives,

letter to

GE

Workers,

letter

addressed to students,

GE

Strike

RUL.

Paul Jennings,

GE

Strike
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I

File,

Box

26,

lUE

Archives,

RUL.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston College,
Holy Cross, Northeastern,

Boston University and the University of Massachusetts
Amherst. On October 30 and

31,

1969, radical students along with a group of strikers from
Lynn and Ashland picketed a

GE recruiter at MIT.
Three; Organize to

GE's

The

protesters sang "Solidarity" and chanted "Six, Five,
Four,

Smash GE!" Students saw such

exploitation of the workers in

its

plants,

activism as an opportunity to protest

and more importantly, the company's

complicity in U.S. imperialism as the fourth largest defense contractor.

slogans were

"GE world

Students

recruiters

Young

at

scab" and "Ho, Ho,

down

evolved into

at all points,"

BC

GE

personnel

that, if the strike

39

racial protest.

were

SDS

and the

to succeed,

GE had to

including campus recruiting. Their success had been "a

students

who

participated."

A

similar action at

One hundred members of the

blocked students from seeing

GE

also prevented

from conducting interviews on campus. The Boston College

great boost to the

yes.

Chi Minh."^^

Boston College and Holy Cross

People's Socialist League contended

be "shut

Ho

Among the

Holy Cross

Revolutionary Student Union

GE recruiters. As protesting

students chanted, "Workers

no," counter demonstrators chanted, "Freedom yes. Students yes." This

GE action resulted

in the suspension

anti-

of twelve white and four black students. The Black

Student Union contended that a disproportionate number of black demonstrators - four
out of five- had been selected for punishment. In protest, sixty-four black students -the

Old Mole, 7-21 November 1969,

7.

Old Mole, 21 November- 4 December 1969,

8.

106

whole black student population- along with

forty whites quit school until the
sixteen

student demonstrators were reinstated by the Holy
Cross administration.^^

At Boston University, an anti-GE demonstration ended
a hundred

officer,

SDS members

was conducting

bloody melee. About

break up a seminar that George Meyer, a

tried to

at the

in a

BU

GE

personnel

Business School. As soon as the police arrived,

skirmishes broke out. Twenty-four students were arrested while
three officers and a

number of protesters were
struggle.

On December

seven hours.

BU

injured.

10, activists

Among the

students"

campus -unless they agreed

radicals,

occupied the

demands were

UE Local

BU

their

administration building for twenty-

the banning of GE recruiters from

company— and

to debate the strike against the

university committing to participate in the

later,

however, did not give up on

AFL-CIO

also the

boycott of GE products.

A

few days

205 Treasurer Charles Lovell and International Representative Florence

Criley delivered ''union thanks" at a meeting of 1,200

BU

students.

UE

appreciated the

41

students' "wide support for the strike."

Striking workers were rarely involved in student demonstrations against
university campuses.

examples of such

The

protests at

participation.

highly limited. The strikers

GE on

MIT, Boston College and Boston University

are

But the cooperation between students and workers was

who

directly supported the radical students' demonstrators

were overwhelmingly from the UE.

If students

were

intent

on using the

GE

strike to

connect corporate responsibility for U.S. imperialism to the Vietnam War, the UE's stand

40

Boston Globe 13 December 1969, 1,5; Boston Globe, 14 December 1969, 1.14,
^

^^Springfield Union, 12

December 1969,

37;

UE News,

107

15

December 1969,

7.

on the

conflict

made

it

easier for the radicals to estabhsh a link
with

some of the union

members.

Long an opponent of the Cold War,
since 1965,

when

the U.S.

had turned the

the

UE had

spoken against the Vietnam War

conflict into an

American war. In

its

publications, the union linked the declining workers'
living standards both to the
to

raw corporate power. 'The current

due

inflation,'" the

to the sharp increase in military spending... and

advantage of these military expenditures."'*^
industrial

GE was

complex,

company

As one of the

a perfect target for the

fostered U.S. imperialism and exploited

UE News

war and

stated in July 1969,

'"is

price profiteering to take

pillars

New Left:

of the military-

a corporation that both

American workers.

Rather than the organizational worker-student alliance

(WSA)

that the

Pro gressive Labor faction envisioned, the cooperation between workers and radical
students resulted in

more

individual activism. Boston College activists claimed that,

although small, their protests had shown to "a few students" that workers were not
''redneck bigotsr and to
43

hate their fathers/'

^^a

few workers^'

radicals should not be overstated.

totally inadequate to

similarities

between the

improve the

lot

of the working

bargaining.

My

1969,

UE

While the PLP worker-student

the lUE, intended to protect the living standards of their

^^UE News, 2S

were not

New leftists tried to capitalize on the workers'

oppose the power of GE. However, the

unionism as

that radical students

6.

Old Mole, 21 November- 4 December 4 1969,

108

8,

^^spoiled kids

who

determination to

and the young

alliance

class, the

members through

viewed trade

UE,

as well as

collective

At

the University of Massachusetts, the

GE

class affluence and conservatism to the
forefront.

brought the issue of working-

strike

Don

GHckstein, the editor of the Daily

Collegian, the student newspaper, contended that the
allegedly oppressed workers earned
a

wage

that

was good enough

Although he admitted
that

GE

that

had offered was

an American worker: $ 3.25/hour plus benefits.

for

"Boulderism" was "unjust and

fair

enough. Consequently,

support the "racist lUE, or the UE, which had close

it

illegal," the

was

20c/hour increase

hypocritical for the

SDS

to

with the "highly- Wallace

ties

veering Auto Workers" and "the crime ridden Teamsters." Organized
labor was not only
affluent, in Glickstein's view.

It

was

accusation. Dillard said that $3.25

new

leftist

added

that

it

and hawkish.

SDS member

In a letter to the editor,

below the $10,000 needed

racist

Peter H. S. Dillard responded to Glickstein's

amounted

for a family

to $ 6,760 per year. This

of four, according

was "good propaganda

to the federal

sum was

govemment. The

to point out the figure $3.25/hr., to a

college community, since the average college kid.. .gets even less on his

remembers

that

and not bound

he "made"

to

spend the

it.

well

summer job and

Yet, most college students, Dillard claimed, were single

rest

of their

lives in a factory. Finally,

working sentiment among students who would graduate

into

he lamented such

"one of the most

anti-

class-

45

oriented societies in the world."

Campus

protests against

GE also prompted a response from lUE

University of Massachusetts radicals" dismay, Paul Jennings sent them a

"warning" the night before a campus

sit-in to protest the

44

Daily Collegian, 31 October 1969,

6.

45

Daily Collegian, 3 November 1969,

7,

109

leaders.

letter

To

of

presence of GE recruiters.

the

Violent protests, the president of the

SDS

lUE

asserted,

would not help

meeting, students condemned Jennings for two
reasons.

argued, his statement

was

also an attack

on the rank-and-file

First,

UMass SDS

At an

SDS members

strikers

militant action. Second, they felt that the recruiters
had "no place

they were scabs." The

the strikers.

who had

taken

on campus because

chapter finally opted for a "non-obstructive"

demonstration and a petition to the administration, calling for the
halt of GE recruitment

meetmgs on campus.

46

On December
Society at

UMass

Henry Lussier,

told

them

12, 1969,

about 20 members of the Students for a Democratic

staged a brief, peaceful

secretary-treasurer of the

that the

sit-in

outside the administration building.

New England lUE,

union appreciated their

support.'*^

He

of competent

GE employees.

collaborate with the strikers, Lussier claimed,

products. In an official statement, the

conscious young people"

who

lUE

was

disruptions

worked

supported the

GE

to the advantage

December 1 969,

1

Boston Globe, 12 December 1969, 23
48

Springfield Union, 12

The

best

in the union's

way

for students to

of GE

strikers.

However, the lUE president
their

freedom of speech."

of the company, not the union or the

46
1 1

was not

leadership praised the efforts of "socially

workers.

Daily Collegian,

it

to take part in the boycott

disavowed "those who break up meeting and deny others

Campus

the students and

also asked the protesters to stop

distributing literature that contained misstatements of fact:

interest to prevent the hiring

met with

December 1969, 37

110

lUE

officials

were embarrassed by supportive gestures coming
from such groups

as the Progressive Labor Party or the

The Boston Globe reported

that

some Lynn

the rhetoric and the tactics that the

claimed:

over."

"We

Mai

Youth Revolutionary November Action

new

don't want to smash GE.

Mitchell, another

employee

workers preferred to demonstrate

themselves. The unions

welcomed

used. John Heim, aged thirty-three,

leftists

We want to return to work after this

in their

strikers also feared that the students

were "downright hostile" toward both

strikers

at the

Coalition.

Lynn

plant, told the

own way,

strike is

newspaper

that

"picketing without violence."

were simply trying

to

gamer

Many

publicity for

the students" support as long as

it

was confined

to

helping conduct a boycott of GE. Peter Di Cicco, business agent of striking
Local 201 of
the

lUE

preferred the student demonstrators to follow the "union's guidelines,

Historian Peter

lUE and
the

UE

the

Levy

AFL-CIO was

built

and the student

activists.

"warm"

new

eventually

to the

Jennings issued a "Statement
Strike."

rightly claims that "the

on a shakier foundation" than

the cooperation

Contrary to Levy's conclusion, the

leftists'

On

New Left's collaboration

AFL^CIO

this

was "a

between
did not

participation in the unions' drive against

that there

GE.

were "many well-meaning students who

wantfed] to join their support for the strike to their opposition to the war

AFL-CIO,

with the

Confrontation Tactics, Vietnam and the General Electric

The lUE president admitted

but, to the

49

serious mistake."

The

GE

strikers,

wanted the "support of responsible anti-war students" as well as

49

Boston Globe, 18 December 1969,

4.

Ill

that

in

Vietnam,"

Jennings explained,

of "others on the

campuses,

in the general public,

and

[their]

own

rank and

file

- who

[had] different views

on Vietnam.
In an

AFL-CIO American

Federationist

Way Now?" Kahn chastised the New Left
styles with

article, entitled

for being "a

no shared sense of direction, and very

internal differences." Nevertheless,

Kahn

"American Youth: Which

melange of grouplets, projects and

often, with

profound and even

bitter

admitted, numerous students had responded

positively to highly publicized labor struggles such as the farm
workers strike and the

nation wide campaign against GE. In Kahn's view,

LID had helped

build student-worker

collaboration through workshops, student-labor institutes and different
action projects.^'

This attempt to strengthen the

however, was

when

far

between the labor and academic communities,

from the "revolutionary" coalition

turning to the labor

James Higgins, a
been a turning point
first

ties

movement

in the winter

staff contributor for

in the relations

between

that

some SDS

factions had sought

of 1969-70.

The Nation, argued
intellectuals

that the

and organized

GE

strike

labor.

had

For the

time since the upheavals of the 1960s, "union and campus" had "been talking
,.52

together."

in

This cooperation paved the

October of 1 970.

Among the

way

for a

more formal academic-labor

alliance's promoters

were

MIT professor and Nobel

50

Peter B. Levy, The

New Left and Labor in

Illinois Press, 1994), 151;

the 1960s

Paul Jennings, "Statement

and the General Electric Strike,"

GE

Strike

I

File,

(Urbana

On

Box

alliance

& Chicago: University of

Confrontation Tactics, Vietnam

26,

lUE

Archives,

RUL.

51

Tom

Kahn, "American Youth: Which

September 1970,

Way ^ov^T AFL-CIO American Federationist,

3.

^^James Higgins, "Union and Campus: Talking Together," The Nation, 6 September
1971, 171.
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Prize winner George Wald; Harold Gibbons,
vice-president of the Teamsters; Leonard

Woodcock, president of the

Members of the
attention

class,

UAW;

and Joseph Rhodes

alliance-s executive

committee were

intent

from "student unrest and "permissiveness"'"

such as unemployment,

inflation,

New leftists, however,

and

in the US...has

A

a weakness.
institutional

been

strength in that

on redirecting public

to issues that troubled the

its

it

"the definitive character of the student

rootlessness.

has enabled the

To

date, this has

New
...

been both strength and

Left to stay clear of outgrown

in that there is

which consistent operations can be

no permanent base of

constructed."^'' This undercut

the possibility of an alliance between radical students and the rank and

support

it

provided,

Many

new

working

racial injustice."

forms and functions. But a weakness

support, nothing from

Harvard Junior fellow.

did not maintain the newly developed cooperation
between

campus and union. As Higgins admitted,

movement

Jr.,

leftists

were not instrumental during the

GE

file.

Despite the

strike.

factors allowed the fifteen striking unions to maintain a strong coalition

until a settlement

was reached.

In order to rally widespread support behind the

workers, the unions appealed not only to
their counterattack

its

members

GE

but also to the general public. In

on the company's anti-labor propaganda, the unions presented

GE

as a

greedy profiteer, a "Robber Baron" whose 1968 return on investment had been 22 percent

above the average

for the nation's industrialists. This figure, the unions contended,

easy to explain:

resulted

it

from unusually low wages -worker exploitation-

was

as well as

53

Deborah Shapley, "Labor-Link: Union Heads, Academic Leaders Discuss Alliance,"
Science 170, 30 October 1970, 516,518.
54

Higgms, 174.
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unusually high prices, consumer exploitation.

GE products, the AFL-CIO took the dispute

By

calling a nationwide boycott against

into the marketplace

and thus made

it

possible for the public to join in a labor cause.

Although the company claimed

GE"s

that

"progress,'- organized labor let the public

know

^'most important product"

that

it

was

"profit

a long history of price-fixing and antitrust violations. Since 191

defendant in 65 antitrust cases, 49 of them

filed

1,

"

was

The corporation had

GE

had been the

between 1959 and 1969. The

price-fixing indictment dated from 1960 and involved $ 1.75 billion
in sales.

of the

strike, the

Company

UE

stated, "Millions

in the

came

new "Robber Baron

to a close. In a

the end

General Electric

era" were not unusual in the labor press as

review of Ferdinand Lundenberg's The Rich and the

Super Rich (1968), Steel Labor asserted

that the years

of the great family fortunes when

wealth was concentrated in a few hands were not over. '^Not only are they

he

By

big

a prime example of corporate arrogance."^^

References to a
the 1960s

of Americans [had] seen

last

said, "but bigger than ever- they

Ray MacDonald, an AFL-CIO

similar vein,

corporate octopus." The 1960s

MacDonald

own most of the

action in

America

research economist,

movement toward

still

with us,"

today.""

condemned

In a

"the

concentration of economic power,

argued, surpassed the peaks of the two previous merger waves in the 1900s

and the 1920s. The consolidation of new conglomerates affected both consumers and

'^UENews,

1

December 1969, 6

^^"Back Again

By Popular Demand," 7Vo/a

Express, 5-18 December 1969;

February 1970,3.

Steel Labor, April 1969, 11.
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UE News,

9

workers.

It

raised the prices of goods and services and
posed potential problems for

collective bargaining.'^^

According to the

UE

general officers, the unity of the

UE and the lUE at the

bargaining table was sustained because both unions
"cast aside anything which interfered
59

with winning their fight "

The unions' clashing

constituted, undoubtedly, the

inflation

major

rift

was caused not only by GE"s

positions on the

between the two. The

profiteering

extraordinary gains on selling military equipment.

1969

UE report

stated,

period, before the

War

in Vietnam."^*^

military-industrial complex.

tie

For

profits

on defense

its part,

lUE remained

contracts, a

Union ads meant

to counteract the

movement

coalition's approach to the strike

in

GE

as a pillar of the

company's propaganda

any way.

won widespread

backing. This in

turn enthused the workers with a renewed militancy. Baltimore employee

McCrukin

Jr.

explained: "People can't believe that the

workers because

its

consistent with the

foreign policy, never referring to

organized labor to the antiwar

The union

repeatedly argued that

goods but also by

civilian

GE

UE

were "25 percent higher than they were during the 1959-1963

AFL-ClO's support of American

did not

on

Vietnam War

GE has a big name.

They

company

didn't believe the

is

doing

Hugh

this to the

company was

the prices they sell the appliance in the market, they couldn't believe

so bad.

GE pays the

58

Ray MacDonald, "The Conglomerate: Corporate
Federationist, February 1969, 17-23.

^^UE News, 9 February 1 970,

^V£A^m5,28

3.

July 1969,6.
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Octopus,^'

AFL-CIO American

With

workers so
stations

little."

were open

Community groups gave sandwiches and
to collect

food for the

strikers.

coffee to pickets. Fire

Workers were invited

to explain their

grievances before religious groups. Teachers designed
special material to discuss the
strike

with their pupils. Retired workers contributed money.
Nationally

scientists, editors,

lawyers and public officials requested aid for the

Hundreds of local unions collected money

for the strike fund.

Was

GE

known

writers,

employees.

this, as

union leaders

claimed, "a glowing chapter in the history of American Labor"?^^

The three-month

strike

ended with the

first

negotiated settlement with

GE

in

twenty years. "Our members have nailed shut the casket of Boulwarism,"
claimed

The company's

Jennings.

collapsed.

take-it-or-leave-it dictates for collective bargaining

The agreement provided 50c an hour across-the-board wage

had

increases;

pay

increases of 55c to 75c an hour for high-skill workers, and four cost-of-living adjustments
in a forty

month

More

period.

rather than percentages. This

importantly, general

was intended

wage

hikes were in cents per hour

to help those workers

who

earned the least

and were hurt the most by the increasing cost of living and geographical

The unions

also

won

of service, the company's

new minimum pension of $

a

first

offer

^^UENews,

17

month

for each year

had been $ 5.00. The settlement also included

numerous health insurance improvements: payment of the

room and miscellaneous

6.50 per

63

differentials.

full cost

of a semi-private

hospital expenses for 365 days, plus elimination of the

November

1969, 7

^^UENews, 9 February 1970,
^^lUENews, 4 February 1970,

3.

3
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contributory aspect of employee insurance.
Moreover, workers obtained a

vacation after 30 years of service, and a fourth

had been

real negotiation

the bargaining.

offers.

In

The

wages and

week

after 15, rather than

was

far better

week of

20 years. There

and GE's management had moved substantially

final settlement

fifth

in the course

of

than GE's October 7 and December 6

cost-of-living adjustments, the difference resulting
from

movement

by the company since the December proposal was almost 20
cents an hour. To the lUE
president, the

new

contract

was "an

incredible victory,

won by

the strikers through unity,

determination, courage and militancy."^"*

New leftists,

for their part, regarded "the strike itself as "far

more

significant

than the settlement." Radicals viewed the renewed labor militancy as highly
promising.

Some

workers, they contended, had started to see the connections between the oppressive

GE policy

and the U.S. government goals

in

Vietnam.

considered collective bargaining to be inadequate since
to

make

who had

New
it

leftists

nevertheless

still

recognized the company's right

millions of dollars in profits each year while paying meager wages to employees
little

control over production.

by announcing, on February

When

6,

To

the radicals,

GE

a 3 percent price increase on

had the

all

last

media usually

point out that workers would have "saved" a lot of money -and trouble-

are "only" about

company made. This

is

Old Mole, 20 February-

5

March 1970,

8.
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if

they had settled

based on the assumption that

money. As Michael Harrington argued, however,

Ibid., 1-3.

in the strike

major appliances.^^

a long strike ends in contemporary capitalist society, the

for the last offer that the

word

all strikes

strikes "are often

concerned with much deeper, more social
emotions and values, with the right of men
and

women to

have, as

some of the

current theorists of American labor put

it,

Harrington did not aim to romanticize the workers'
drive against
the fact that vigorous

wage demands from

the rank and

file call for

a 'voice.'"''

GE but to

stress

considerable

organization and coordination and involve the workers'
identity both

at

and outside the

workplace. The fact that workers viewed themselves as
"consumers" as well as
"producers" did not necessarily

power of corporate America.

mean

In a

that they

message addressed

from Ashland, Massachusetts, summarized

want honest pay
filers also

made

for

it

it

and

had become incapable of challenging the

we want

to

their aims:

high school students,

"We

GE strikers

expect to work hard, but

we

an end to the back-breaking speed-up." Rank and

clear to the students that the corporation's attitude affected everybody:

GE tried to "get people to pay the highest possible price for the products" that workers
made.

The
workers
class.

strike

brought to light a number of important facts about American

in the late 1960s.

At

poverty

GE

Blue-collar workers were not fully integrated into the middle

best, they nibbled at the

line.

edges of affluence. At worst, they were below the

Contrary to what political analysts Richard M.

Wattenberg claimed, "The Social Issue" had not come

economic concerns.

New

On December 21,

York Times headlined.

Michael Harrington, Socialism: Past

J.

to replace the "old-fashioned"

1969, the Citizens Committee placed an ad in the

"A Word About Some

66

Scammon and Ben

&

Forgotten Americans."

Future (Arcade Publishmg:

GE

workers

New York,

1989),

270.

"A Message

to

High School Students from General

lUE/TJE Reports, Box 26, lUE Archives, RUL.
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Electric Strikers,'"

GE

Strike

were some of the "forgotten Americans," but they
were not the quiescent members of
Nixon's

"silent majority."

The sponsors of the advertisement

stressed the fact that these

forgotten Americans were not "the poorest of the
poor;" they were not "unemployed or

unemployable;" and they did not work

in

worked

were urged

for a corporate giant. Readers

workers by joining a picket

Even
still

if radical

line,

"marginal industries or in sweatshops;" they

boycotting

students were

among

GE

to express their solidarity with the

products or making a contribution."'

the most supportive of the

viewed trade unions as bureaucratic and manipulative

obtain the quantitative economic

demands

tilers

issues.

It

were confronting an international corporation

intransigent position for over twenty years.

however, did not appeal

to the

was
that

The

still

unions. Yet, this did not necessarily

strike,

also about power.

had held an

New Left revolutionary

project,

radical

resorted to collective bargaining and to labor

mean

that "seeds for

workers, they

GE

overwhelming majority of workers. To the

students" disappointment, workers

James Matles contends

The

GE

institutions that could only

that the leaders framed.

however, was not ''merely" about bread-and-butter

Rank and

GE

support for the status quo. In

change

in the labor

movement

are

Them and

Us,

sown among

69

rank-and-file workers by the conditions forced upon them."

strike,

it

remained

to

be seen

if the

By

the end of the

GE

seeds for change would grow.

"A Word About Some Forgotten Americans," New
Strike II, lUE/UE, Box 26, lUE Archives, RUL.
^^Matles, 304.
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York Times, 21 December 1969,

GE

CHAPTER 4
THE GM STRIKE

After the settlement that ended the 102-day

GE

strike,

union leaders insisted that

the workers' victory had "severely limited the ability
of the fourth wealthiest corporation

United States to unilaterally dispose of the welfare of the
working people and

in the

families."'

Throughout 1970, blue-collar workers continued

tried to "limit the ability"

to

make

their

headlines as they

of the Big Three automobile manufacturers -the General

Motors Corporation, the Chrysler Corporation and Ford Motor Company-

to set the tenns

of a new three-year contract with the United Automobile Workers (UAW). White House
economists regarded the results of the automobile negotiations as crucial since they were

bound

to set the pattern for talks in other industries

the U.S.

steel,

and thus have a decisive impact on

economy. Following the auto settlement, contracts would be negotiated

in the

copper, can, railroads, meatpacking, and aerospace industries as well as in the

postal service.

Early in 1970, Richard Nixon claimed that the nation's economy was slowly but

appreciably recovering from

management

its

1969 slump and exhorted both organized labor and

to avoid inflationary settlements.

Gradualism characterized the Nixon

Administration's economic agenda in 1969 and 1970, as the president waited for

and monetary policies

to

do

their

fiscal

slow job of stimulating economic growth. The

combination of fiscal austerity and monetary

restraint,

'"A statement from the General Officers of the United
Workers of America (UE)," UE News, February 1970,
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however, eventually plunged the

Electrical,
3.

Radio and Machine

country into a recession.

mired

in a

new

By mid-1970, Robert M.

economy was

condition -"stagflation"- which combined the
problem of inflation with

sluggish output and rising unemployment."'

advisors that the state of the

November

Collins contends, "The

was

It

economy could prove

congressional elections.

The

clear to Nixon's

most

realistic

the Republicans" Achilles heel in the

UAW could choose to mount a strike not only

against the General Motors Corporation but also against
the administration and the

Republican Party.

The

UAW did both.

stage a walkout against

As

GM,

contract negotiations collapsed, the union decided to

the world's largest,

most powerful and

profitable

manufacturing enterprise. By 1970, the corporation employed around 800,000
workers

woridwide, paid more than
advertising.

buses bought

It

both the

and spent 200 million dollars on

sold 52 percent of the cars, 49 percent of the trucks and 80 percent of the

in the

on the toughest

1.7 billion dollars in taxes

United States.^ There

target that they could find.

is

no doubt

The

UAW and the Nixon Administration.

that the

strike against

autoworkers were taking

GM became a test case for

The walkout revealed

the extent to

which

the various tensions within the union membership could -or could not- be overcome. In

an off-year election, moreover, the economic and

Nixon's

political

ability to capture the working-class vote that

impact of the

GM strike tested

he so badly needed. As the

2

Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 113.

in

PostM'ar America

(New

3

William Serrin, The Company and the Union: The "Civilized Relationship" of the
General Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers (New York: Alfred A.
Knoft, 1973), 70.
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economic downturn deepened, the president's
of organized

As

was

to

win

the support

labor.

the year began labor leaders were unwavering
in their criticism of the

administration's economic policies.
reports that described a bleak

the

greatest challenge

AFL-CIO

The AFL-CIO Executive Council

economic outlook. Throughout the

first

periodically issued

quarter of

1

970.

leadership insisted that "the worst combination of
economic trends

continue[d] to plague the American people.*" The inflation
rate kept rising from 4.2

percent in 1968, to 5.4 percent in 1969 to nearly 6 percent in the

Unemployment had jumped from

1.1

AFL-CIO

Executive Board claimed that the

Nixon Administration had chosen "economic restraint
economy." In the union

economy, depressing

money, high

instead of "selective measures to

leaders' view, three factors

residential construction

interest rates

quarter of 1970.

million in 1969 to 3.9 million in early 1970: this

equaled 4.7 percent of the work force. The

aid the

first

and causing

were slowing down the

rising

employment:

and the reduction of federal appropriations

tight

for essential

4

government programs.
approach, the

AFL-CIO

Despite

its

negative appraisal of the government's economic

Executive Council showed

its

willingness to collaborate with the

administration under very specific circumstances:

If the President determines that the situation requires overall stabilization

measures

[...]

the

AFL-CIO

equitably placed on

all

will cooperate.

But such mandatory controls must be

costs and incomes -including

all

prices, profits, dividends,
5

rents

Gary Fink,

and executive compensation, as well as employees' wages and

ed.,

AFL-CIO Executive

(Westport, Connecficut:

^Ibid.,

Greenwood

Council. Statements

and Reports, 1967-1972,

Press, 1977), Vol. 4, 2025-2026, 1954.

2027.
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salaries.

UAW president Walter Reuther, George Meany's archrival, was less
to the president's call for restraint in
the negotiations

between the

sympathetic

UAW and the

automobile industry. Reuther acknowledged that the
economic climate was not
favorable, considering that there were

more than 100,000 autoworkers

laid off.

Yet the

UAW president asserted that "no corporation [was] going to hide behind Mr. Nixon's
recession and try to deny [auto workers] ...equity."
Reuther stressed the incredible
profitability

of the American auto industry. From 1947

and Chrysler, Reuther

said,

to 1969,

had combined earnings of $ 35

General Motors, Ford

billion.

This figure was

equivalent to a return 14 times greater than their total investments.
Autoworkers were
entitled to a share

of those profits and the

the picket lines in 1970."

to strike out

Meany

on

his

own,

As Nelson

to test his

UAW was "prepared to fight for that equity on

Lichtenstein claims, "Walter Reuther seemed ready

new freedom

looking over his shoulder." The

with neither Lyndon Jolinson nor George

UAW president's immediate challenge was to

face a tough bargaining season and meet the expectations of a fractious membership.^
In the late 1960s, Reuther

the

had been involved

in

many

battles outside

UAW. As we have seen, the UAW leadership had been stunned by

popularity with white autoworkers in 1968.

Though they had been

autoworkers back into the Democratic column

in

November,

it

was

and inside

George Wallace's

able to swing

many

clear that racism cut

deeply through the white rank-and-file. Racism on the shopfloor, meanwhile, had led
radicalized black workers to organize dissident rank-and-file groups that fueled "black

power" ideology

^

in the plants.

The Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM)

"Reuther Urges "Total Fighf for Key '70 Proposals,"

UAW Solidarity, May

1970, 8;

Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate
ofAmerican Labor (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 429.
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formed

in

1968 and soon had offshoots

in several other plants,

Avenue Revolutionary Movement (JARUM) and

(ELRUM)

at the

Eldon Gear and Axle

groups that opposed the

plant.

the

The

such as the Jefferson

Eldom Revolutionary Movement

RUMs were black

Marxist-Leninist

UAW leadership as much as they antagonized the company.

They accused the union of perpetuating in-plant racism
and sub-standard working
conditions. Because of their revolutionary ideology and
overt hostility towards white

workers, these groups soon became isolated. Their importance,
however, should not be
underestimated. The

RUMs,

contends Heather

racism central in ways that the

Ann Thompson, "had made

the issue of

UAW leadership had never done, and they had challenged

the assumption that the leadership

was always

acting aggressively

on the workers'

behalf"^

The 1970 round of contract
Mainstream publications

negotiations took place amid these internal tensions.

dutifully covered the

developments

at

UAW,

the

the union's April collective bargaining convention in Atlantic City.

program

beginning with

The union adopted

a

for negotiations with the Big Three that stressed the losses workers had suffered

as a result of inflation and called for substantial across-the-board

restoration of full cost-of-living protection.

The delegates

should have a pension goal of $500 per month

at

wage

increases and

also voted that the union

30 years of credited

service, regardless

of age. "The loudest and longest thunderclap of applause," the UA IV Solidarity reported,

"boomed through

Heather

the Atlantic City

Convention Hall" when Walter Reuther voiced

Ann Thompson, "Auto Workers,

Lordstown,"

in

Dissent, and the

Robert Asher and Ronald Edsforth,

University of New York, 1995), 190-191.

124

eds.,

UAW:

Detroit and

Autowork (Albany:

State

his

wholehearted support for the 30 years-and-out
retirement program. The

UAW president

told the 3,142 delegates:

We

have understood

demand. You do not have to be a social psychologist
to
know why It is that there is a deep human urge on the part
of a worker who has
been buckmg a Ime for 30 years and who wants
to get out of the rat race in the
plant... Frankly, had 1 been bucking the
line for 30 years I would have been
this

raising hell about that a long time ago.^

Reuther wanted his union to win what Newsweek called
"the

UAW history."
him.

When

packag([e

many thought

that

lost their lives

much of the

UAW and the Big Three would soon die.

on a plane crash shortly

after the

zest of battle in the negotiations

between the

Yet, contrary to most analysts' predictions,

Leonard Woodcock, who took charge of the union 55 days before negotiations
skillfully

m

Moreover, he rightly claimed that rank-and-filers were solidly
behind

Reuther and his wife

convention,

fattest

guided the

started,

UAW through the summer bargaining, the autumn strike, the winter

settlement, and the workers' ratification of the pact. In a mid-term election year
marred

by recession, the

GM strike, which idled 394,000 autoworkers for almost two months,

took on special relevance.

Most

analysts agreed that Reuther' s successor

was

likely to

be

UAW vice-

president Douglas Fraser, but he withdrew from the competition for the union presidency,

The
the

UAW Executive Council eventually elected Woodcock, who had been the head of

UAW's

9

General Motors Department since 1955.

negotiations offered

president of the

Woodcock an

UAW.

The upcoming

contract

opportunity to prove his leadership

skills.

As

he could have delegated the task of negotiating with General

^"Reuther Urges "Total Fight" for Key '70 Proposals," 8
9

Lichtenstein, 440.
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Motors

to another nicnibcr

involved

in the

of the Executive Board, but he decided

bargaining process. The mainstream media
portrayed

''businesslike," "professional;'

Some
when

and "generally unemotional" than

observers believed that the union's change
the Big

to get directly

Three delivered

adversaries were far apart.

in leadership

economic

their first

Woodcock would

Woodcock

up

would

to the

more

his predecessor.'"

avert a strike.

offer in September,

try to live

as

it

was

Yet

clear that the

union's reputation for

tough bargaining.

The companies

offered a

wage

increase of 7.5 percent for the

first

contract,

and

3

percent for the following two years. The Big Three also expected
to keep the existing
ceiling of 8 cents an hour a year

on cost of living adjustments. Proposed changes

in

Supplemental Unemployment Benefits (SUB) were small: only one cent an hour
per

worker would be added

New

Christmas-

seniority.

to the

SUB

The corporations

fund.

also offered an unbroken

Year's holiday but proposed no improvements in vacations, overtime or

Finally,

workers would have

pay part of the increasing health care insurance

to

11

costs.

"Grim-faced United Auto Workers

officials,"

The Detroit Free Press reported,

"quickly rejected the three-year contract offers from the automotive Big Three." The

UAW sought "substantial" wage increases, as much as a
first

year.

allowance

More

importantly, the union aimed to remove the cap on the cost of living

(COLA) and

to obtain greater

supplemental unemployment benefits, which

provided workers with income protection

""Heading

16 to 20 percent hike for the

for the Strike

in the

event of short-term layoffs.

Nobody Wants," A/t^w.vwcv/:,

The Detroit Free Press, 2 September

1

970.

1
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As

14 September 1970, 79,

far as

pensions were concerned, autoworkers wanted
$ 500 a month, after 30 years

in the plants,

regardless of age. Apart from the unbroken
Christmas-New Year's holiday that the Big

Three offered, the union was demanding longer
vacations and the

right

of workers to

refuse overtime. While the companies expected
their employees to share the cost of

UAW called for a company-paid dental plan plus improved health-

health insurance, the

care coverage. After the corporations had announced
their

co-director of the

The

GM's

department, pointed out, "the gap

UAW's demands heightened the

issues directly related to blue-collar

analysts argued that

wage

was not

part,

The corporations

UAW signed

complained

from two and a half percent a day

members of the work

in

every area."'^

as well as

would be

many

political

inflationary.

Union

a "wage-price" spiral; a "price-wage*" spiral drove

had been significantly eroded since the

years,

enormous

is

Autoworkers were demanding higher wages because

Corporate leaders, for their

Irving Bluestone,

debate on a number of economic and social

increases in the auto industry

leaders responded that there

inflation.

life.

first offer,

force were absent

to

its

more

power

previous contract in 1967.

that absenteeism

more than

their purchasing

had doubled

five percent.

in the past ten

Moreover, younger

often than were other workers. This

was

allegedly the result of the widely publicized "blue-collar blues." If the 30-and-out

program was approved, the auto makers claimed, plants would be made
the retirement plan that the union proposed

most

was bound

to deplete the

inefficient, since

companies of their

reliable employees.

During the

UAW's negotiations

fashioned" economic issues were

still

with the Big Three,

central, as they

'^ibid.
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it

became evident

had been

at

that "old

GE. The autoworkers

were often thought of as the
blue-collar

This
to

employee

sum was below

government

Under

the

at

the

aristocrats

minimum

to a

how

had taken

its toll

on autoworkers' purchasing power.

1964 contract, workers had been guaranteed an extra penny
an hour

consumer price index, no

UAW had agreed to limit such increases

high the index climbed. In 1967. the

maximum

in 1969.

required for "modest but adequate'" income,
according

for each gain of four-tenths of a point in the
government's

matter

fact the average

any of the Big Three auto corporations earned
$ 9,599

figures. Inflation

UAW's

of the blue-collar world. But in

of 16 cents over the three years of the contract. Had the union
not agreed

to a cost-of-living cap,

by 1970 the autoworkers would have been receiving 26 cents an

hour over and above the 16 cents

that

now

autoworkers were

increasing inflation and unemployment, the

drawing.'^ In view of the

UAW considered a return to the original

cost-of-living clauses to be crucial. For the contract's

eight percent increase over 1970 base pay rates.

first

Added

year, the union called for an

to that

hour cost-of-living "overage" that workers considered "owed"

would be

the 26 cents an

to them, plus another five

cents an hour from the increase in living costs between April and July 1970. That

amounted

14

to

an average wage increase of 61.6 cents an hour.

"Non-economic" demands such

as the 30-and-Out retirement plan and the

elimination of compulsory overtime reflected grievances directly related to working

conditions in auto plants and to the nature of assembly-line work itself Autoworkers

commonly complained about

speed-ups, long hours, unhealthy and unsafe environment

and short breaks. Throughout 1970 autoworkers'

stories

appeared

in a

wide range of

'^"Heading for the Strike Nobody Wants," 80.
'"*"

Analysis of GM's Latest Economic Offer,"

UAW Solidarity, October
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1970, 4

Even Fortune,

publications.

the quintessential business magazine,
devoted

two

articles to

a thorough and empathetic discussion of
the "blue-collar blues" on the assembly
fact, the

auto corporations were particularly concerned
about blue-collar workers'

discontent, as absenteeism

missing

In

line.

was becoming a growing malady

men and women on

willing hands

is

The

effect

of

an assembly line that depends on the unbroken
chain of

Management

obvious.

in the plants.

union leaders and intellectuals alike

officials,

attempted to develop theories for such a phenomenon.

The workers themselves provided
Moses, an assembly

line

worker

at the

the most persuasive explanations. Grover

Ford River Rouge Complex

told a Detroit Free Press reporter: "I dropped

time to pick them up for two hours.

never stop coming

and had had

at

to take a

You

my

glasses yesterday and

get behind and

at

with a stopwatch watches you

all

didn't have

up.

They

Ford for seven years

for being absent too often.

another Ford Rouge assembly man, explained: "Each year the line

man

1

you can never catch

you." Moses was twenty-eight, had worked

week off -without pay-

suburban Detroit,

in

is

day and has the foreman add a

a

Henry Wilson,

little

little

faster

and the

extra to your

^

job.. .In three days,

you do

five days

work."

The increasing number of younger workers on

the auto plants

was undoubtedly

linked to the growing absenteeism. At the General Motors Corporation, for instance, out

of a

total

of 394,000 workers represented by the

years of age.
the job he

Tom

It

was

was

a fact of factory

life that

the

UAW,
more

assigned. Because their jobs were

Ricke, "The Workers'

September 1970, Section B,

View From

1

14,000 were under twenty-five

seniority a

worker had, the easier

more onerous, some

analysts argued.

the Line," The Detroit Free Press, 20

1.
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the younger workers stayed

away from

recognized the problem of absenteeism

the plant

among

more

the younger

UAW leadership also

The

often.

work

force.

Shortly before

his death, Walter Reuther said:

believe that the most important factor is a new
breed of worker
willmg to accept the discipline of the work place and
to
I

who

is

not as

have a management

decision that vetoes what he considers to be an
individual decision on
lived his life.

The

how

he

UAW president told both managers and union leaders that to solve the problem of

absenteeism workers had to be given "a sense of worth and dignity"
and not be treated as

an "extension of the production process."'^ Although many reports
pointed to boredom

and monotony as the major causes for blue-collar workers'

stemmed from

a plant

management system

that

restlessness, discontent often

workers considered oppressive and union

contract gains that they regarded as insufficient to offset the corporations"
excesses.

At age twenty-nine, Gary R. Bryner, president of the 8,200-member Local
Lordstown, Ohio, had become one of the most vocal leaders of the

worker"

that

moved

to his plant, the

most automated and

fastest line in the world.

took to walk from one place to another;

of

"Young worker

General Motors Assembly

to

the

GM production managers constantly used

how many

how many

gun turned; how deep was the screw's

'^Jack Crellin,

When the

young unionist remembered, Lordstown became

stopwatches and told assembly line workers

fast the

UAW's "new breed

Reuther had described. Bryner insisted that there was a question of

"manliness in being able to stand up to the giant."
Division

12 in

1 1

seconds

hole.

have his day

1970, Section A, 23.
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seconds or hundreds of seconds

At one

it

took to shoot a screw;

point,

in auto talks,"

it

how

GM even tried to take

The Detroit Times, 26 July

the newspapers off the line, Bryner
recalled.

numerous

local disputes with

The young

leader claimed that in the

management, assembly workers were

telling

GM:

We perspire, we sweat, we have hangovers, we have feelings
and emotions,

and
about to be placed in a category of a machine.
When you talk about that
watch, you talk about it for a minute. We talk
about a lifetime.

we

To

re not

the younger workers, Bryner argued, the

most important incentive was not

to

make an

extra dollar but to keep their senses while on the
assembly line and to have the prospects

of more leisure time.'^

Many

autoworkers shared those feelings. In

the union and General Motors heated up, the

late

UAW's 30

August, as negotiations between

and Out National Committee

paid for an ad in Detroit's newspapers presenting voluntary retirement
after thirty years

of service as ^Ihe number one issue." This grass roots demand, the
committee argued,

aimed

at

giving

men who had

spent thirty years in a plant "more of those Golden Years

18

ot retirement."

Gary Blonston, a Detroit Free Press

writer, stressed the fact that

Out was "not an issue concocted by the hierarchy of Solidarity House," but

30 and

rather "the

19

product of a long-term, widespread, grassroots campaign."

The prospects of voluntary

early retirement appealed to autoworkers of all ages. For the senior blue-collar workers,

the major motivation

could

still

do

so.

was leaving

the plants with

enough money

to enjoy life while they

To younger workers, 30 and Out meant something

else:

every time a

17

Studs Terkel, Working: People Talk About What They

About What They Do (New York: Pantheon Books,

Do All Day and How

They Feel

1972), 187-194.

18

The Detroit Free Press, 26 August

1

970, Section A,

9.

19

Gary Blonston, "Why "30 and Out" Has Become The Auto
Detroit Free Press, 4 October 1970, Section B,

131

1.

Strike's Hottest Issue," The

worker with 30 years of service decided

employee

to

move up

to retire,

the job hierarchy in the plant.

The 30-and-Out plan was anathema
Bramblett,

of the

he opened up a possibility for a younger

to the

Big Three management. Earl R.

GM vice-president for personnel and head of

its

bargaining team, viewed most

UAWs demands as -fantastic'" and "deliberately vague''.

He was

particularly

outraged, however, at the union's proposed 30-and-Out plan.
The major objection was
"the potential loss of experienced skilled trades employees."
In September 1970, the

number of (IM hourly employees with
of these, almost one

third

be extremely costly for

Bramlett argued,

Moreover, the

it

were

GM.

thirty or

skilled workers.

more years of service reached 16,820; out
Replacement of these employees would

Using the on-the job-employee-in-training method,

took eight years for an unskilled worker to become a journeyman.

GM vice-president did not regard monotony on the job. harsh discipline or

poor working conditions as causing the increasing absenteeism on the

plants.

In

Bramlett's opinion, the nation's economic abundance along with the industry's high

degree of security and social benellts allowed autoworkers

and improvements. Bramlett insisted

that the union's

to insist

on even more benefits

demands were

"just too

many and

21

too high."

On September
the corporation, this

announced

that the

1

1 ,

was

GM presented a new contract offer to the

a final offer.

1

1

AW.

Although the union quickly rejected

According

it

to

and

walkout was inevitable, the proposal was a substantial improvement

20

"Statement by

GM's

Bramblett," The Detroit News, 14 September 1970, Section A,

12,

21

Jud.son Gooding, "Blue-Collar Blues on the

Assembly Line," Fo/7//m\

The Detroit News, 15 September 1970, Section A,
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17.

.luly

1970, 71;

over the Big Three's offer of September

GM offered the UAW a 9.8 percent wage

1.

hike over a three-year period, compared
with the original 7.5 percent. This increase

would mean an
the next

two

additional 38 cents an hour the

years.

from 16 cents

to

I

he corporation also

28 cents over the

cent an hour in increase in the

was

silent

first

on the union's demand

retired workers.

life

first

year and 12 cents an hour in each of

lifted the ceiling

of the contract,

on the cost of living allowance

fhe

year and an unspecified boost after

for a dental care

program and

Finally, in order to address the 30-and-out

employees the option of retiring

at

UAW was asking for a 61.5

any age

The proposal

improved benefits

demand,

after thirty years

limitations on the benefits a retiree could receive.

for

that.

GM offered

for

its

of service but placed

At age 58, an autoworker would

retire

on a monthly $500 pension. This amount, however, would be reduced by
8 percent a
year

when an employee

retired prior to the

supporting large numbers of workers

in a

minimum age of 58. "The burden of

period of long retirement," Bramlett insisted,

"...was a responsibility that neither the U.S.

economy

or any industry [could] afford to

22

assume."

From

UAW,
entire

the

the beginning of the negotiations between the automobile industry and the

company spokesmen had

American economy

stressed the fact that

it

was

in the interests

to reach a non-inllalionary settlement.

of the

Michael Harrington, a

UAW ally, described the corporation's position as "the myth of greedy workers forcing
23

civic-minded corporations into an inflationary

^^"Statement by

GM's BrambleU,"

spiral."

For his

part.

Woodcock

depicted

12

23

Michael Harrington, " fhe case

tor sharing auto industry profits,"

August 1970, Section A, 23.
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The Detroit News, 19

GM as a "monstrous monopoly" and accused
economic

The

offer.

possibility

of a

it

of "chiseling and cheating"

strike against

GM, Woodcock

A walkout against the nation's biggest manufacturer could deplete
million strike fund within eight weeks.
Nevertheless,

conduct any such strike

support and cutting

AFL-CIO and
voiced

its

in the "old fashioned

down on

loomed

large.

the union's $ 120-

said, the

UAW would

way," by depending on other unions'

strike benefits.'' Despite the

the clear differences

UAW's disaffiliation

from the

between the two labor organizations, the AFL-CIO

support for the autoworkers. In an attempt to preserve
profits,

Nixon Administration

sacrificed the workers' earnings.

"The reaction of America's organized workers
is

Woodcock

stated,

in drafting its

The AFL-CIO

to this unjust

Meany

said, the

leader warned:

and unfair economic policy

obvious. They can -and they will— seek to redress their grievances

[...]

at the

25

collective bargaining table."

President

Nixon was well aware of the

fact that

redress their grievances" at the ballot box. In 1968,
political base -the

American middle

skilled workers, suburbanites,

It

was

clear to

Nixon

this coalition

that the first

"Woodcock's

strategy

—

split the

built a conservative

that

had given him a very narrow

would guide White House

major

be in the congressional election. To maintain

24

Nixon had

of business and professional people, farmers,

and the "new South"-

margin of victory. Maintaining
time.

class

workers could also "seek to

political test

its

politics for

some

of his administration would

coalition, the

Republican Party needed

Big Three," Detroit News, 3 September 1970, Section

A, 23.
25

"Unions aim for the blue-collar vote," Business Week 5 September 1970, 48-49, Folder
15, Box 031, COPE Research Files, Office of the President, George Meany Memorial
Archives (Hereafter GMMA).
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the support oforgani/ed labor.

political force

and the key

Dissalisllcd blue-collar workers
represented a potent

to building

real majority;-

In 1970, the president lelt

pressed to prove that Washington was hearing
the blue-collar blues; accordingly, he
several political moves,

i-irst,

the adnunistration issued a study by assistant
secretary oC

M. Rosow, which sympathetically described

labor .lerome

made

the frustrations

and concerns

of blue-collar workers. Second, on Labor Day, Nixon
hosted about two hundred union
leaders and their wives "at a banquette under the
glittering chandeliers of the

of the White

1

lull

Meany was
the AI

felt that

the guest of honor at the extravagant Labor

L-CIO

of character, devoted

when he

Room

louse."^^

(leorge

Nixon toasted

Fa.st

president and praised

to his church,

devoted

the presidents that he had

known had

pillar in the

f

that, regardless

of their

American people. And

to this

man

storm— strong,

ollowing the president's

here.

I

may

toast,

Meany

political differences, all

shared something: they had

president they could possibly be for the

Nixon, he concluded: " This applies

''a

dinner.

to his family, ..standing with his country

served the interest of freedom."

stood up and started his reply by saying

him as

Day

all

wanted

then, with a

to

be the best

nod toward

be bouncing on your head

27

tomorrow mornmg, but

this

Meany "s comments

goes tonight."
in a

pre-Labor Day interview prompted a number of articles

and editorials on Nixon's relationship with organized

labor.

I

he Al L-C'IO president

26

Robert

S.

Boyed "Labor Oetting

1970, Section A,

Political

Rush," The Detroit Free Press, 7 September

I.

27

White House Press Release, September 7, 1970, quoted in Allen J. Matusow, Nixon's
Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes (Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University
Press, 1998), 81; Mnr York Times. 8 September 1970, 1, 20.
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reiterated organized labor's support

of the president's policies on the Vietnam War
and

domestic unrest but repeated his disapproval of the
administration's economic

The Democrats could not escape Meany's

criticism either: he insisted that the party

"disintegrated" and about to be taken over by "extremists."

Meany's statement

as a political tactic.

Democratic Party not

policies.

The AFL-CIO

Some

president

to take labor's support for granted

was

analysts interpreted

was warning

the

and lean farther Icftward.^^

Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey was already following Meany's
advice: he
urged liberals to

let

working people know

that they too

condemned

''criminality

and violence and extreme social turbulence" and scorned "extremists of the

left

and

riots

as well as

extremists of the right— black extremists with guns and white extremists with
sheets and
29

guns."

During the interview, Meany made

it

very clear that, despite the workers'

economic concerns, the AFL-CIO leadership had not moved
of labor-management negotiations, Meany claimed

viewed the

strike as a

made no sense

it

"much

less desirable

to the left.

In his discussion

that trade unionists increasingly

weapon." The AFL-CIO president

stated that

for "a well-established union" to strike "a well-established industry."

Yet, workers needed to retain the right to strike in case an employer did not want to

"listen."

As

the walkout against

GM seemed more and more likely. The Detroit News

claimed: "...the country owes [Meany] a debt for frankly admitting that the

Boyed,

strike is

an

1.

I

"Liberals for law

& order, too?"

The Detroit News, 13 August 1970, Section B,
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10.

expensive weapon that doesn't

an anachronism in

The
September
one

GM,

sense, often doesn't settle a thing
and, in effect,

day and age."^

UAW leadership and membership did not share the newspaper's view.
15,

two weeks

who had

after the

White House dinner, workers

at

On

GM plants in thirty-

started wildcat strikes during the day. Bramlett,
the chief negotiator for

considered the autoworkers' action "a strike against reason."
To Woodcock, "the

company

[had] held out

idled 383,626

no other choice."^' The

The indictment of the
strike- against

almost ten weeks and

who were

sent

home

as a result of the walkout.^^

UAW leadership for using an "anachronistic" weapon

-

the

GM was mild compared to some reporters' description of the GM

negotiations and walkout as

grounded

strike lasted for

UAW employees in the U.S. and Canada, plus 9,676 lUE workers and

4,350 United Rubber Workers

little

in the belief, shared

more than

by many

a charade. This kind of accusation

leftists, that

was

only wildcat strikes were legitimate

signs of a rank-and-file militancy. These illegal walkouts were allegedly the only
that

is

and two Canadian provinces walked off their jobs and
joined thousands of

states

others

this

make

workers had to

try

and shape

to their

made

business unionism. If workers

had delivered the goods simply

own

way

needs a system built on bureaucratic

gains because of a legal strike, the union leadership

to take the

wind out

the dissident groups' sails.

A

30

"Meany on
Section B,

strike

weapon:

It's

"less desirable," The Detroit

News, 7 September 1970,

6.

31

"340,000 Auto Workers Strike General Motors," The Michigan
1970,

Daily;'" 15

September

1.

^^Strike Tally, Folder 29,

Box

169,

UAW-GM Department Collection, Part

State University Archives of Labor and

Urban
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Affairs (Hereafter

WSUA).

II,

Wayne

majority of blue-collar workers, however,

good enough weapon

still

regarded the union-sanctioned strike
as a

to negotiate better contracts/^

The coordinated

effort

of the

UAW leadership and the rank and file along with

considerable community support, contributed to
the success of the
30,

two weeks

after the strike

fearing the strike fund

had begun, the

would soon be

strike.

On

September

UAW International Executive Board,

depleted, reduced the salary of all Officers,

Executive Board Members, International Representatives
and other non-office and

maintenance staff by
available for

fifty percent.

Furthermore, as soon as strike benefits were not

GM strikers, Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey announced, the union

employees would receive no pay. These emergency measures were passed
to ameliorate a serious

the union's General

economic

Fund and

situation: as a result

the Strike

of the

in

an attempt

GM walkout, both income to

Fund would be reduced by $ 1,250,000 a

34

month,

As had happened almost
GE,

a year before during the electrical workers strike against

the automobile workers' cause rallied the support of prominent

The National

Citizens'

two weeks before

Committee

to

Aid

the strike settlement

the Families of

American

citizens.

GM Strikers was created only

was announced; however,

its

mere formation,

UAW leaders argued, had "an immeasurable public relations benefit to the UAW and the
33

In his controversial The

argued that the

own

(1973), journalist William Serrin

UAW leadership had staged a strike against GM only to strengthen

GM

been willing to negotiate

further.

UAW Inter-Office Communicafion, Folder 28, Box

Collection, Part

its

The nine-week walkout, Serrin contended, had been totally
would have signed the same agreement in September if the UAW had

political position.

unnecessary:

34

Company and the Union

II,

WSUA.
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169,

UAW-GM Department

One of the aims of the Committee was

strikers."

editorials that criticized those

assistance to remain on strike.
their families got

GM's

Some

local

resorted to food stamps and welfare

conservatives even argued that if the strikers
and

hungry enough, they would eventually force

their leaders to accept

October 30, the Citizens' Committee ran an advertisement

in

"We do

straits.

citizens to contribute

"from $

The Committee claimed

it

1

on up"

to help the strikers

was "not taking

any money raised would not go

to the

UAW;

who

not want the hunger and misery of

the strikers' families to be a deciding factor in the strike's
resolution."

American

twelve national

newspapers. The key paragraph pointed to the inhumanity of
those

expected the striking workers to go hungry:

that

numerous

original offer.^^

On
and

who

autoworkers

to counterbalance the

The ad

who were

sides in the dispute."

local

It

also urged

in dire

also claimed

committees would "make specific

allocations to hardship cases."^^

On November
the

1

7,

Secretary Lawrence Carlstrom reported that, in

Committee had received contributions from 550 donors amounting

Although Carlstrom considered
the

this

sum

to

Committee had served a useful purpose

Carlson's report was, in

letters that the

fact, the

its

short

life,

to $ 30,464.

be "disappointingly small," he believed that
all

the same.

The most

interesting section

of

inclusion of some of the numerous "for and against"

Committee had received since

its

formation. Apart from the short notes of

support that accompanied most donations, 66 citizens had expressed their disagreement

35

UAW Inter-Ottice Communication, Folder 8, Box 34, Leonard Woodcock Files, UAW

President's Office,

WSUA.

^^Advertisement, Folder

7,

Box

34,

Leonard Woodcock

WSUA.
139

Files,

UAW President's Office,

with the Committee in signed

letters,

while 178 had sent unsigned responses
that were

written in vituperative and even obscene
language. These
clear indication of the extent to

which the

anonymous

replies

were a

GM strike had polarized public opinion.

Carlstrom pointed out that "not since the early days
of the

New Deal" could he remember

"such a paranoiac reaction to a plea for help."

The anonymous notes ranged from

a

mere "Let them

starve!" or

bastards have got to be kidding" to "The hell with the stinking

smash

goddam unions

the

UAW!

to pieces." In other cases, the target

"You greedy

Congress should

was not

the workers or the

unions but the Committee members themselves: "You gotta be crazy! The
supporters looks like a

list

of Who's

Who Communist Party

of the donations do you Jew radicals plan to
or

"Same

old tired,

worn out

revolutionaries like Julian

split

letter-head liberals.

list

of

U.S.A.;" "What percentage

with the Negroes on said Committee?"

Not

a

Bond amongst your group."

dime when you have
Julian

Bond was

in fact a

member

of the Committee, as were prominent Americans figures as disparate as George Meany,
Caesar Chavez, Michael Harrington, Reverend Francis B. Sayre and Rabbi Jacob

J.

38

Wemstein.

The

UAW strike against GM also reopened the possibility of a student-worker

alliance that the

GE

walkout had raised the year before. Radical and

mobilized to support the strikers

in various

ways.

Two

liberal students alike

days before the strike deadline,

University of Michigan student radicals organized a group that would back

GM workers

37

Preliminary Report by Lawrence Carlstrom, Folder
Files,

UAW President's Office, WSUA.

38

Ibid.
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8,

Box

34, Leonard

Woodcock

if

they decided to walk out. The
Students to Support Auto Workers -as
they ealled

themselves- would provide "politieal and
material support"
lor the

group

The group's

said.

intention to link

CJM

to the strikers, a

spokesman

policies to the defense industry

and imperialism prompted responses from other
students who believed

that

it

was "not

nccessaiy to agree with the workers' analysis of
their problems to support them."'"
In an

impassioned

article that

echoed

his uncle Walter's rhetoric,

history from Troy, Michigan, called on the student

Al Rcuther, a senior

community

in

to reject the Students

To

Support the Auto Workers" "self-delusions." These radical
students, Rcuther argued, had
to "accept the

strike

workers as their equals- equals

and determine

During the

their

own

who

(were| qualified to lead their

destinies."^'

GM strike, a comparatively moderate

also had the chance to forge a

new student-worker

faction of the

alliance.

SDS

3,

much-divided

chose Detroit as the

for a demonstration to gather radical students from around the country

On November

own

SDS
site

on Election Day.

around a thousand students gathered on the Wayne State University

mall and then staged a rally

at the

nearby General Motors Building. Most of the

demonstrators were from the Detroit area, but there were also students from Georgia,

Minnesota,

Illinois.

Ohio and

New

York. "Only a handful of workers" participated

in the

demonstration. The Dctroil Free Press reported. Throughout the day, SDSers carried

39

"Students

start

group

to

back auto workers," The Michigan Daily, 13 September 1970,

1.

40

Steve Koppman, "Auto Strike Begins," The Michigan Daily, 16 September 1970,
41

Al Rcuther, "A perspective on student worker alliances," The Michigan Daily, 26

September 1970,4.
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4.

banners that read, "War Maker, Strike Breaker,
Smash
chanted, "Elections are a pack of

lies,

don't vote organize," or

workers and students must unite."'' Though the

from the Weathermen, the

enough

SDS

fair three-year contract.

could

make

a difference.

The

its part,

the

activists explicitly distanced

who

still

themselves

GM" but to

believed that their votes

students' harsh criticism of GM's "racist,"

to rally

"war oriented"

few workers.

UAW was also interested in fostering cooperation between

workers and students. The union's approach, however, was very different from
the students".

fight,

was inflammatory

did not want to "smash

Moreover, most workers

and "capitalist" policies were bound
For

"Same enemy, same

radical splinter group, their rhetoric

to estrange the vast majority of workers

win a

GM" or "Smash Racism" as they

The Alliance

Committees

that

Chicago and

New Jersey,

for

of

that

Labor Action developed Worker-Student Support

worked closely with

UAW regional directors in Michigan, Los Angeles,

areas in which the largest numbers of strikers were

concentrated. Carl Wagner, the twenty-five-year-old project coordinator, explained that

students performed a

Strikers

m need.

number of "behind-the-scenes

43

In California, for instance,

UAW Local 645 voted to accept donations

of food and money from University of California

community organizations except

Communist

Party,

at

for the Progressive

John Birch Society and the

tasks," such as collecting food for

Santa Barbara students and other

Labor Party, the SDS, the

Ku Klux

Klan. Paul Schrade, the

UAW

42

"1,200

rally in Detroit to support auto workers,"

1970, 2; "750 Join Brief SDS Protest

Section A,
43

ALA

GM," The

Note the marked difference

Files,

Strikers,"

Detroit Free Press, 4

November

in the headlines.

Worker-Student-Support Committees,

Woodcock
Backed

3.

at

The Michigan Daily, 4 November

Memo,

Folder

8,

Box

42, Leonard

UAW President's Office, WSUA; "Students and National Leaders
UAW Solidarity, December

1970,
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2.

1970,

regional director in California, insisted: "Neither
the extreme right nor the extreme

going to hijack our

strike."

workers who attempted

Yet, rank-and-filer

UC

to stop

l

Yank

1.

Shaw

led a small

group of

Santa Barbara students from unloading food on the

union premises. C,M workers did not want any of their
^'commie food," Shaw
The Local 645 incident, which made the headhnes
an indication of workers' distrust of college students. The

committees and
workers

strike schools served a

that the majority

double purpose,

in the

frustrated.

leadership,

Patricia

UAW's

students strike support

fhey attempted

to

show

of students were "realistic" and "democratic," and not

who wanted

to get politically

it

up

in the

following way:

have almo.st nobody on campus

leadership that

makes

lerberl

The

sense.

In their

make

to talk to,

it

better.

When

to druj^s, freak-outs, Yippies,

they turn

almost no intellectual

confusion and agitation they turn

and the refurbished

in

wild

Stalinist elitism

of

Marcusc.

UAW leadership was not alone in

its

effort to

improve the relationship

between organized labor and the university community. During the

44

Harry Bernstem,

Angeles limes,

hey also

I

to action, they

I

I

involved but were confu.scd or

students want to examine the real world and

directions

to the

Cayo Sexton and Brendan Sexton, themselves members of (he lAW

sununed

Many

argued."''

Los Angeles Times, was

"followers of the Weathermen, the rock-throwers, or the obscenity chanters."
catered to those students

left is

1

1

PresidenfsOflice,

"GM

hem Load ol Lood,"Z.rAv
Leonard Woodcock l-iles, UAW

Strikers Curse Students Bringing

.lune 1970,

I,

24, Lolder 8,

Box

42,

GM strike, initiators

I

WSUA.

Penn Keble's speech

to participants in the

New Jersey. Kemble was

l)AW-(iM Local

731 Strike School,

Youth Project on Democratic
Change of the League for Industrial Democracy, Folder 8, Box 42, Leonard Woodcock
President's Office, WSUA; Patricia Cayo Sexton and Brendan Sexton, lilite
Files,
Prenlt)n,

the Director of the

UAW

Collars

York:

ami Hard-Hats: The Working Class and the Future ofAmeriean

Random

llou.se,

1971), 9.
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Politics

(New

of a national movement

to bring labor, faeulty

Harvard University. Participants claimed

"foment

hostility"

that reactionai-y political forces

between these groups. "Peace,

environments" were concerns
shared,

and students together held two meetings

that

racial justice,

were trying

at

to

job security and decent

American workers, students and

faculty

members

fhe facuky group present was led by Nobel laureate
Dr. George Wald and

included academics from Columbia, Cornell, Brandeis,
Boston University, Massachusetts
Institute

of Technology and

1

larvard.

Representatives of AFl^CIO unions, including the

Steelworkers, the Oil. Chemical and Atomic Workers and the
Amalgamated Clothing

Workers, as well as leaders of the independent UE,
the meeting.

the

Though probably very limited

Democratic labor-liberal alliance

During the nine weeks

that

that the

in

scope, this

political, religious

political persuasions.

was a

clear attempt to revive

had been seriously weakened

in 1968.'^'

GM strike lasted, then, autoworkers were both

backed and chastised by the American public,
prominent

UAW and Teamsters, also attended

fhe

UAW gathered support from

and union leaders as well as from students from a range of

Strikers also

became

the targets of ferocious criticism for

GM and the

"selfishly" deepening the country's

economic recession. On November

UAW settled the dispute.

contract did not put an end to the controversy over the

The new

automobile negotiations, but rather furthered
the

American public eventually pay

it.

Was

1

1,

the settlement inllationary?

for the autoworkers' gains?

Had Woodcock

Would

led the

UAW into a costly strike only to prove his leadership qualities? Had the whole affair
essentially been a

sham?

46

"Move

to Bring Together Labor, Faculty, Students,"

144

UE News,

December 1^70.

4,

At the onset of the

strike,

UAW -with a strike fund of $
of more than $ 4

billion.

many

observers thought that

120 million-

On November

1

it

was senseless

to confront a corporation that

1,

for the

had liquid assets

however, most observers thought the

GM-

UAW contract to be a union victory. A GM spokesman affirmed that the corporation
could have afforded a

much

longer strike, but

management estimated

two weeks'

that in

time the employees' hardships "could have been the seeds
of lasting bitterness."
true that in another

but

it

was

two weeks the autoworkers would have exhausted

also an important fact that

The

turning point in the talks

to restore the cost

managed

first

week

in

to 16 cents per

GM agreed

November when

had made

in

1967 when limiting the cost of living allowance

hour over a three-year period. The

UAW leadership also

to establish the 30-and-out retirement principle, but not "at

rank-and-file had demanded.

in

the

COLA formula- were more

wage

important

GM initially offered a wage boost of 38 cents an hour

than immediate wage increases.

for the first year of the contract, while the

cents.

On

1972, the age limit would drop to 56.

long-term gains -especially the

GM finally settled on 51

any age," as the

GM workers with 30 years of service could retire at age 58

with a $ 500 monthly pension;
front, the union's

."^^

of living protection without a ceiling. Woodcock thus "corrected" the

strategic error that the union

(COLA)

the

Due

UAW demanded 61.5 cents.

to inflation,

The

UAW and

however, 33 of the 51 cents were
48

already

owed

to the workers; only 18 cents constituted the ''reaP' hike.

47

*'GM-Union Pact Gives Victories For Both

November

was

their strike fund,

GM was losing $ 90 million in sales daily
came

It

1970, Section A,

Parties/'

3, 9.

48

Ibid. 9.
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The Detroit Free Press, 23

It is

evident that to obtain the cherished unhmited
cost of Hving allowance, the

UAW retreated from the

first

year

wage

increase of 61.5 cents an hour and

on the controversial 30-and-out demand. Yet there
were other
full

compromised

less published gains.

The

amount of cost of living adjustments would be paid each
week. Deferment of

payment over three-month periods -provided under

the 1967 contract-

was ended. The

company would

also contribute 5 to 10 cents an hour per worker in
Supplemental

Unemployment

Benefits, a clear

fringe benefits, after

improvement on the previous

20 years of service, workers would be

settlement.

entitled to four

As

regards

weeks of

49

vacation mstead of three.

The

when

UAW fared most poorly on

its

non-economic demands. In August 1970,

contract talks started, the union officers put on the table a

"making the work more

tolerable

number of proposals

for

and the workers happier, thus improving plant

efficiency and product quality." There

was no doubt

high. In addition to the soaring absentee rate, the

that tensions

on the shopfloor were

number of grievances

in

GM plants had

increased from 106,000 in 1960 to 256,000 in 1969. In response to the mounting
tensions, the

UAW proposed to limit the company's right to discipline a worker until

proof of misconduct was

officially recorded.

of a team system on assembly

monotony of performing

the

lines,

same

The union

also called for the introduction

varying each worker's job content to lessen the

task fifty to a hundred times an hour. Furthermore, the

UAW sought the elimination of noise and fumes in the plants as well as the right of the
50

worker

to refuse overtime.

The Detroit Free Press, 13 November 1970, Section A,
The Detroit Free Press, 10 August 1970, Section C,
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6.

10.

Most of the above demands
first

offer

on September

1.

By

virtually disappeared after the

Big Three made

their

the time of the settlement, only a highly
restricted right to

refuse overtime remained in the contract.
According to the 1970 agreement, where there

were sufficient workers available and capable of doing an
assignment,

who

did not wish to

work overtime were excused. Also, blue

collars

GM employees

who had worked

13

consecutive days would be excused from work the next following
Sunday.^' Compared
to the union's initial

lent

non-economic demands, these were token

credence to the accusation that the

gains. This apparently

UAW won economic gains because

it

guaranteed

a slow grievance process and never invaded the -'sacred" area of
management rights.

Yet those

who defended

viewed collective bargaining

the role that unions played in capital-labor relations

in a different light.

Labor reporter Ralph Orr said of past

negotiations in the auto industry.
In the 59"" minute of the

1""
1

hour,

when

the choice

was one

less step in the

grievance section or another five cents an hour in wages, reality dictated the
52

choice: a nickel

is

visible

and spendable, a shortened contract clause

is not.

In 1970, practical and political necessity once again dictated that economic gains should
prevail over worker prerogatives.

The

strike against

GM cost the UAW about $

160

million and almost bankrupted the union while the nation's most powerful corporation
lost millions

of dollars

in its

nine-week resistance

to the autoworkers'

The Detroit Free Press, 13 November 1970, Section A,

Ibid.
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10.

demands. Eighty

five percent

of production workers and eighty percent
of the skilled tradesmen eventually

CJM-UAW pact

ratified the

that

many

critics referred to as a sell-out."

The Nixon Administration immediately

Woodcock

inllationary.

large element oithe

insisted that the

wages

C.M-UAW contract

singled out the

as

government's evaluation was incorrect. "...A

that will be paid in this contract," stated the

"will be as a result of the cost-of-living clause.

Those payments

will

I

JAW

president,

be made ajhr [my

emphasis] prices have risen."^" The debate on the inllationary
effects of increases
labor costs had been going on for months. In

Al L-C'IO leadership repeatedly argued
in Hal

its

reports

on the national economy,

that the rising inflation

was

largely

''a

in

the

profit

ion" caused by businesses that tried to "maintain or increase large
prollt margins."^^

The

President's condemnation of the

OM settlement highlighted Nixon's political

dilemma: the economic downturn had dramatically limited

As New York Times

collar vote.

split at the wallet."

combined with

reporter

The considerable

the 5.1 percent

Republicans" "blue-collar

James Reston put

it,

"the Nixon-labor alliance

increases in the cost of living and interest rates

unemployment

strategy.""^^'

his ability to rally the blue-

As

rate

historian

were enough

to

wreck the

Alan Matusow points

out, " fhe

GM

53

B.

.1.

Widick, "Sweethearts or Adversaries?" The Nation, 16

G. O'Donncl, "The Conspiracy Theory About the Big

.lune 1973, 792;

GM Strike," The

Lawrence

Wall Street

Journal, 23 March 1973.

^"^Howard I.ipton,

"GM

Strikers Blaze Victory Trail,"

(JAW Solidarity, December

1970,

3.

AFL-i TO Executive C \)uncil. Statements and Reports, 1967-1972,
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977) Vol. 4, 1953.
Gary Fink,

^^'.lamcs

ed.,

Reston, "Political Nightmare," The Detroit Free Press, 18 September 1970,
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Strike

and the grim economic news doomed Nixon's
hopes

middle-income blue-collar workers.

An

for

major inroads among

October Gallup poll on Congressional

preference indicated that 60 percent of the manual
workers with incomes over $ 4,000

would vote Democratic, almost

The

off-year election results

not yet replaced the

Economic

„57

same percentage

the

made

it

clear to the president that the social issue

American

Issue in

as in 1966,

politics.

campaign, Nixon's national strategy was designed

had

During the Congressional

to defuse

and neutralize those issues of

substance that might stimulate a broad-based political participation in the
1970 election.

The Republicans managed

to virtually eliminate the

peace issue was obscured, the

state

war

of the economy assumed considerable importance.

This was precisely what Nixon feared might prove the
president

Agnew

knew

that the

Economic

as a political issue. But once the

Issue

was

OOP's undoing. By

killing him.

October, the

Nixon and Vice-President Spiro

then launched frenzied cross-country tours in a clear attempt to turn the elections

on the Social

Issue.

While the Republicans seemed

to stake all their party's

hopes on the belief that

the electorate's major concerns were social, labor leaders revived the national

as a

campaign

issue. Just a

broadcast on the

CBS

few days before the

network, George

economy

election, in a paid political radio

Meany urged

workers: "Cast your ballot as

your job, your health, your pocketbook and your family's future depended on

it.

if

They

58

really do.

They

are what

is at

stake in this election.'*

Whether union members followed

57

Matusow, Nixon

's

Economy, 82; Alec Gallup and George H. Gallup,

Poll Cumulative Index: Public Opinion, 1955-1975, Report

N°

eds..

The Gallup

64, October 1970, 17.

58

"AFL-CIO Leader

Speaks:

Meany

Michigan Daily, 30 October 1970,

votes for liberals, supports national health plan." The

3.
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the

AFL-CIO

president advice or not, a post-election Gallup
survey

blue-collar workers had voted even

more

showed

that in

1970

strongly for Democratic candidates than
in

,

previous elections.^^

Although Nixon

November

3,

insisted that the administration

was pleased with

the Democrats scored several important victories.

The

the returns, on

party gained nine

seats in the

House of Representatives and

out of

with a net increase of eleven. Democratic candidates also
captured from the

fifty-

a majority of state governorships -twenty-ni
nine

Republicans control of one or both houses of the legislatures
the

GOP margin

net loss of only

in a

number of others. The Democrats kept

two of the twenty-five Democratic

of 57.6 million voters

set a record for

in

control of the Senate, with a

seats at issue.

Moreover, the turnout

an off-year election.^"

The Progressive identified "some encouraging signs"
California,

seven states and narrowed

in the election results.

Ronald Reagan, the foremost proponent of the "law and order"

behind moderate Republicans on his

ticket.

In

strategy, ran

Democrat John V. Tunny had defeated

Senator George Murphy, Reagan's close partisan, while African- American candidate

Wilson C. Riles had defeated Dr.

Max

Rafferty, "long a

symbol ofjingoistic know-

nothingism." Nixon's Southern Strategy did not appear to be

moderate Democrats defeated

racist

Republican candidates. In Texas, a conservative

The Gallup Poll, Report N° 65, November 1970,

M. Barry, "The
December 1970, 1-2.
^°John

infallible either. In Florida,

Voters' Decision

1970,'"

150

1.

AFL-CIO American

Federationist,

Democratic candidate
Bush,

who many

for the Senate defeated a very conservative
Republican,

already considered likely to

The GOP's hopes

lay

become

George

a figure in national politics"

on the belief that the ''Middle American" was moving

towards conservatism. Tired of crime, campus disruption,
bombings and narcotics, the
"forgotten American" would vote Republican. But the
mid-term electoral returns
shattered the fiction of a "silent majority" that blindly
followed the administration's '"law

and order" slogans. In the

states in

campaigned on the Social

Issue, six

while thirteen

which Vice President Agnew aggressively
of the candidates

Seven candidates

lost.

fourteen were defeated;

1 1 1

whom

whom

he supported for Senate

won

he backed for governor were elected but

candidates for House seats

won

with his endorsement and

62

121 lost with

it.

It

was evident

that the public

was not swinging

business-dominated Republican Party was finding
collar majority.

It

was

it

to the right

and

thai the

very difficult to win over a blue-

also apparent, however, that the

Democrats could

easily lose the

blue-collar vote if they ignored the workers' needs. In an attempt to capture the workingclass vote, the administration had tried to exacerbate the differences that existed within

the Democratic coalition between workers and unionists,

who were mainly concerned

with bread and butter issues, and the more ideological middle-class
part, the

only to

Democrats found

show

that

liberal coalition.

in the

liberals.

In an article published a couple

AFL-CIO

their

UAW walkout against GM an excellent opportunity not

economic issues were not "old-fashioned" but also

Harrington praised the

For

to revive the labor-

of weeks before the elections, Michael

president for backing Democratic candidates with

^'"The People, Yes," The Progressive, December 1970,

^^Ibid., 2.
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4,

whom

he disagreed on the Vietnam War. If President
Nixon were

office in 1972, Harrington concluded,
"middle-class reformers

have to "overcome

their parochial righteousness

Unfortunately, labor leaders and liberals found
Issue than on the Social Issue.

"

9.
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be removed from

and anti-warriors" would

and win with the trade-unionists.""

much

easier to agree

The Vietnam War remained

Michael Harrington, "'GOP bid for labor vote

1970. Section B,

it

to

futile,"

on the Economic

as divisive as ever.

The Detroit News, 23 September

CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZED LABOR'S MOST DIVISIVE ISSUE:

THE VIETNAM WAR
During the

first

two years of the Nixon Administration, American labor unions

were generally successful
standard of living.

in

coordinating their efforts in defense of their members'

The AFL-CIO

lUE, the independent

affiliated

UE

and thirteen other

unions collaborated during the walkout against General Electric and
the
supported the disaffiliated

AFL-CIO

UAW during the latter's strike against General Motors.

Union

leaders usually agreed on their assessments of rank-and-file grievances. Yet
on U.S.

foreign policy issues generally and on the American involvement in Vietnam in
particular, there

During

were longstanding and deepening divisions within the ranks of labor.

their drive against

reference to the Vietnam

public.

GE,

War

The lUE continued

to

the

lUE and UE

leadership carefully avoided any

in their presentation

of the workers* grievances

back the organization's

official position

on the

George Meany's and Jay Lovestone's unconditional support of American
intervention in South Vietnam. For

its part,

the left-leaning

UE

"The war and

conflict:

military

had opposed the war

since 1965, and repeatedly linked the workers' loss of purchasing

in military spending:

to the

power

to the increase

profiteering corporations," reported the

UE News in

1969, "have undermined the U. S. economy, causing higher prices and taxes." Similarly,

by the time of the

GM strike, the UAW had not only left the AFL-CIO but also joined
1

those

who

'"Viet

called for an immediate withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam.

Nam Resolution," UE News,

6 October 1969,
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6.

Conflict over U.S. foreign policy

War

11,

was not new

to organized labor.

During World

ideological differences had been submerged in the
service of the cause.

time of the

German

attack

on the Soviet Union

in 1941 until the

president Phillip Murray allied with the communist

support of the war effort. The onset of the Cold
Soviet Union

made such cooperation almost

two camps and the pressures

to

organization in

the United States and the

impossible. Labor divided ideologically into

choose sides became almost inescapable. Murray was

determined to impress both the U.S. government and American society

at large

with

organized labor's commitment to national values and goals. Consequently, the

CIO

president undermined the

proved

to

Schatz,

"made support

CIO.'"

The

be crucial in the
for

leaders of the

left

within his organization. The 1948 presidential election

CIO

unions" political alignment: "Murray," claims Ronald

Truman and
left

the

end of the war, CIO

members of his

War between

From

the Democratic ticket the test of loyalty of the

wing unions supported Progressive Party candidate Henry

Wallace, and thus adhered to the Communist Party line rather than the Democratic Party
line.

The UE,

show

its

the largest Communist-led union, boycotted the 1949

disgust for the CIO"s raids on

its

CIO

convention to

membership. The C10"s purge of left-leaning

unions soon followed. Under Murray "s leadership, the convention expelled the
smaller communist-led union, the

Farm Equipment Workers

UE and a

(FE). Delegates also

approved several other decisive measures. Through a constitutional amendment,

Communists were barred from holding CIO

offices; the International

Union of Electrical

^Ronald W. Schatz, "Philip Murray and the Subordination of the Industrial Unions to the
United States Government,"" in Melvyn Dubofsky and Warren Van Tine, eds.. Labor
Leaders in America (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 253.
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Workers (lUE) was chartered

to rival the

UE; and hearing boards were

other unions on charges of "Communist domination."

By

1950, the

set

up

CIO had

to try ten

expelled

seven other unions: the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers; the
Fur and Leather Workers;
the Food,

Tobacco and Allied Workers; the Marine Cooks and Stewards;

the Fishermen's

Union; the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's
Union and the American

Communication Association/

The CIO's indictment of the

Communist

labor leaders' priority

economic and job-related
to

advance the

radicalize

interests

interests

left-wing unions rested on the argument that the

was not

to strengthen the

unions and thus defend the

of their members but rather to use the unions as fronts

of the Soviet Union. Their main objective was supposedly to

American workers and achieve a

proletarian dictatorship along Soviet lines. In

sum. Communists were eliminated from the labor movement

Many American

security.

that "a single

Communist

citizens probably shared

in a position

in the

name of national

Congressman Fred Hartley's

belief

of power within the labor movement could act

under the direction of Russian agents so as to seriously hinder

this country's ability to

4

defend

its

people and wage war against

bureaucrat George

Meany nor

aloof from the Cold

War

its

enemies."

Neither the quintessential labor

the progressive union leader Walter Reuther remained

rationale that

came

to

dominate American domestic and foreign

policy.

Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Random
House, 1969), 437.
^

and Mark McColloch, Cold War in the Working Class: The Rise
and Decline of the United Electrical Workers (Albany: State University of New York

Ronald

L. Filippelli

Press, 1995), 185,
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Meany was
II,

a staunch anticommunist throughout his career.
During

he saw the U.S. alliance with the Soviet Union as a
necessary

World War

evil to defeat fascism.

In this period, he drew closer to leaders such as David
Dubinsky of the International

Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) and

Ladies'

"spymaster" Jay Lovestone,

who

also regarded

the quintessential anticommunist and

communism

as an evil, expansionist and

enslaving force. In their view, the Soviet Union was a threat to the U.S. in
the
international arena while

war,

Communist

Meany became even more

party

members were

vociferous in his anticommunism: "The

conspiracy," he proclaimed, "overshadows everything that
the darkest days of the

a domestic menace. After the

Vietnam War, Meany

we may

Communist

think of."^

Even

in

steadfastly supported U.S. military

intervention in Southeast Asia.

In fact, for over twenty years, Lovestone wrote the

policy papers.

A former communist purged from the party in
away from

crucial in steering U.S. foreign policy

of World

War

AFL-CIO

II.

Dubinsky described

this

president's foreign

1928, Lovestone

detente with the Soviet

was

Union

at the

end

enigmatic personality in American politics as

"the unofficial Secretary of State for the labor movement."^ Working in close
collaboration with the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and

later the

AFL-CIO, Lovestone turned

originally created to aid

the Free Trade

—

European unionists

Union Committee (FTUC) -

into a bastion of anticommunism within the

"George Meany: Labor's Organization Man,"

Labor

Quoted
Leaders

in

American, 337

^Quoted

in

Ted Morgan, A Covert Life. Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, And

in Robert Zieger,

Spymaster (New York: Random House, 1999), 370.
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in

American labor establishment.' In 1963, he was designated
International Affairs Department and thus

Nevertheless, as

long career,
with

Meany

movement,

it

was

it

became an "openly prominent"

AFL-CIO
character.

Ted Morgan claims, "while Lovestone's appointment seemed
in fact the

for the

as

as head of the

beginning of a ten-year-decline... Above

Vietnam War would contribute

divided the nation."

Among

all,

to

crown

a

his full support

to his demise, dividing the labor

labor leaders, however, there were

disagreements on foreign policy issues long before the war in Southeast Asia
escalated.
It is

even possible to

talk about the

Meany and

Walter Reuther began his participation

the Reuther "camps."

in the labor

movement

as a sociaHst.

The

UAW president, as Nelson Lichtenstein claims, "came to combine the tactical approach
of traditional business unionism of liberal Keynesianism and the social vision of western
9

European

social

democracy."

union's 1947 convention,

UAW hierarchy.

Reuther consolidated his control of the

when

Although a

his caucus took over almost every

critic

UAW during the

key position within the

of the government's increasingly virulent

anticommunism, Reuther made sure

that

most CIO union leaders signed the

anticommunist affidavits required by the Taft-Hartley

act

and repudiated Progressive

Party candidate Henry Wallace during the 1948 presidential election. Rather than taking

issue with the emerging

Cold War foreign policy consensus, Reuther accepted

^Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and

Dan Georgakas,

(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois

it.

His

Encyclopedia of the American Left
Press, 1990), 435-437.
eds..

8

Morgan, 336.
9

Nelson Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther and the Rise of Labor-Liberalism,"
Leaders in America. 280.
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in

Labor

assessment oreoinnuinisiu, however, dilTeied considerably
from Meany's. Reutlier
believed that eonununisni was a system that thrived
only where poverty and degradation

allowed

it

to exist.

If

advanced

capitalist nations

hoped, the attack would produce a

He

sphere.

ol'st>cial

the

arms

assault

on poverty. Reiither

liberali/.ing etlect within the nations

also believed that the U.S. should secure a

Union and thus temper
support

waged an

race,

l

ike

most

CIO

under the Soviet

modus vivcmU with

the Soviet

leaders, Reuther regarded the

relbrm programs abroad as the best way to contain

communism and

disapproved of the obsessive anticommunism of AI L leaders. After the 1955
merger, however, the

AM,

on foreign policy

more than

for

hawkish anticommunism dominated organized labor's stand
fifteen years.

But the differences between Meany and

Reuther remained just below the surface throughout the 195()s and the early
In the post- World

Icderal

government

War

11

19()()s.

period, cooperatit)n between organized labor and the

in foreign pt>licy issues

was taken

probably shared .lohn Windnuiller's description of the
a variety

Al' l.-CK)

as a given.

iabt>r

Most observers

leadership's

commitment

of international activities and causes as "substantial, controversial, and probably

n reversible."

Historian Ronald Radosh

was

the implementation of U.S. foreign policy,

far

more

critical

of labor's involvement

unionism" depended on the continued existence of "corporate capitalism."
reason, unions supported a cold-war

Radosh was categorical

in his

in

frade unions, Radosh claimed, participated

actively in cold-war politics around the world because the survival of their "corporate

"'.lohn P.

to

economy and

I'or this

protluctiiHi for military defense.

indictment of organized labor:

Windmuller, " The Foreign Policy Conflict

Science Quarlerly 82, no. 2 (June 1967): 205.
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in

American Labor."

/V)//7/<v//

Unions are meant

be junior partners of the large corporations, and their
leaders
seek only those gains acceptable to the system's top
leaders; they see the chance
to

for these gains disappearing if they

Furthermore, rank and

filers,

move

to challenge corporate foreign policy.'

Radosh contended, were

either unwilling or incapable to

challenge their unions' support of "a backward and reactionary
foreign policy/
In the mid-1960s,

12

however, U.S. foreign policy issues triggered a major

controversy within organized labor's leadership. In 1966,

Meany and Reuther had

a

serious confrontation over American labor's boycott of the International Labor

Organization (ILO)

in

the issue with other

members of the AFL-CIO Executive

Geneva, a decision

that

Meany

allegedly took without discussing

Council. In that year, Leon

Chajn, the Polish government delegate to the ILO, was elected chairman of the
organization by a delegate vote of 184 to 183. After consulting with Meany, the

CIO worker delegate Rudy

Faupl walked out, refusing to

over by a representative of a

totalitarian country."

reading the newspaper headlines.

He condemned

"sit in the

AFL-

Conference presided

Reuther learned about

this incident

by

the walkout as "unwise,"

13

"undemocratic," and "unauthorized."

The AFL-CIO

policy in Latin America also provoked friction between the

Meany-Lovestone dominated Executive Council and Victor and Walter Reuther.
1962, a group of AFL-CIO leaders

-Meany among them-

established the

In

American

"Radosh, "Labor and Foreign Policy," The Nation, 8 September 1969, 210.
12

Radosh, American Labor and United States Foreign Policy (New York: Random

House, 1969), 29.

Quoted

in

Windmuller, "The Foreign Policy Conflict

Interestingly enough, the

ILO claimed 64

in

million affiliate

countries.
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American Labor," 208, 212.
members in 94 non-Communist

Institute for Free

labor.

As

Labor Development (AIFLD)

AIFLD

the

was not

technically

part

to increase U.S. aid to Latin

of the AFI^CIO,

could receive funds

it

from U.S. business firms and contracts from government foreign
Victor Reuther denounced the

important holdings

in Latin

Central Intelligence

was "a propaganda

AIFLD

for

America and

its

aid agencies. In 1966,

inclusion of American businessmen with

stated -in a published interview- that the

Agency was involved
gift to the

American

in its activities.'" In

Reuther* s opinion, this

enemies of free trade unions who effectively

characterize[d] these businessmen as symbols of

Yankee imperialism and enemies of

15

social progress."

During an AFL-CIO Executive Council meeting
walkout,

Meany and

it

was

Chicago shortly

his close advisors presented a special report

AIFLD. Victor Reuther's harsh

whom

in

criticism of the

AIFLD, though

directed, could not be disregarded, as

it

came from

on the

after the

activities

ILO

of the

resented by those at

the high echelons of

organized labor. In the course of the meeting, the board passed a resolution praising the

AIFLD's work

in Latin

America and

rejecting Reuther's "vilification'" of the

organization. Only Walter Reuther and Joe Curran of the National Maritime Union voted

against the resolution. This

AFL-CIO
By

was a

clear sign of Reuther's growing isolation within the

Executive Council.
then, the

Vietnam War was becoming another matter of contention within

labor ranks. Reuther

was

initially as

opposed

as

Meany

to an

the

American withdrawal from

14

Harry Bernstein, "AFL-CIO Unit Accused of "Snooping Abroad," Los Angeles Times,

22

May

1966.

'Victor Reuther, 'The International Activities of American Trade Unions,"
Haber (ed.). Labor in a Changing America (New York, 1966), 304-305.
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William

Southeast Asia, but the
escalation.

In 1966,

UAW president stood eloser to the doves than to the advoeates of

Reuther summarized his position

in the

following way:

We

must work toward an international guarantee of
peacekeeping in Vietnam and
a negotiated settlement under the auspices of the
United Nations or another
mternational agency. Only this rational and responsible
solution will enable the
long-suffering people of Vietnam to process toward social
betterment and

economic progress.
In opposition to Reuther, the

resolution on the

AFL-CIO

Fxecutive Council adopted a decidedly hawkish

American involvement

in Indochina.'^

meeting before the statement was passed,

hysterical, jingoistic

By

began

who had

left

the

the resolution as "intemperate,

free labor

movement."'*

to appear within the union leadership, the antiwar

swelling. In the 1965-1975 period, a wide array of Americans embraced

peace activism: liberals and radicals,
professors.

condemned

and unworthy of a policy statement of a

the time dissent

movement was

later

Reuther,

Some

men and women,

scholars even argue that there were

United States during the Vietnam War.
organization; there

was not a

was wrong" with American

I

blacks and whites, students and

"many" antiwar movements

in the

he movement did not have a single directing

unified leadership; and there

was no consensus on "what

foreign policy. Peace activists, however, tried to subordinate

their differences in the interest

of ending the war.

extension of the antinuclear campaigns of the

In its origins, the

late 194()s

movement was an

and 1950s. Between 1965 and

16

SANH, A

Citizen's Organization for a Sane World,

1975, Vertical Files,

Archives

(I

lereafter

I

1

1.

Vietnamese Conllict. 1968

he I'amiment Institute Fibrary and Robert

RWFA).

'Vindmuller, 206-219.
1

Damon

Stetson's report.

New

York Times, 27 August 1966.
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Wagner Fabor

1967, as they faced pro-war majorities, peace activists engaged
in respectful protests that

were designed
ins,

an antiwar consensus. They discussed the war, organized
teach-

to build

and marched peacefully. Some protesters burnt

effort

aimed

at

influencing policy-makers and

was

draft cards. This kind

of antiwar

largely perceived as middle class and

respectable.'^

"It will

Phillip S.

come

Foner

imperialist

as a surprise to

states, "that

movement

many even

inside the labor

movement

organized labor was an important force in the

to learn,"

first anti-

20

in

American

history."

Foner's point

is

well taken.

has been

It

widely asserted that American workers overwhelmingly supported a "hawkish^" position

on the conflict
activist

in

South Vietnam„ As early as

unions -Local

1

in 1965,

199 of the Drug and Hospital Employees Union and

the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union-

CIO

however, several traditionally

came out

District

against the war.

left-

65 of

The AFL-

Executive Council resolutions applauding the Johnson Administration's escalation

of the war, however, drowned the early voices of opposition
involvement

in Indochina.

to

American

military

The formation of the National Labor Assembly

for Peace in

1967 broke the once seemingly monolithic stand of the AFL-CIO on the war

Over

the next

''dovish," but

few years labor leaders and rank and

most labor unions' stand

antiwar position of the radicals. In

for peace did not

fact, the

filers

issue.

grew increasingly

match the

anti-imperialist,

overwhelming majority of union members

19

Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield,

Movement of the Vietnam Era

(Syracuse,

NY:

An American

Ordeal: The Antiwar

Syracuse University Press, 1990), 387-

391.
20

Philip S. Foner, U.

1989),

S.

Labor and the Vietnam War (New York:

1.
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International Publishers,

never spoke for or against the American military
intervention in Indochina. In October
1967, more than two years before Nixon introduced "the
silent majority" in one of his
speeches, leading

Committee

for

members of the Cold War establishment

created the Citizens

Peace with Freedom in Vietnam. This organization was
allegedly meant

to give "the silent center an opportunity to support
[the U.S.]

commitment

and the policy of non-compromising— although limited resistance

in

Vietnam

to aggression."

Founding members of the committee included former Presidents Dwight
Eisenhower and
Harry Truman; former Senator Paul H. Douglas of Dlinois as organizing
chairman; and
General

Omar N.

president George

Bradley, Archbishop Robert E. Lucey of San Antonio and

Meany

as co-chairmen.

AFI^CIO

The AFL-CIO Executive Council voted

to

contribute $ 10,000 to the newly formed Committee.^'
Just a

month

after the creation

of the Citizens' Committee, the Chicago Labor

Leadership Assembly for Peace attracted nationwide attention.
large

number of trade

echelon labor leaders

unionists really challenged

who

despite the fact that very

Meany' s

It

was

position.

the

first

time that a

The 523 middle

attended the meeting represented sixty different unions,

few

time in almost thirteen years,

locals

had taken an

AFL-CIO

official anti-war position.

unionists sat

down with

For the

first

"outcasts" like the

Teamsters, the International Longshoremen's and Warehouseman's Union (ILWU), the

UE, and

others, to discuss

American foreign policy

issues.

To

the

UE leadership, the
22

assembly was "an important step

in the direction

of redeeming the labor movement."

21

Freedom in Vietnam, 1967 and contributions'
Affairs Files, George Meany Memorial Archives

Citizens Committee for Peace with

Folder

2,

Box

(Hereafter

66, International

GMMA).

^^UENews,

1

January 1968,

8.
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letter,

During the meeting, the highly respected

socialist leader

unionists to unite for political action against the war.

number of union

leaders

in Southeast Asia.

Norman Thomas

was evident

It

had doubts about the righteousness of U.

Rank and

filers'

that

called

on trade

an increasing

S. military intervention

sentiment towards the conflict, however, was more

difficult to gauge.

Many workers
daily concerns.

It is

considered foreign policy matters to be far removed from their

not surprising, therefore, that on foreign policy issues, union leaders'

views should play a more prominent

role than in other areas.

Given the

"remoteness" from union members, labor leaders can follow their

field's

own preferences more

freely in foreign policy issues than in collective bargaining or political action.

Consequently, political commentators presented the

Vietnam War

AFL-CIO

leaders' support of the

as representative of the workers' attitude towards the

American

military

involvement in Indochina.
There were several factors that contributed

to a

widespread -and often

unexamined- view of blue-collar workers as staunch supporters of the war.

First,

working-class citizens were viewed as more "authoritarian" and willing to support "law

and order" issues than other segments of American
participation of union

members

societ>'.

Second, the rather limited

many

observers to conclude that

in anti-war rallies led

workers unconditionally backed the administration's handling of the war. And
scattered displays of patriotism, such as the 1970 hard-hat demonstrations in

City, reinforced the stereotype of the

American worker as hawkish.
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third,

New York

A

number of political

scientists

used sociologist Seymour Lipset's theory of

working-class authoritarianism to explain the workers'
presumed support for an
escalation of the conflict in South Vietnam. In
1959, Lipset stated:

A

number of elements

Low

mdividuals.

contribute to authoritarian predispositions in lower class
education, low participation in political or voluntary

associations of any type,

little

reading, isolated occupations,

economic

insecurity,

and authoritarian family patterns are some of the most important
Lipsefs argument was based on two assumptions:

first,

that sociocultural

and economic

factors determine personality traits such as authoritarianism, and
second, that the

"authoritarian" an individual, the

more prone he

Survey data, however, undennined
a Gallup Poll found that adults in union

the

war

issue.

or she

to support

"hawkish"

that the

that

example,

families were almost evenly divided

United States had made a mistake

sending troops to South Vietnam. In an editorial comment on the survey, the

Times claimed

policies.

that conclusion. In January 1968, for

member

Moreover, 43 percent said

is

more

New

on

in

York

on the war issue "labor leaders [were] not always good barometers of
24

the thinking of their

up,

members."

Nevertheless, as the 1968 presidential campaign heated

two developments apparently confinned Lipset's

more pronounced among working-class

citizens. In

thesis that authoritarianism

was

August, a Gallup poll reported that

seventeen percent of union families backed the independent party candidate George
25

Wallace.

White workers' support of the Alabaman ex-governor seemed

23

Seymour Martin Lipset

Political

Man

to

show

that

(Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1959). 100-

101.
24

New

York Times, 9 January 1968.

25

Alec Gallup and George H. Gallup, eds. The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index: Public
Opinion, 1935-1975, Report N° 38, August 1968. 7.
,
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they were more hawkish than middle-class Americans.
The working class' negative
reaction to the Chicago

1

968 antiwar demonstrations apparently also indicated the

existence of higher levels of authoritarianism

ClO

among

lower-status groups.^^

The AFL-

president assailed the antiwar protesters as "dirty-necked,
dirty-mouthed

demonstrators"

who had

tried

Mayor Richard Daley's

patience beyond endurance and

'

received from the Chicago police exactly what they deserved.
political analysts

found

in Lipset's

27

Thus, a number of

authorharianism thesis an explanation for both

working-class support of Wallace and rejection of antiwar protesters.

These conclusions were soon challenged. After a thorough analysis of data
collected by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center in the 1964-1968
period,

James D. Wright found

that social class

were either unrelated or inversely

related.

and support for escalation of the war

Wright pointed out

working-class citizens were those most, and not

that the

least, integrated into

most "hawkish"

middle-class

28

political culture

and exposed

to

mainstream media.

political attitudes are the inevitable result

The

class

argument

that certain

of certain sociocultural and economic

conditions, Wright said, did not hold true. Workers' attitudes changed over time and
29

were

''quite malleable'' or ''quite

responsive to specific sociopolitical events."

26

John

P.

Robinson, 'Tublic reaction

Quarterly
27

no,

1

to political protest:

Chicago

1968.'' Public

Opinion

(Spring 1970): 1-9.

James A. Wechsler, 'The Scars of Chicago/' The Progressive, November 1968, 26-27.

28

James D. Wright, "The Working Class, Authoritarianism, and
Social Problems 20, no. 2 (Fall 1972): 133.

Ibid., 148.;

the

War

in

Vietnam."

The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N° 41, November 1968,
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4.

Wright also outlines the implications of the class
authoritarianism argument:
educated upper middle class represents an enlightened
culture which
embraces the desirable norms of tolerance. These groups
represent the bulwark,s
of liberality and are to be trusted in the democratic arena.
The lower strata, on the
30
other hand, are not, unless they can be indoctrinated
into
...the

I

the enlightened culture.

It is

evident that political analysts tended to overestimate the
liberalizing influence of

education and social status. Conversely,

many

underestimated the working-class capacity

for progressive reform.

Working-class authoritarianism, moreover, was not an adequate measure
attitudes

on the Vietnam War. Workers could oppose the

same time

reject anti-war demonstrations at

conflict in Indochina

for

and

at the

home. Some observers -especially those

more understanding of American working-class

realities-

explained this apparent

contradiction by stressing the fact that low-income groups were

opinions than high-income citizens, particularly

when

more

reticent to air their

those opinions might be viewed as

"unconventionaP" or "unpatriotic." Furthermore, while the middle- and upper-class
citizens analyzed the

Vietnam War

in abstract

terms -whether they viewed

necessary anti-Communist struggle or as an American imperialist venture-

it

as a

many

31

working-class Americans saw the conflict in a more pragmatic way.

By
American

the end of 1969,

casualties led

evident that

unionists

Meany

seemed

to

economic hardship

many union members

at

home coupled

to turn against the war.

did not speak for the 14 million

be as divided as the

rest

with the rising

AFL-CIO

It

rank and

of the country on the war

toll

of

was becoming

filers,

issue.

since

A

Wright, 142-143.

^'Harian Hahn, "Dove Sentiments

Among

Blue-Collar Workers," Dissent 17, no. 3 (May-

June 1970): 203.
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Dcconibcr 1969 Clallup

poll indicated that 55 percent

themselves as "doves," and 3

more

likely he or she

was

to

percent as -hawks." The lower a person's income,
the

1

disapprove of the war.

15,000 and over called themselves "doves;"

among

year, 62 percent favored de-escalation of the war.

The antiwar movement
late

1960s and early 1970s.

initiative in the

antiwar

antiwar activists

By

late

seem

moved from

l-ilty

those

percent of those

who made

who made

less than $

S

5,000 a

32

tried to tap into working-class opposition to the

war

in the

1967, Charles (Miatllcld claims, "the weight and

movement had

the political system did not

of American adults described

shifted to the left."^^

to respond,

As

the conllict escalated and

opponents of the war despaired. Many

protest to conlVoiitation.

fhey abandoned

their attempts to

inlluence policy-makers and worked to mobili/e large demonstrations. Protest grew

sharper and more theatrical.

A

tiny

number of extremists

resorted to violence: they

detonated bombs, attacked the police and vandalized buildings.
the

media played up these

actions,

which became attached

To

the pacillsts" dismay,

to the public

image of the

34

antiwar movement.
After S1)S collapsed in 1969 and Republicans assumed control of the White

I

lou.se,

antiwar liberals

political

felt in

a stronger position to bring the anti-war

mainstream. In an attempt to

Vietnam,

liberal

and radical antiwar

movement

into the

popular support for U.S. withdrawal from

rally

activists agreed to collaborate in the organization

^^The Gallup Poll Cumulative Imlcw Report

N°

33

DeBenedetti, 391.

^^bid., 391-392.
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54,

December 1969,

7-8

of

two

efforts: the

Moratorium and the

Brown, Marge Sklencar, David

New MobiHzation.

Hawk

Peace campaign veterans

and David Mixner were the founding members of

Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC), which coordinated

the

demonstrations of October 15, 1969. The organizers' aim
was

movement

into the

for

the

War

in

November

the nationwide antiwar

to take the antiwar

communities where people who had never protested against the war

before could do so "respectably.'- Simultaneously, the

End

Sam

Vietnam was preparing

13-15.

The

New

Mobilization Committee to

for a national demonstration in

New Mobe leaders rallied the

pledged to keep the demonstration non-violent. Both the

Washington D. C.

support of radical groups yet

VMC and the Mobe were intent

on countering the anarchic and violent protest of the 1968 Chicago demonstrations.
Prior to the October 15 Moratorium, the Alliance for Labor Action
large ads in leading

movement,

American newspapers. Hoping

the official statement began,

fellow-Americans

who

UAW,

workers to the anti-war

take our stand with the millions of our

an end of the war

call for

signed by the heads of the

"We

to rally

in

Vietnam." The advertisement was

the Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Chemical

Workers Union, who represented over four million members. Peace,

would

reunite

America and allow

disease." There

was nothing

to

(ALA) placed

it

be

the

ALA claimed,

to fight against "poverty, hunger, ignorance

won

in

Vietnam, the

ALA

insisted, but there

and

were

35

many problems

to

be solved

at

home.

About a hundred unionists of the San Francisco Bay Area gathered
California, a

that

in

Oakland,

few days before the Moratorium. They unanimously passed a resolution

was most

indicative of the antiwar trend within the ranks of organized labor. This

UAW Solidarity, November

1969, 11
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chapter of the Labor Leadership Assembly for Peace
disavowed the AFI^ClO's support

of the administration's Vietnam policy and called

American troops from Southeast Asia. During

for

an immediate withdrawal of

the convention,

Amalgamated Clothing Workers, was unabashedly

critical

Ann

of the

Draper, officer of the

AFL-CIO

president:

of the muddled mind of Meany and an indication of his
unconcern for the membership that he should castigate all of Nixon's
domestic
policies and then endorse the Nixon war policy which is the
major base and
aggravation of our severest economic and social ills.
It is

characteristic

The assembly

called

upon union leaders and rank and

Moratorium and the November

1

filers to

5 National Mobilization to

support the October 15

End

the War. "This stand

symbolizes," the resolution read, "the great gulf between the labor bureaucracy and
the
membership.'*^^

Millions of citizens participated in the October 15 Moratorium. The

activities,

intended to suspend "business as usual,'" were varied: wearing black armbands, shining
car headlights, passing out antiwar flyers from door to door, joining demonstrations.

Over

a

1

00,000 people gathered on the Boston

Common

million participated in various antiwar activities in

led a candlelight vigil in

Washington D. C.

and approximately a quarter

New York

City. Coretta Scott

Political figures as varied as Dr.

King

Benjamin

Spock, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, pacifist David Dellinger and
diplomat Averell Harriman voiced their opposition to the war. "The Moratorium was,"
37

Charles DeBenedetti stated, "a national demonstration, teach-in and memorial service."

Resolution, 1969, Folder 13,

Department,

Box

74, Jay Lovestone Files, International Affairs

GMMA.

^^DeBenedetti, 263.
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A
Socialist

cross section of leftists and radicals -especially
those associated with the

Workers Party (SW1>) and

the

Young

Socialist Alliance

(YSA)- was

thrilled at

organized labor's participation in the Moratorium.
George Morris, a contributor to The
Mililcmt,

the

claimed

that the

alignment of a large section of the trade union movement
with

Moratorium had played a

crucial role in the massive eruption of national
antiwar

sentiment throughout the country.

Ad hoc Moratorium committees of local and

labor leaders had been formed in cities such as

Washington

I).

1%9

C. October 15

struggle for an end to the

war

in

was,

in

New

York, San I-rancisco, Chicago, and

Morris's words, "a turning point

George Morris were wrong

imperialist." Neither the

ALA

anti-imperialist crusade.

to believe that labor's opposition

its

opposition to the Vietnam

Furthermore, the signers of the

was

"anti-

War

as part of an

ALA statement disassociated

themselves from the more violent antiwar demonstrators:
activities

protest but

advertisement nor the resolution passed by the San

Bay Area unionists presented

I'rancisco

in the

Vietnam, and, objectively, against imperialism."^"

The Moratorium signaled an unprecedented broadening of antiwar
analysis such as

regional

"We

deplore the reprehensible

of a small minority who burn the American Hag and equate anti-Americanism
39

with anti-war, lor their actions are indefensible and counter productive."
largely admitted that the decision of most

Americans

to

speak

again.st the

"ideological" than was the radicals' opposition to the war. Yet

Moratorium had

to a certain extent vindicated those militants

38

George Morris, "Labor

November

for Peace:

1%'), M-.^, f older 3,

Turning Point

Box

12,

Labor

University Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs

UA W Solidarilw November

1

969,

1

1
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l

Among

many

Radicals

war was

believed that the

who had

resisted the draft.

Unionists," The MiliUnU, 8

oday Collection, Wayne State
(1

less

lereafter

WSUA).

demonstrated

at the

Pentagon, and confronted

Mayor Daley's

police in the streets of

Chicago.^^

The ALA'S
radicals: "Let us

criticism of U.S. foreign policy probably

now put

labor alliance's ad," but

the sad

that

"of all

at the point

Indochina had been a mistake, the
"imperialist."

to

most

Vietnamese chapter of our history behind," exhorted the

remember

capable of being transplanted

sounded mild

ALA

Ramparts -a publication

political systems,

democracy

is

the least

of bayonet." American military intervention

said, but the decision

had not necessarily been

largely representative of the

stated that the military debacle in Indochina

was a

direct

in

New

Left critique-

consequence of the U.S. "global

empire's" growth. The editors summarized the antiwar protesters" role

in the following

way:

The job of the radicals in the Moratorium is
Vietnam is not simple aberration, but rather

to

convince the

the natural

new

protesters that

outgrow of a system

that

seeks to lock the third world into a permanent state of indentured servitude.^'

The differences between
Broadly speaking,

liberal

liberals

saw

and radical antiwar dissidents thus were
the

Vietnam

substantial.

conflict as a very serious mistake in foreign

policy that could be corrected through civil participation and electoral politics. Radicals

regarded American military intervention in Indochina as a counterrevolutionary war that
the U.S.

waged

for

American capitalism

to

willingness to downplay their differences

remain hegemonic. The two factions'

made

the massive support of the October 15

mobilization possible.

40

"The Moratorium,

the

War and

the Empire," Ramparts, 29 October, 6,

Box 341, Walter Reuther Files,
WSUA; "The Moratorium, the War and the Empire," 6, 8.

^'aLA

flyer,

1969, Folder

1,
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8.

UAW President's Office,

In response to the

Peace with Freedom

in

Moratorium Day demonstrations,

Vietnam published, 'The Choice

designed to explain

''the

public." In the

place, the

first

more Vietnams

victors to try

Communists would

And

mount.

dangers of a unilateral

in Asia, Africa

in

would be

Vietnam," a pamphlet

standstill cease-fire" to

Vietnam and

attacks

on towns and

to

villages

backs on their commitment

antiwar demonstrations, the Committee

war but did not "want

"a war weary

the

would

in Southeast

discredited throughout the world. Despite the

silent center" represented the majority

the

for

and Latin America. Second, the

finally, if Americans turned their

undeniable increase

Committee

Committee claimed, such an action would encourage

take over South

Asia, the U.S. leadership

in

the Citizens

of the American people

buy an end

still

insisted that "the

who was unhappy

to hostilities at the price

about

of defeat, dishonor and

of peace with freedom here and abroad." The AFL-CIO American Federationist
reproduced the text of the Committee's pamphlets, thus allowing
audience within the working

Committee and
withdrawal as

Hanoi

the

AFL-CIO

allies

As members of the Cold War

class.

top ranks described those

who

it

to achieve a

wider

establishment, both the

supported immediate

of the Communists. The October 1969 document concluded:

on three battlefronts -in Vietnam, in Paris, and in American
public opinion. The enemy's only remaining chance for total victory lies here
is

fighting

in

42

the U. S. -in the pressures ot

Hawks and doves
center."

And,

in a

alike claimed to

Department,

in

have the support of the so-called

"silent

way, the working class showed many of the characteristics

attributed to the "silent majority."

"The Choice

American public opinion.

The President introduced

Vietnam," (1969), 14-15,

16, Folder 14,

GMMA.
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that

Nixon

the slogan in his speech of

Box 031,

International Affairs

November

3,

my

Americans-

fellow

1969,

responsibility for

training

when he

its

I

stated,

"And

so tonight-to you, the great silent majority
of

ask for your support/'

security,

Nixon

To enable South Vietnam

stated, the country

and equipment of South Vietnamese

forces.

to

assume

had considerably increased the

The U.S.

air

operations had been

reduced by twenty percent and American casualties had declined
to the lowest point
three years.

By December

15, 1969,

brought home. The president made

full

in

Nixon promised, over 60,000 men would have been
clear to the

it

American public

that the rate

of U.S.

troops withdrawal depended entirely on the progress of the Paris
peace talks, the training

program of South Vietnamese
Indochina.

To dismiss

and the Communists' level of military

forces,

the importance of the increasing antiwar protests,

a vocal minority, however fervent

its

activity in

Nixon

said: "If

cause, prevails over reason and the will of the

majority, this nation has no future as a free society." In other words, the "silent majority"

could not allow the antiwar '"minority" to jeopardize democracy

at

home and

the U. S.

43

role abroad.

The AFL-CIO Department of Public

Relations immediately released a statement

by Meany on Nixon's Vietnam speech. The AFL-CIO president praised Nixon's
decision to honor U. S. commitments abroad as well as his attempt to achieve "an

honorable, negotiated peace."

Meany

also chastised the administration's critics for not

accepting that continued hostility or peace was entirely Hanoi's responsibility. Nixon's
detailed description of his

the

AFL-CIO and

the

Vietnam

policies.

for

2233-2236, Folder

claimed, "deserved the backing of

American public." To the antiwar

43

"Nixon Calls

Meany

Vietnam Unity, Says
19.

Box

028,

COPE

No

Pullout

Research
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activists'

Now,"

Files,

dismay, the hawkish

Presidential Report, 1969,

GMMA.

minority was not the only Americans that found
Nixon's arguments persuasive.

days after the president's speech, a Gallup poll
indicated

that

Two

77 percent of Americans

supported the president's policies, whereas only 6
percent opposed them.'' With a
masterful address that exploited the ^achievements" of
his Vietnamization plan, Nixon

won

the backing of "the silent majority."

Despite the volatility of American public opinion on the war,
activists

claimed that "the

administration.

was

silent majority" shared their concerns,

The publication of Vietnam and the

liberal

antiwar

and not those of the

Silent Majority: the

Dove

's

Guide

indicative of the peace advocates" preoccupation with the state of the
antiwar

movement and with Nixon's
citizens.

attempt to capitalize on the silence of most American

Social scientist Sidney Verba described "the silent majority" as both "a cleverly

designed symbol" and "a reality," but said

it

was "more complicated than

suggested by the President's speech and feared by

Democratic Senator George

Rosenberg and

McGovem

Phillip Converse,

many opposed

the monolith

to the President."

praised the analysis presented by Verba. Milton

J.

and concluded:

The authors confirm that the war is in sharp conflict with beliefs and attitudes held
by most Americans. All that remains is to make the connection compelling
enough to alter their positions on Vietnam itself There is a broad community of
45

interest in terminating the

The

silent majority

war waiting

to

be perceived and activated.

argument presented the antiwar groups

as antagonizing not

only the administration's foreign policy but also the majority of Americans. In

fact, the

44

"News from
Department,

the

Box 03 Country Files,
New York Times, 5 November 1969, 11.

AFL-CIO," Folder

GMMA;

9,

1

45

,

International Affairs

Rosenberg, Sidney Verba and Philip E. Converse, Vietnam and the Silent
Majority: The Dove 's Guide (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row,

Milton

J.

Publishers, 1970), 19,

xii.
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majority of those

who demonstrated

against the

war were not

violent,

and the majority of

working-class Americans were not staunch hawks.
Most Americans did not have definite

and well thought-out opinions about foreign policy

issues. Furthermore, the

which survey questions were formulated often influenced
obtained. Citizens tended to oppose an

such as

'^defeat,"

"Communist

the results that pollsters

American withdrawal from Vietnam when words

when terms such

de-escalation

as "killings,"

"continuing war," or "domestic costs" were used in opinion polls on the
Patriotism,

anticommunism, and

policy supposedly hindered
In The

Dove

's

was "intruding

Among

the

many American

into their lives

Executive's handling of foreign

citizens

and hurting them

most compelling pragmatic reasons

economy and

Economic hardship had

to those

trust in the

war."*^

from joining the peace movement.

Guide, Verba claimed that most people turned against the war because

troops were the faltering

unrest.

in

take-overs," or "Moss of American credibility" appeared in

More people supported

the questions.

way

led

in

ways

that [were] very close to

home."

for supporting a U.S. withdrawal of

the decay in

many workers

American

to

quality of life due to social

want an end

peace activists whose motivations for participating

in the

to the war, as

antiwar

opposed

movement

were allegedly more "ideological." Milton, Rosenberg and Verba presented an
empathetic discussion of the views of lower-status groups on the Vietnam War. But
these liberal analysts

who

overlooked several issues.
lives

because

in

many

avoided the excesses of more radical peace
First, the

Vietnam War was "intruding"

Ibid.,

""^Ibid.,

activists also

into the workers'

cases their sons were doing the fighting in Indochina.

46

24

40-41.
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it

And

secondly, a large number of peace demonstrators
were also motivated by pragmatic
reasons, such as avoiding the draft.

Throughout the conllict
fighting in

Vietnam were seldom

union publications

Southeast Asia, the social origins of those

in

the focus of debate; the only exceptions

that reported that

military intervention in Indochina.

The

attention devoted to

complex

class inequalities

youngsters

One of Appy"s

who managed

to

'

that, contrary to

to

mask

widespread

or

belief, existed

of military service were not documented and the

feelings of working-class families

considered.

"Middle America or "the

mass media's attempt

underestimate very tangible class differences

The

were some

workers paid the heaviest human cost of the U.S.

silent center" in the early 197()s attest to the

in the country.

who were

interviewees

whose sons were

summed up

avoid the draft

in the

in

Vietnam were hardly

his class resentment

towards the

following way:

Where were the sons of all the big shots who supported the war? Not in my
platoon. Our guys" people were workers.. .If the war was so important, why
our leaders put eveiyone's son

in there,

didn't

only us?

Student peace activists believed that their anti-war crusade was a noble one, but they
often failed to notice that while they avoided the draft, joined demonstrations, and

confronted the American establishment, other youngsters -working-class boys- were

domg

the "dirty

Antiwar

work"

in Southeast Asia.

liberals advised

peace protesters to dissociate themselves from the public

stereotype of the violent demonstrator, to avoid downgrading patriotism, and to cite the

great

number of leaders who opposed

the war. "Respect

48

Christian Appy, Working Class War:
Mill

for,

and comprehension

of, the

American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel

and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1993),

177

1

1.

other man's concerns

is

recommended The Dove
committed

to

the beginning and the basis for lasting
political persuasion,"
's

Guide. Although many peace activists were
genuinely

understanding ^the other man's concerns," they did not
always

Cully

understand the war's real impact on the lower classes of
American society. Also, radicals
often jailed to acknowledge the fact that

many workers viewed

an

who

elitist

attack by a privileged minority

Rather than

chose to evade

it,

resist the draft,

many

could avoid the

college

antiwar struggle as

their

draft.''^

men who opposed

the

war

in

Vietnam

taking what journalist James f allows called the 'Ihinking-man
route."

Middle-class students

knew

the details of physical deferments; an "underweight

disqualification," for instance, could

do the job. Working-class youngsters seldom had

access to this kind of information, f allows, a Harvard University alumnus, recalled
his

humane Cambridge antiwar

how

friends "let the boys from Clielsea be sent off to die."

Not only did college students often have very personal motivations

to

oppose the war,

fallows claims, but they also harbored class prejudices against the workers.

narrow mindedness, he says, many peace

activists

In their

thought that the working-class boys

simply needed some lessons on the correct approach

to the

war

in

Indochina and

to the

50

dralt at

proposed was
class.

One

home.

A

ol the priorities ol the worker-student alliance that

to launch political-educational

Cambridge pamphlet

campaigns

that circulated in the

peace movement was largely middle

class:

'Though

to reach the

some

American working

summer of 1970 admitted
there

is

radicals

that the

very wide opposition to the

49

Milton,

'

James

et. al,

The Silent Majority and Vietnam: The Dove

f allows,

8 (October 1975):

"What did you do

in the class

7.
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's

Guide, 142-149, 155.

war, daddy?" Washington Monthly

7, no,

war among workers,"

the

document

movement." As they had done

stated, "as a class they stand

summer of

in the

inviting students to participate in a work-in that

activists

1969, radical antiwar activists were

would build

ties

between the antiwar

and the workers/'

The work-in was
aware of their class

a well-intentioned effort, but college students were not
always

Although peace

privileges.

rates in their speeches against the

American

the "ignorant" lower class

who

numbers of peace demonstrators used

activists frequently

wounded. Students also often looked

appeared to support the war.

the

word "pig"

.

they hated us

m return."

let

them know

And

it,

and

it

in

Chicago

was no

great

The

ritt

"We

in 1968.

wonder

that

between the antiwar movement and the working class

the late 1960s. Events in

May

1970, however,

galvanized the image of the white worker as a reactionary and rampaging
the spring of 1970,

many peace

patriot.

activists felt that their efforts during the

October Moratorium and the November Mobilization
little.

who

52

was widely discussed throughout

By

linally, large

to refer to blue-collar citizens

disapproved of antiwar demonstrations such as the one staged
hated the pigs," Fallows stated, "and

mentioned casualty

military intervention in Vietnam, they rarely

stressed the "class" percentage of the dead and

down on

back from the

"In April 1970," Foner stated, "the antiwar

to

End

the

movement was

War had accomplished
in a state

of quiescence"

53

but

"it

was

the

calm before the storm."

^Vietnam Work-in
3,

II:

A

At the end

of the

month, Nixon's decision

to

proposal to Radicals in the Professions, pamphlet, 1970, Folder

Vietnamese Conllict, Vertical

Files,

RWLA.

52

Fallows, 16-17.
53

Foner, 96.
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send U.

ground troops into Cambodia further polarized
American public opinion on

S.

the war. According to

Cambodia

in

Newsweek, the president "had plunged American troops

into

hopes of shocking the Communist enemy and stabilizing
a turbulent

54

world/'

Nixon's move was a gross miscalculation. His announcement
of the invasion

of Cambodia shocked Americans
In response,

who

believed de-escalation of the war was underway.

thousands joined antiwar demonstrations throughout the country.

Nixon's decision hardly moved Meany and
leadership simply reaffirmed

May

1970. the

1.

its

his supporters.

The AFL-CIO

support for the administration's handling of the war.

AFL-CIO Department of Public

On

Relations released the following

statement:

The President has

clearly outlined the

problem

to the

American people.

It is

unmistakably clear that he made his decision on the basis of his clear obligation as
commander-in-chief to protect American servicemen[...] In this crucial hour, he
should have the

A

few days

after

full

support of the American people.

He

certainly has ours.^^

Nixon's Cambodian decision, a violent confrontation between peace

demonstrators and

New York

construction workers reinforced the image of working-class

hawkishness.
Violent protests broke out immediately after the president's announcement of the

Cambodian invasion and within a few days
colleges and universities.

Cincinnati,

Ohio

The

State University,

News from

the

serious unrest at a

and Columbia University. But

May

Front,"

Newsweek, 18 May 1970,

26.

AFL-CIO,

1

May

number of

included the University of Maryland, the University of

the shocking headlines on

54

Home

was

made

University in Ohio that

"Mr. Nixon's

list

there

1970, Folder

WSUA.
180

I,

Box

12,

4,

it

was Kent

State

1970. During a

campus

Labor Today Collection.

antiwar demonstration, the Ohio National Guard
shot and killed four students and

wounded another

twelve.

Nixon made

public through his press secretary:

The Kent

State students

publicized tragedy

Americans

in

his chilling response to the

"When

Kent State

dissent turns to violence,

„56
it

invites tragedy.'

were not the only victims of the widespread violence:

was followed by

killings

this

widely

the less reported police shooting of six African-

Augusta, Georgia and another two

at

Jackson State

The murder of peace demonstrators prompted more

in Mississippi.

protest and eventually led to a

violent physical confrontation between students and workers.

On May

two hundred flag-waving construction workers armed with hammers and
attacked a group of demonstrators

who had

honor the memory of the students

killed at

"hardhats -as the mass media would

call

gathered in

New York's

1970, about

8,

lead pipes

Wall Street

Kent State University. After the

them— invaded

district to

assault, the

City Hall and then

left to

break

57

mto Pace College and

attack

some

students there.

As Maurice Isserman

contends, "The

"hardhats" were instantly enshrined in political myth, symbols of unthinking

authoritarianism to the

left,

and of rugged patriotism

to the right."'

scientists, politicians

and moviemakers

alike, the construction

symbol of American

labor: the hard hat

was the "Middle American,"

silent majority"

^^"Mr. Nixon's

who had

Home

finally

worker soon became the
the

member of "the

Front," 27,

Harry R. Rubenstein, "Symbols
Hats," Labor's Heritage
Patriots,"

social

decided to speak his mind.

57

Rampaging

To journalists,

1,

& Images of American Labor: Dinner Pails and Hard

no. 3 (July 1989): 45-46; Fred Cook, "Hard-Hats:

The Nation, 15 June 1970, 712.

58

Maurice Isserman, ^^Hardhats and Longhairs/'Z)/^.^e^/41
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(Fall 1994): 568.

The

Peter

Greater

I.

Brennan, president of the Building and Construction
Trades Council of

New York,

claimed that the construction workers' violent protest
had been

spontaneous. The union leaders, Brennan insisted, had not
played any role in planning

"They did

it,"

Brennan

Nevertheless, on

May

"because they were fed up with violence by anti-war

said,

demonstrators, by those

who

19,

spat

on the American

flag

and desecrated

during a Council meeting held

union leadership approved the decision

The union minutes summed up
[...] let

it,

to

hold a rally

at

at the

it."^^

Commodore

Hotel, the

City Hall the following day.

the purpose of the demonstration:

the general public

know what we

think of our flag and country. ..the one

and only, U.S.A. [...] bring your banners and get your rank and file members to
march, but once again. ..no violence. Let us show the city and the country that we
are law-abiding citizens.

It

would prove very hard

for construction

workers to recover their image as "law

abiding" citizens after the mass media had portrayed them as believers in

country" and "not necessarily
hats" reputation

was

further

in equality for all

damaged by

and the

right

"God and

of dissent."^' The hard-

the accusation that most workers had not

participated spontaneously in the pro-war and "patriotic" demonstrations. Fred Cook, a

contributor to The Nation, contended that most protests had been carefully orchestrated.

Construction firms encouraged the demonstrations, by allowing workers to close
their jobs

and paying them for marching instead of working. The

New York

down

City police

^Vook, 716.

^Vhe Minutes of the Building and
George Meany Files, Office of the
^'"The Blue Collar Worker's

Construction Trades Council (1936-1984), Microfilm,
President,

Lowdown

GMMA.

Blues," Time, 9

182

November

1970, 68.

either turned a blind eye

on hard-hats' violent behavior or simply cheered construction

62

workers on.

At a Washington Press Conference,

UAW president Leonard Woodcock

referred to the hard-hat demonstrations as ''mobilized,
organized, possibly paid violence."

Construction workers,

continued to work

Woodcock contended, had

received "the same pay as

if

they had

63
all

week."

The Cambodian invasion and

the developments that followed deepened the

divisions within organized labor as a larger

number of leaders and rank and

filers

became

»

more vocal

for or against the war. Jack Barnes, the Socialist

Worker Party

secretary,

claimed that the post-Cambodia upsurge had brought about crucial changes

in the labor

movement:

[

The] open breaks in the labor bureaucracies

war

make

it

possible for opponents of the

inside the unions to effectively argue their view and mobilize the sentiment

against the

war

that already exists

among

millions of American workers.''^

Barnes" claim, though probably optimistic, was well taken. For the

of union leaders did break with the AFL-CIO

At about the same time
district to beat

up peace

official stance

that hard-hat demonstrators

West Coast. Organized labor

the

Nixon Administration's

in the

time, a

number

on the Vietnam War.

stormed into the Wall Street

kind of labor activism was taking shape on

activists, a different

the

first

San Francisco Bay Area directed

escalation of the

war and not against

its

the antiwar

anger against

movement.

"cook, 713.
63

UAW Washington Report,

1

June 1970,

3,

Folder

2,

Box

12,

Labor Today Collection,

WSUA.
^^Jack Barnes,

June 1970,

"The impact on

capitalists,

unions and student forces," The Militant. 5

9.
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On May

18,

452 Bay Area trade union

officers, executive board

members and shop

stewards placed a full-page advertisement in the San
Francisco Chronicle. "Dear Mr.
President:" the ad began,

"American working people and

their families are deeply

disturbed at your expansion of the war into Cambodia. Those
sons..."

I

men

being killed are our

he unionists^ petition stressed their distrust of the administration
and demanded

U. S. immediate withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and Cambodia."

Another important development took place on

member of the AFL-CIO

thirty-five

man

May

24. Jacob S. Potofsky, a

Executive Council, publicly broke with the top

bureaucracy's position on the war. The president of the 41 7,000-member Amalgamated

Clothing Workers of America contended that the union's rank and

of all Americans," longed

for

lile,

"like the majority

"peace now, without delay, without further military

adventures, without more killing." In a similar vein, the American Federation of State,

County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), which represented about 490,000
workers, called for an end to the war. The union passed a resolution stating that the

AFSCME not only opposed "the expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia"
called for "the immediate and total withdrawal of all U. S.

but also

armed forces from Southeast

66

Asia."

A

day

after Potofsky's break,

August Scholle, the Michigan State AFI^CIO

president, also distanced himself from

conference held

at

the Michigan

Meany's

AFL-CIO

^Yabor

it!,"

in their

opposition to the war. The highlight

San Francisco Chronicle, 18 May 1970,

Says: "End the War," fiyer. Folder

news

headquarters in Detroit, Scholle stressed the

need for the labor movement to join students

""We've had

position on the war. At a

1,

Box

184

12,

15.

Labor Today Collection, WSIJA.

Of the press conference was the unionists'

call for

an Emergency National Conference

Against the Cambodia-Laos- Vietnam War. The
sponsors of this antiwar parley stated
that the conference

was not intended

revolution or to found a

massive opposition

this antiwar

new

Nixon's decision
polarized U.S. society.

first

out the strategy of tactics of social

movement;"

major aim was

one with significant trade union sponsorship,

Cambodia and

A

to organize

large

AFL-CIO

67

the social unrest that followed further

The May 1970 events marked

openly with the

its

The Cleveland Area Peace Action Council would host

to invade

stance on the Vietnam War.
to break

hammer

political party or

to the war.

meeting, the

"to

a turning point in organized labor's

number of leaders and rank and

filers

decided either

top bureaucracy's position or to embrace a pro-war

position by participating in "patriotic" demonstrations.

Numerous unions made

public

statements against the war and distanced themselves from the "official" AFL-CIO"s

support of Nixon's handling of the war. But

demonstrators that

made

it

was

the

New York

hard-hats' pro-war

the headlines in the media.

In public discourse, the

mass media and commercial iconography,

the

construction worker would replace the factory worker as the prototypical American blue-

collar.

The

New York hard-hats matched the stereotype of the American rank and

relatively affluent

and

satisfied with his

job but also authoritarian and hawkish.

observers argued that the hard-hats were simply "Middle Americans/'
"Silent Majority"

who were now openly demanding law and

order

at

filer as

Many

members of the

home and peace

with honor in South Vietnam. Reports of the hard-hats" displays of patriotism soon
eclipsed the discussion of the "blue-collar blues" that had occupied political analysts at

67

"Unionists join in sponsoring antiwar parley," The Militant, 5 June 1970,
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1

the end of the decade. In the construction workers
Nixon

saw an unprecedented

opportunity to expand his poUtical base in the direction
of the blue-collar workers,
especially in northern industrial areas that had traditionally
aligned themselves with the

Democratic Party. As the president prepared
first political test

for the

of his administration, a White House

"swimming toward

As Senator McGovcrn
II.

strategist stated that

workers were

Nixon Administration on grounds of patriotism, support

the

and order, and against the left-wing extremists

Vietnam War,

1970 Congressional elections, the

in the

law

Democratic Party."^^

stated in his foreword to

S. military intervention in

for

The Silent Majority and the

Indochina was "in sharp conilict with beliefs

and attitudes held by most Americans." The war's consequences such as high taxes,
infiation, social unrest

and rising casualties were debasing the "American Dream."

order to turn "the silent majority" against the Vietnamese conflict,

McGovern

In

argued,

peace advocates needed "to make the connection"" between the war and the people's
69

hardships "compelling enough."

remained

to

be seen

who would

As

the Congressional elections approached,

be the most successful

in

making

it

the "right connections."

Inspired by the hard-hats" patriotic demonstrations, Nixon exacerbated the Social Issue.

The 1970

election results eventually

showed

that the

Economic

Issue could not be

underestimated.

"Nixon"s Plan To Win The Blue-Collar Vote,"
1970, 20.

Rosenberg,

et. al., xii.

186

U. S.

News

&

World Report, 20 July

CHAPTER 6
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN DISARRAY
In the

Nixon

months preceding the 1970 congressional

that he faced

it

was

clear to Richard

an uphill struggle to win workers away from the Democratic Party.

Jerome M. Rosow, the Assistant Secretary of Labor

was one of the

elections,

for Policy, Evaluation

and Research,

administration's blue-collar strategists. At Nixon's request, in 1970,

Rosow produced

a report on The Problems of the Blue-Collar Worker.

group

Rosow

that joined

in his venture included

George

The working

P. Schultz, the Secretary

of

Labor, Attorney General John N. Mitchell; Donald Rumsfeld, director of the Office of

Economic Opportunity, and Daniel
stated that his objective

administration

was

was

intent

to

P.

Moynihan, counselor

on solving

think that the American worker

The public

it.

"We know the

elections.

The

is in

to

it

United States

is

an affluent

goes against our preconceptions to

a bind."'

release of Rosow's report

of Nixon's intention

Rosow

prove that there was a "blue-collar problem" and that the

added the assistant secretary of labor, "and

society,'"

to the president.

on August

13, 1970,

was a

clear indication

win over the votes of blue-collar workers during the forthcoming

analysis focused

on the problems of families with incomes between $

5,000 and $ 10,000 a year. This income range covered families living above the poverty
level but

below the $ 10,664 a year

that the

Labor Department considered necessary

for

an urban family of four to enjoy an "adequate" standard of living. The report advocated

^CPR NationalJournal (January 1, 1971), 236, Folder 17, Box
Files, George Meany Memorial Archives (Hereafter GMMA).
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031,

COPE

Research

better educational opportunities for working-class
children

improved housing, and

better transportation.

He

and

adults, tax breaks,

proposed, however, no concrete

measures to achieve these goals.

Most

labor leaders gave

Rosow's

report a cold shoulder.

When

questioned about

The Problems of the Blue-Collar Worker, union presidents Paul
Jennings,

Leonard Woodcock, who represented the
agreed that

it

was

facile

and

electrical, steel

that the conclusions

was flawed

Woodcock

in that

it

"There

stated,

no question

neglected. People do want to

know

that the leaders

years. Moreover, the

inflation.

he has been

of unions and political leaders are
2

to

them;'

Despite the administration's

concern for the plight of the worker, the labor leaders asserted,

prove very difficuh for Republican candidates to

economic "game

many

that the blue-collar believes that

aware of their problems and thinking of solutions
efforts to express

and autoworkers respectively,

downplayed the impact of unemployment and

is

W. Abel and

were obvious. The administration was

dramatizing facts that union leaders had been saying for
report

I.

plan'^ that entailed tight

The "game

plan''

was

the administration's

as the

inauguration.

The president was undoubtedly a

first

would

the blue-collar voter with a an

money, unemployment and high

was perceived

interest rates.

response to rising inflation, which

most pressing economic problem by the time of Nixon's

often hard to categorize.

intervention in the

woo

it

On the

conservative, but his conservatism

one hand, Nixon believed

economy should be minimal. On

as the key to a great presidency. In

its

that the federal

government's

the other hand, he viewed "activism"

successive attempts to solve the country's

^Ibid., 238.
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was

economic problems,

the administration

most of Nixon's conservative
Social Issue, the

tenets.

would not only be

active;

it

would

Ironically, to a president so intent

also contradict

on exploiting

the

Economic Issue became a paramount concern. Historian Allen
Matusow

explains:

[Nixon] spent countless hours pondering how to prevent the
economy from
defeating him, how to manipulate foreign trade and monetary
issues to woo

how

to

appease voters with doubtful policies he did not believe

in

labor,'

while keeping

his conservative base intact.

In the late 1960s,

Kcynesianism and monetarism were the two dominant and

opposing economic theories. Keynesian economists regarded the private sector as
responsible for economic instability and the government's fiscal policy as capable of

keeping the economy running smoothly. By cutting taxes and increasing expenditures
raise aggregate

demand and maintain employment, Keynesians

asserted, the

to

government

could avoid recessions. By raising taxes and cutting expenditures to take pressure off
prices, conversely, the

government could curb

inflation.

Monetarists disagreed. Milton

Freeman of the University of Chicago, monetarism's highly regarded

theoretician,

contended

instability.

that

governments, not the private sector, caused economic

U.S. Federal Reserve, which controlled the

cause of booms and busts. Economic

monetary policy.

money supply

stability

in the

country,

was

The

the true

depended largely on the Federal Reserve's

While Kcynesianism prevailed during the Democratic administrations

of the 1960s, monetarism dominated the economic policies of Nixon's

first

two years

office.

Allen

.1.

Matusow, Nixon

"v

Economy: Booms,

Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998),

6.

^bid., 12-14.
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Busts, Dollars,

and

Votes (Lawrence,

in

In 1969 and 1970, Paul

McCracken, a monetarist and

the first chair of Nixon' s

Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), shaped the
administration's game plan. The
Director of the Office of Management and Budget

(0MB),

the chair of the Federal

Reserve and the secretary of the treasury completed Nixon's
quadriad of economic
advisors.

both

McCracken sought

fiscal

economy

and monetary

to cool off the

restraint.

economy and curb

inflation

it

came

to be referred to as "gradualism."

government extended the existing 10 percent income

inflation, the

1968 to

"game plan"

less than 5 percent in

The

tax surcharge and repealed the

investment tax credit while the Federal Reserve slowed the growth

in late

to

His policy, McCracken told Congress, was to slow the

"gradually"; consequently,

from 7.9 percent

by resorting

in the

money supply

mid- 1969.^ Intended

ran the risk of causing a recession.

By

to stifle

the end of 1970,

gradualism had not worked in the way economic analysts expected. The economic

downturn

that

Nixon feared so much had

cost

him

substantial political losses during the

off-year election.

The 1 970 Congressional
in the

New Deal

election returns reinvigorated labor leaders' confidence

coalition of workers, liberals and minorities as an effective base for

winning elections. That year's voting patterns seemed

to indicate that the

American

public rejected conservatives. Democratic candidates drew 69 percent of the votes of
blue-collar workers, 75 percent of low-income voters, 59 percent of city dwellers and 90

percent of African-Americans. Nationally, the Democratic Party received 53 percent of

"Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics ofEcofwmic Growth

York: Oxford University Press, 2000),

1

12.
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in

Postwar America (New

The presence of George Meany and

the vote.

Day

other top labor leaders at the

dinner held at the White House created the impression
that the

was on

970 Labor

1

AFL-CIO

president

the verge of supporting Republican candidates.
During the Congressional

election campaign, however,

members

Meany

Nixon Administration and urged union

chastised the

to vote for labor-supported candidates.

Al Barkan, director of the

AFL-CIO Committee on

Political

Education (COPE),

contended that during the 1970 electoral campaign the Republican Party had
misjudged
the appeal of the law-and-order issue to workers and underestimated the
importance of
their

economic concerns. In a statement issued
While people are losing
plan. ..Approximately

year ago. Those
that increases

production.

Its

game

it

end of 1970, Meany claimed:

their jobs, the Administration

two million more Americans
still

have jobs have been

unemployment, continues

In the aftemiath

thought

who

at the

hit

is

talking about

game

are out of work today than a

hard by an economic policy

inflation, cuts the

workweek and reduces

plan has failed. Economically and humanly,

of the 1970 congressional

its

election,

Nixon's

it

flopped.

political strategists

evident that the Republican candidates would not secure endorsements from

the unions in the near future.

The Republicans' aim

from the rank-and-file.

economic

If the

Democrats did not have a program

difficulties

to take

therefore should be to capture votes

were turned around and the

on the

offensive, the administration

make

a strong appeal to union

confident that the Republican Party would

was

members

in the

next election campaign. This would be more a '^Middle America strategy'' than a blue-

collar strategy.

^Memo from COPE, Committee on
Folder 17,

Box

031,

COPE

^CPR National Journal

Political Education,

Research Files,

GMMA.

233.
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AFL-CIO

(January 4, 1971),

2,

The

crucial issue in 1971

was

the administration's ability to reverse the

downturn. While gradualism had hurt the administration
achieved some victories, according to Alan Matusow.
"the administration had reduced excess

inflationary recovery/'**

in the

1970 election,

economic
it

''At relatively little cost,"

demand and now stood on

had
he says,

the brink of non-

Although his economic policies were producing slow resuhs,

Nixon stayed with gradualism

a

few more months. Nixon

still

trusted the

judgment of

George Schultz, the head of the Office of Management and Budget and a Friedman
disciple.

Yet the president promised

that his 1971 State

of the Union Message would be

"the most comprehensive, the most far reaching, the most bold program in the domestic
9

field

ever presented to an American Congress."

role of a domestic reformer

This was Nixon^s attempt to assume the

and thus pave the way

for a reelection bid in 1972.

During his address, Nixon anticipated expansionary
effort to align

policies. In a

demagogic

himself with the dissatisfied ''middle Americans," the president made what

Time referred to as a "self-condemnatory statement:"

Most Americans today
not

up with government at all levels. They
tolerate the gap between promise and

are simply fed

—and should — continue
not

to

will

periormance.

A ''new American Revolution", Nixon contended, "a peaceful revolution in which power
was turned back

to the people,"

significant proposal

was

would remedy

the situation.

The president's most

a 25 percent net increase over the 1971 budget in the funds that

8

Matusow,

87.

9

'The Nixon ^^Revolution": Promise and Performance,
'Vid.
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" Time,

1

February 1971,

1

flowed from the federal government to

proposed

total

spending of $ 16

billion,

states

and communities. Although Nixon

only $ 6 billion of that

sum was newly

appropriated money. Nixon told a newspaper reporter at^er
the speech, "I'm

Keynesian

now

a

in economics."''

Organized labor received the State of the Union message as coolly as
did the
democratically controlled

Leonard Woodcock,

92"''

Congress. Soon after the address,

testifying before the Joint

UAW president

Economic Committee of Congress,

contended that Nixon's budget was "simply a mildly expansionary budget." The
administration would spend the same amount
"full

was

employment." In the

it

received in revenues and thus achieve

UAW president's view, however, Nixon's "full employmenf

actually a four percent rate of unemployment. Moreover,

Nixon's plan

to share federal

revenue with

Woodcock

states, since "the greater part

criticized

of the funds for

revenue sharing would come from cutting back existing federal programs." Woodcock

contended that

state

the people and

more

and

local

governments were often

less

concerned with the needs of

subject to the influence of special interest groups than

was

the

federal government.'^

The

presidential decision that really infuriated labor leaders

on the manpower

bill.

During the highest unemployment

percent in January 1971- Nixon vetoed a

bill that

in

was

his

thumbs-down

more than a decade -6

could have created thousands of public

service jobs and provided funds for urban development, pay raises for federal workers,

and an extension of a hospital construction aid program. The

Business Week, 16 January 1971, 22

UAW Solidarity, March

1971, 3

194

bill

had passed

in the

House of Representatives by a 177-159
Committee on

Political

vote,

and

in the Senate, 68-13.

Education contended that "the manpower legislation stood
as one

of the most important pieces of domestic legislation"
because
for the tlrst time "federally-supported public service

enabled local and
hospitals to hire

state

The AFL-CIO

governments and nonprofit

unemployed workers

paying 80 percent of payroll

costs.

for

it

had intended

employment." The

institutions such as

bill

to establish

would have

community

needed services, with the federal government

Both Meany and Woodcock condemned Nixon for

distorting the bill's language and intent in his veto statement. Labor
leaders viewed the
bill

as indispensable to creating "useful jobs needed by the community," not
"dead-end,

make- work jobs,"

The

first

as

Nixon

called them.'"'

months of 1971 were undoubtedly one of lowest points of Nixon's

term as president. In his memoirs, he admitted

that the administration's

first

problems were

so overwhelming that even his nomination for reelection in 1972 was being questioned.'^
In February 1971

,

the construction industry presented a profound challenge to Nixon's

ability to control the inflationary spiral.

first-year

wage

The

nation's largest industry had negotiated

increases averaging 8 percent; to administration officials, something close
15

to 6 percent

would be justified.

clampdown on

13

3,

The president had two

construction prices and

wages under

options.

He

could institute a

the authority granted to

Memo

from COPE, Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO (January
Folder 17, Box 031, COPE Research Files, GMMA.

14

Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (The

RN

him by

4, 1971), 1,

Library Editions, 1978),

497.

''^"Wage-price guides: hard hats only?" The Christian Science Monitor, 30

Folder 17,

Box

031,

COPE

Research

Files,

GMMA.
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March 1971,

Congress -despite his oppositionbill that

in

August 1970. Or he could suspend the Davis-Bacon

since 1931 required contractors to pay union rates on
federal or federally

supported construction projects. Despite advice to the contrary,
Nixon chose to suspend
the

Davis-Bacon

bill

and thus permit federal construction contracts

below prevailing wage

to

be negotiated

rates.

Unions regarded
unionized were alarmed

this action as

union busting. Construction firms that were

at the possibility

Nixon's decision caused a

flurry

of losing contracts

to

nonunion contractors.

of activity among union leaders

crackdown on unions. Meany made

clear that the

it

AFL-CIO

who viewed

it

as a

did not consider the

administration's effort to restrain construction wages even-handed or workable.
absolutely, completely unfair to

AFL-CIO

make

the construction worker the whipping boy," the

president insisted. In an April Senate appearance,

Bums, one of the

architects

Federal Reserve Board.

'1t is

Meany

roasted Arthur F.

of the administration's economic policy and chairman of the

Meany

lashed out

at the

administration's "'double standard" of

rewarding big business and banks while demanding wage restrains from working people.
In the

AFL-CIO

failure

leadership's view, the

Nixon Administration intended

to cover

up the

.16

of its economic policies by making a "scapegoat" of American workers.
In

May

1971, a Gallup survey indicated that public concern over inflation was

greater than during the 1958 recession.

'^"Meany Hits Move

to

The Vietnam War continued

to

be

named

as the

Brand Workers as ''Scapegoats:' AFL-CIO News. 10 April 1971,

1-2.
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country's top problem but economic issues were

now

a close second.'^

A few months

later,

public confidence in the

More

than five million workers were unemployed and several million
more were working

less than full-time

Nixon Administration's game plan reached a new low.

because of production cutbacks. Unemployment rates for construction

workers were up

to 9.6 percent, 10.1 percent for African- Americans

young men 20

24 years of age.

and 10.1 percent for

1

to

By June

1971, the

CEA

economic advisors seemed
calls for a 7.5 percent

to

growth

seriously doubted that gradualism could work. Nixon's

be slowly metamorphosing into Keynesians. There were
in the

even wage-price controls. Years

money supply over

later,

Nixon

1972, an 8-million tax cut and

stated:

The economy remained sluggish in the early months of 1971 There were signs of
improvement ahead, but patience had worn thin and we ran out of time. Demands
for action poured down on the White House from all sides. Media criticism of our
policies became intense. Republicans as well as Democrats reflected the pressure
.

they were receiving from their constituents and vociferously called for

new

policies.

On August

13, the president

secret meeting at

Camp

and his top economic advisors

left

David. The key figures making the

John Connally, head of the

trip

Washington D.C.

for a

were Treasury Secretary

0MB George Schultz, chairman of the Federal Reserve

Arthur Bums, and chainnan of the

CEA

Paul McCracken.

As Nixon

recalled, they

were

17

Alec Gallup and George H. Gallup, eds., The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index: Public
71, May 1971, 15.
Opinion, 1935-1975, "Public Concern Over Inflation;^ Report

^^Gary

M.

Fink, ed.,

Connecticut:

AFL-CIO

Greenwood

Executive. Statements

Press, 1977), vol. 4, 2182.
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Nixon, 517.
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and Reports, 1956-1975 (Westport,

"running out of time." The president's chances of reelection
depended largely on

his

successful handling of the economy.

The administration desperately needed

way

to find a

to

promote economic

recovery and reduce unemployment while solving the problems of
inflation and the
international standing of the dollar.

during the

new

Camp

The

David meeting was an

New

Economic Policy (NEP) agreed upon

all-out

plan relied largely on three key measures.

of tax cuts for business and individuals

unemployment

war on the nation's economic woes. The
First,

Nixon"s advisors expected a

to stimulate the

economy and bring down

Secondly, a 4.7 million-dollar cut in federal spending along with a

rates.

90-day freeze on wages and prices would supposedly cool off the inflationary

And

thirdly, the president's top aids

s

on imports would protect the

.....
the international scene.

economic position

On August

New

20

York Times pointed

Nixon's top advisors have been suggesting,
everything will work out

dollar and the

in

1971, the

1,

spiral.

argued that the termination of the dollar-gold

convertibility and a 10 percent border tax

country

series

fine.

that with

out, "It

may

well be, as President

more patience and persistence

But the ranks of the doubters seem

to

be growing steadily

21

Two weeks

and substantially."

New Economic

the president unveiled "the most comprehensive

later,

Policy to be undertaken by this nation in four decades." Time compared

Nixon's swift reverse

in policy to the

New Deal

hundred days of the

sweeping changes introduced during the

in 1933.

unemployment, the president imposed

Faced with mounting

direct controls

20

Collins, 120-121;

^^New York Times,

Matusow, 150.

1

August

1

1971, Secfion

III, 1.
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inflation

first

and

on prices and wages

for the first

time since the Korean

War and committed

businesses' pay and pricing decisions.
the president based his action on the

the federal government to a major role in

When Nixon announced

Economic

the wage-price freeze,

Stabilization Act of 1970. This law

granted stand-by powers to the president to "issue such orders as he

may deem

appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages and salaries." Ironically,
Nixon had

vigorously opposed the

bill

and insisted

that

he would never use

Not only was the

it.

president taking the Democrats' advice in economic matters, he was also resorting
to
legislation that the opposition party

The most

had forced upon him.

controversial element in Nixon's package

was

the freeze

on

prices,

wages, rents and dividends for a 90-day period. Labor leaders quickly spelled out
objections to the president's grand design for economic recovery.

what he considered a highly discriminatory program

Meany was

at

interest rates, profits,

stocks, the price of land, capital gains and dividends. Employers, the

wage

outraged

that favored big business at the

expense of workers. Wages were frozen but there was no freeze on

argued, would be happy to enforce the

their

freeze but there

was no

AFL-CIO

effective

president

machinery

to enforce price controls.

On August

19, the

AFL-CIO

Council issued a report that described the freeze as

"unequitable, unjust, unfair and unworkable." The practical effect of the president's

design for recovery was to nullify every collective bargaining agreement that provided a

wage

or salary adjustment during the 90-day period.

pledge that the

AFL-CIO

Executive Council had made on other occasions since 1966:

We will cooperate with fair, equitable,
costs, prices

and incomes including

^^Time, 30 August 1971,

The statement concluded with a

across-the board mandatory controls on

profits, interest rates,

8.
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all

dividends and executive

compensation as well as workers' wages and
does not meet that test.

The presidenfs program

salaries.

Within forty-eight hours of the president announcing his new game
plan, the

UAW International Executive Board met in special session to analyze the implications of
the freeze.

wage

The Board unanimously agreed

provisions, including

its

that the

union would not permit abrogation of

cost-of-living and annual

improvement

The

factor clauses.

UAW board also authorized Woodcock to propose to Meany and Teamsters president
Frank Fitzsimmons "joint action"

August 18 wire sent
with you and

all

to the

to mobilize other unions against the

AFL-CIO

chieftain.

Woodcock

stated:

"we

wage

freeze. In

an

are ready to join

of American labor in necessary action to obtain an economic policy

in

24

the interests of the broad

mass of the American people."

Labor leaders appeared

united on their all-out campaign against Nixon's order. Woodcock's appearance

Meany 's Washington
might soon

office shortly thereafter fueled press speculation that the

re-affiliate

AFL-CIO

White House

to

report

was

at

UAW

meet with the

issued, a group of labor representatives

president, John Connally,

Paul McCracken, Arthur Bums, Hebert Stein and Jim Hogson, the

making

be

with the AFL-CIO.

Shortly after the

invited to the

to

the wage-price freeze work.

George Schultz,

men

The Cost of Living Council, under

of Treasury Secretary Connally, was the agency empowered

to

was

in charge

of

the chairmanship

impose the

controls.

"We

AFL-CIO Executive Council, Washington D.C. (August 19, 1971),
Folder 2, Box 4, Leonard Woodcock Papers, UAW President's Office, Wayne State
University Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs (Hereafter WSUA).
^^Statement by the

24

Leonard Woodcock's wire
Papers,

to

George Meany, Folder

UAW President's Office, WSUA.
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2,

Box

4,

Leonard Woodcock

told them," recalled

Meany,

"that

we would

suggest the establishment of an independent,

voluntary agency free from government control, of a

Labor Board of World War

II."''

shaped Phase

new program, which was

of Nixon's

II

The AFL-CIO

tripartite nature, similar to the

president's

recommendation eventually

November

begin on

to

90-day freeze on prices and wages expired. The administration's
price and

wage

NEP

when

13

the

and the

in general

controls in particular earned considerable public approval. Trade

unionists were the biggest exception. This posed a serious problem for

president

War

was convinced

that his building

organized labor's support. Before Phase

of a

I

New Majority

was

over,

Nixon

Nixon

as the

depended largely on

set out to

make peace with

the upper echelons of the labor leadership.

The administration's
Secretary James

first

conciliatory gesture

Hogson announced

that the president

for an independent voluntary agency.

Phase

II

The

came on October
had agreed

three major

to the

5.

Labor

AFL-CIO" s plan

economic watchdogs

to police

of the program would be the Price Commission and two semiautonomous

groups, the Cost of Living Council and the Pay Board. The Price Commission,

composed of several
rent guidelines

and

private citizens appointed by the president,

to

The

Teamsters,

1.

five

set

develop price and

equally of representatives of labor, business and

union leaders would be Woodcock, Meany, Fitzsimmons of the

W. Abel of the

agency would

to

provide supervision, interpretation and enforcement. The fifteen-

member Pay Board would be composed
the public.

was

Steelworkers, and Floyed E. Smith of the Machinists. This

up wage yardsticks and see

that labor

and business respected them.

'^AFL-CIO President George Meany 's opening remarks
CIO American Federationist. December 1971, 3.
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to the ninth convention,

^FI-

After the brief television address in which the president
announced the guidehnes for

Phase

It

II,

Meany

told the press,

"Speaking for organized

we

labor,

will agree to help

make

work."

Union

leaders'

optimism about labor's participation

equitable wage-price freeze soon disappeared.

It

was not

in the

enforcement of an

clear to the

AFL-CIO

Executive Council that the Pay Board would be a truly independent agency, and

demanded
really

total

was not

October

1 1

autonomy.

"We were

voluntary, but

not going to provide a facade for an agency that

was under government

Memorandum, Nixon

Meany

control,"

Meany

claimed. In an

reassured the Pay Board's labor representatives that the

Cost of Living Council would not "approve, revise, veto or revoke specific standards or
27

critena developed by the Pay Board and Price Commission."

The veto

issue clarified, labor leaders then had serious objections to Nixon's

choice of public representatives for the board. Judge George Bolt, the appointed

chairman of the Pay Board, was on the federal

payroll.

The second member, William

Weber, had been on the government payroll from January 1969

when he became
retired

a public representative. Another board

businessman who had spent most of his

of Inland Steel Company. The fourth and

fifth

life in

until

October 21,1971,

member was William

Caples, a

industry as executive vice-president

members were Kevin Gordon and

Dr.

Neil H. Jacoby. Gordon was from the Brookings Institution and one-time Director of the

Budget and Jacoby was a conservative economist from the Council of Economic

^''Newsweek, 18 October 18 1971, 26,
27

Quoted by Meany in his opening remarks
Federationist, December 1971, 4.

to the ninth convention.
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AFL-CIO American

Advisors during the Eisenhower Administration. Considering
the pubUc members,

Meany concluded

CIO

saw "very

president

The

rift

on the board was

like "'playing

wage

28
little

hope

for equity."

increases that

on

its

fell

due during the freeze period of Phase T In an attempt

own turf, Nixon

attended the

AFL-CIO Convention

Harbour, Florida, and delivered a speech that received,

liked

it

in

the business and public representatives of the Pay Board reftised
to grant

to confront labor

message was

with loaded dice." The AFL-

between organized labor and the Nixon Administration deepened

November when
retroactive

that being

clear: the administration

at best, polite

would press wage-price

in

Bal

applause. Nixon's

controls whether labor

or not. In his address to the convention the day before,

Meany had

said: "If the

President of the United States doesn't want our membership on the Pay Board on our
terms, he

knows what he can

president

was

correct:

members want

"A

do." In his speech, Nixon asserted that the

great majority of the

American people, and a majority of union

to stop the rise in the cost of living

Nixon's presence

at the

convention

reports said that the president

and ordered delegates back

made

- and

headlines in

that's

all

what we are going

the major newspapers.

was shocked and angered when Meany banged

to their seats

and added,

"We

AFL-CIO President George Meany's opening remarks
ClO American Federationist, December 1971, 5-6.
29

AFL-CIO

will

now proceed

to do."

Most

his gavel

with Act

to the ninth convention.

^FI-

November 1971,
Section A, 12; Meany 's response in The Washington Star, 20 November 1971; The
Washington Post, 20 November 1971; The Christian Science Monitor, December 1971.
"Nixon: "If We

Fail...All...Will

Lose." The Washington Post, 20
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The AFL-CIO Executive Council stood firm
administration's

labor's role

wage and

in

its

criticism of the

price control mechanisms, issuing a scathing resolution
on

on the Pay Board. The statement made two major accusations. The
board's

public members, the

AFL-CIO

council claimed, were

^'not

independent but rather

handmaidens of the Administration." The second accusation referred
rulings against

wage

to the

increases due contractually during the 90-day freeze:

...

Pay Board

"We

flatly

concept that anyone," stated the report, "has the power to abrogate any legal

reject the

"^^

collective bargaining agreement...

The president did not miss
and his administration and
middle Americans
presidential

when he

whom

the chance to exploit the

rift

between organized labor

to speak over the labor leaders' heads to

he had targeted. Nixon had done

campaign when he spoke

to the "forgotten

praised the hard-hats for their pro-war march

this

working people, the

during the 1968

American" and again

down Wall

Street.

the controversy over the wage-price freeze, the Administration brought

in 1970,

In the midst of

up the old

question of "who represents labor?" Government officials pointed out that only 25
percent of the American

AFL-CIO

work

force of 80 million people were unionized and that the

unions represented only 16 percent of workers. Treasury Secretary John

Connally told the press:

"We cannot permit

one

man

to put himself

above the

interest

„31
all

the working people of this country.

He does

not represent

all

ot those people."

Resolution on Labor's Role on the Pay Board, AFL-CIO American Federatkmist,

December 1971,
"""Is

5.

Nixon Anti-Labor? Ask Meany," The Sun, 28 November 1 97 1.
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of

Surveys conducted

after

Nixon's announcement of the wage-price freeze gave

substance to the accusation that labor leaders were

According

to

an August Gallup

new economic program: 46
The

poll,

'^out

of touch" with their membership.

seven in ten Americans approved of the president's

percent approved of it strongly and 22 percent only mildly.

report stressed that 91 percent of the persons interviewed had heard
or read about the

president's 90-day program, "the highest awareness figures registered in Gallup
surveys

m recent years."

32

In October, Albert E. Sindlinger took a

consumer confidence

poll for

Time. His findings appeared to confirm the results of the August Gallup Survey.

Of

1,114 people polled, 73 percent thought that the freeze was a good economic measure,

while 16 percent thought that
slightly different.

When

it

asked

their opposition to the freeze,

was
if

not.

The survey

they thought that

results

among union members were

Meany and Woodcock were

right in

37 percent agreed with the labor leaders while 54 percent

disagreed. In non-union households, 20 percent considered that the leaders were right

and 60 percent
In

that they

March 1972,

were wrong.

the clash

Administration reached a climax

Workers Union (ILWU) won a

between organized labor's leadership and the Nixon

when

the International Longshore and

strike with a 21 percent

wage

increase.

gains violated the Pay Board standards that set a ceiling for annual

percent. Harry Bridges, the

strike if the

West Coast dockworkers'

Warehouse

The ILWU's

wage

increases at 5.5

leader, threatened to

resume

the

Board reduced the settlement. The Pay Board responded on March 16 by

The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N° 74, August 1971,
"Support for the Rank and File," Time, 6 September 1971,
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12.

1-2.

cutting the

ILWU's

contract from 21 percent to 16 percent.

capitulated, handing the

applied the

ILWU

International

Pay Board an important

victory.

to 12 percent in

The Pay Board's

Two months

later,

the

Board

settlement formula to the Atlantic and Gulf contracts negotiated
by the

Longshoremen's Association (ILA).

from 15 percent

Bridges eventually

actions

won

some

First-year

increases were cut

ports and from 12 percent to 9 percent in others.^^

the respect of those

it

wage

Americans who regarded the unions'

gains as inflationary.

The AFL-CIO
in protest.

"We

president and three other labor

In a unanimously adopted statement, the

will not be part of the

AFL-CIO

off the Pay Board

Executive Council stated:

window-dressing of a system of unfair and inequitable

government control of wages,
Steel workers

members walked

for the benefit of business profits."

Meany, Abel of the

and Floyd E. Smith of the Machinists resigned immediately. Woodcock

resigned the following day after a meeting with the

UAW Executive Council.

president Fitzsimmons decided to remain on the board although he

dissatisfied with

its

was

Teamsters

said to be

composition and major decisions. By the time the labor leaders

the Board, however, almost

all

left

control procedures and policies had been formulated and

the year's major bargaining problems had been settled. Despite the labor leaders'

indignation at the Pay Board's

wage

cuts,

Newsweek contended,

"it

was

politics

more

36

than economics that compelled the labor

Newsweek, 27 March 1972,

members

to quit

even then."

83.

35

Matusow, 197.

"AFL-CIO

Quits Pay Board, Sees

1972; Newsweek,

1

"No Hope"

April 1972, 21.
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for Justice,"

^FL-CVC; News, 25 March,

Soon

after the labor representatives' resignations,

Pay Board. The

tripartite structure

was dropped and a

Nixon announced a revamped

single public unit set up.

The new

board would consist of the five public members, labor leader
Fitzsimmons, and a

businessman

to

"the public,''

Nixon

the

be selected by Nixon. The seven

The president did not miss

said.

new arrangement by

new board members would

pitting

the opportunity to

represent

win support

for

union members against non-unionized workers. After

accusing the three labor leaders of being "selfish and irresponsible," Nixon said:

As

cannot permit any leader representing a special interest, no matter
powerful, to torpedo and sink a program which is needed to protect the

president,

how

I

public interest.

Nixon figured

that there

increases that the

might be resentment among nonunion workers over the wage

most powerful unions won

bosses, he thought, could

In the

months

win

for their unions.

An

attack

on the labor

blue-collar voters.

that followed the labor

walkout from the Pay Board, the president's

fortune shifted dramatically. Early in 1971, few political analysts would have predicted a

Nixon

landslide but in 1972 the incumbent swept the electoral

map of the

United States

except for liberal Massachusetts and the mostly African- American District of Columbia.

Many

different factors contributed to the record defection of Democratic voters and the

dramatic alteration of traditional voting patters. But Nixon's decision to capitalize on the
grievances of "'Middle America" and downplay the Economic Issue was crucial. The

president's strategy

was

to concentrate his efforts

on stimulating a pre-election economic

Text of President Nixon's statement on the labor resignations from the Pay Board. The
Washington Post, 24 March 1972, Secfion A, 16.
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boom and on capturing

the blue-collar vote.

As Matusow

puts

it,

"1972 was the year

everything seemed to break right for Richard Nixon."^^

On the home
away from

the

front,

Democrats

Nixon used
their

key

campaign approached, Democratic

his

New

issue, the

Economic Policy

Senator

Edmund Muskie

the faltering economy. In

an effort to

economy. As the 1972

politicians struggled to turn the

against the administration once again. Criticism of Nixon's
varied.

in

presidential

Economic Issue

New Economic

Policy

was

argued that the president had taken too long to react to

two and a half years, Muskie

had been "no economic policy." Senator George

stated,

Nixon's economic policy

McGovem contended that the

administration's tax proposals benefited only businesses and hurt the working

woman

steal

man and

and the middle-class taxpayer. To Senator Hubert Humphrey, the new policies

were not stimulative enough

to solve the

problem of rising unemployment. "What the

administration just does not understand," insisted Humphrey, "is that the No.l domestic
39

priority

of the nation

is

jobs, jobs, jobs, jobs."

The Democratic

senators' indictments

were well grounded. Yet Nixon had made

Democratic proposals the heart of his economic programs. The president thus
critics

left his

with few additional suggestions to make. To the Democrats' dismay, by the

anniversary of Nixon's

New Economic

Policy,

most analysts rated

it

first

as "a success."

As

the presidential campaign heated up, the administration talked only about the previous

year. Herbert Stein, then chairman of the

CEA,

recounted the good economic tidings:

Production and employment are rising strongly. Unemployment

38

Matusow,

182,

39

Business Week, 8 January 1972,

16.
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is

declining.

The rate of inflation has been redueed. Our international
eeonomie
improvmg. These lavorable trends will almost eertainly
eontinue

position

is

throughout the

year.

Under Phase

11,

had fallen from 4.9 percent

inflation

second quarter of 1971,
progress had been

1970

to 3.2 percent.

In the

output had grown 8.9 percent. The least satisfactory

real

made

in

reducing unemployment, but Nixon's advisors expected

in

it

to

be around 5 percent by the end of 1972.

The

By

late

president also scored a couple of important victories on foreign policy issues.

1971, with increasingly powerful North Vietnamese forces to China's south and

Soviet forces aligned

to seek a

all

along their country's northern borders, Chinese leaders decided

rapprochement with the United

States.

Nixon exploited

normalize diplomatic relations with China. His ten-day

was

a brilliant diplomatic

summit of their own

in

move

May

visit to

that forced the Soviets to invite

that decision to

China

Nixon

in f

to

ebruary 1972

Moscow

1972. Both trips took place with considerable fanfare.

for a

The

administration's surprising reversal in foreign policy seemed to indicate a softening of the

conservative view of the communist regimes.
the close of Nixon's

Nixon's popularity

A

nationwide Gallup survey conducted

summit meetings with Soviet Party

at its

leader Leonid Brezhnev

at

showed

highest point in nearly two years. Sixty-one percent of U.S.
41

citizens

approved ot the way the president was handling

his duties as Chief Executive.

The apparent success of Nixon's "Vietnamization" program
in popularity.

By reducing

Business Week, 29 July

^Whe Gallup

1

also contributed to his boost

U.S. troops in Indochina from 536,000 in 1969 to 24,000

972,

1

6.

Poll Cumulalive Index, Report

N°

209

84, June 1972, 1-2.

in

December 1972, Nixon

Vietnam War

neutralized the

issue

and gradually removed

it

from

42

the center of American politics.

The Democrats'

They nominated

election.

who

senator

self-destructing behavior also increased Nixon's chances for
re-

as their presidential candidate

George McGovem, a

liberal

conservatives tagged as the proponent of the three A's: "Acid, Abortion
and

Amnesty." Despite the support of liberal Democrats and the

Automobile Workers and other unions,
an American electorate.

When

McGovem proved anathema to

asked in a June 1971 Gallup poll

describe their political philosophy,

1 1

of the United

efforts

how

large sections of

they would

percent of those interviewed responded "very

conservative;" 28 percent "fairly conservative'" and 29 percent "middle of the road."

Nineteen percent considered themselves

"fairly liberal"

and only 7 percent "very

43

In such a political climate, Nixon's efforts to court the "Silent Majority" paid

liberal."

off
In the first half of the 1972 presidential campaign, the Democratic Party

went

through an unprecedented series of twenty-three primaries. The season extended over a

four-month period, the
last

one

won
are

in

primary taking place in

New York on June 20.

at

any time

for the Presidency in this

in the

at

ed. Dictionary

on March 7 and the

Congress when he remarked: "There

chamber today than

there probably have

whole history of the Republic." Nixon was

42

James Olson,

New Hampshire

During the 1972 State of the Union Message, Nixon

an appreciative chuckle from the audience

more candidates

been

first

referring to

of the Vietnam War (New York: Greenwood

Maine's

Press, 1988),

556-559.
"^

V/7e Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, "Political Philosophy," Report

15.
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N°

72, June 1971,

Senator

Edmund Muskie, Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey, and

Kennedy. Other

potential candidates such as

George

Massachusetts' Edward

McGovem and Henry

M.

Jackson

missed the speech because they were campaigning.

When McGovem
concern about American

The most

painful

declared his candidacy in January 1971, he expressed his
politics:

new phrase

in

American

political

vocabulary

is

"credibility

gap" -the gap between rhetoric and reality. Put bluntly, it means that people
no
longer believe what their leaders tell them... The kind of campaign I intend to
run
will rest on candor and reason...! make one pledge above all others
-to seek and
speak the truth with

all

The key elements on

the resources of mind and spirit

widely known. In
three-year period

By

fact, his

command.^^

the Democratic candidate's platform were an immediate

withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, important cuts
redistribution of income.

I

1972,

McGovem's

in defense spending,

and

position on the Vietnamese conflict

was

proposal to slash the Pentagon budget by $ 32 billion over a

was more

controversial. Basically, this

would mean

cutting

armed

forces and civilian Pentagon employees by nearly 30 percent. Apart from the practical

and

political

problems of laying people

such a defense

cut.

Simultaneously,

off,

American

allies

might be disconcerted

at

McGovem contended that his major goal was to

provide employment for every able-bodied American. If elected president, the

Democratic candidate claimed, he would
wants work

is

going to have a job.

tell

American people, "Look, everybody who

We don't know quite yet what you'll be doing, but

"Mr. Nixon takes the hard road," Newsweek, 31 January 1972,
45

Robert

Sam Anson, McGovem: A Biography (New

1972), 267.
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11.

York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

you're going to have a good job.

And the Government

is

going to guarantee employment

46

at

decent wages.

As

for

He proposed

income

redistribution,

McGovem's program

to raise the corporation tax rate

involved profound chang(;es,

from 48 percent back

to 52 percent,

its

level

before the tax reform of 1964, to end investment tax credit, and to tighten
depreciation
rules.

In practical terms, this

meant not only

reduced dividends for stockholders.

less profits for the corporations but also

McGovem's most

eventually worst fiasco—was the "Demogrant."

with

minimum income

He would

payments

substitute welfare

grants of about $ 1,000 per person annually.

without any income would receive $ 4,000 a year.
year,

controversial proposal -and

A family of four

A family of four making $

8,000 a

would keep $ 2,000. Families with incomes above $ 12.000 would be taxed

at

progressively higher rates. In this way. about $ 43 billion a year would be shifted fi-om
the

more

affluent to the relatively poor.

Median family income

in

1972 was $

sum. those who barely made ends meet would be paying higher taxes
poor. During the California primary, Hubert

plan.

Humphrey

unmarried

Humphrey

program would,

correctly pointed out that the

secretar>' earning $

dealt a fatal

1

1,000. In

to support the very

blow

to

McGovem's

for instance, require an

8,000 to pay $ 567 in additional taxes; a family of four
47

making $

1

2.000.

would have an increase of $ 409.

As chairman of a Commission on

Party Stmcture and Delegate Selection prior to

the Democratic National Convention in 1972,

McGovem helped enact party

Time, S

May

1972, 19.

"^^Time, 8

May

1972, 19; Theodore H. White, The

York: Atheneum Publishers, 1973). 128;

reforms that

Making of the President 1972 (New
Matusow, 208.
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gave increased representation

Chicago debacle

make

the

to minority groups at the convention. After the

in 1968, the party

modified the mechanics of its delegate selection to

whole process more democratic and "open/" Primaries

party caucuses

became

the

Democrats'

major route of delegate

selection.

rather than the state

Before 1972 most states did

not rely on the primaries to choose delegates to the presidential nominating
convention.

At the Chicago convention,
alternates

among

....

for instance, organized labor

Under

the 3,500 present.

had 200 delegates and 100

the then-existing rules,

most of them were

48

.

That would not be the case

political appointees.

1972.

in

Primary procedures varied substantially from

state to state.

In "delegate

primaries," voters only selected the delegates, but in the "binding primaries" the elected

delegates were obliged to back the specific candidates

South Dakota and California, voters

committed

who had won

the primary. In

cast their ballots for a complete slate

to a single candidate, but they did not

know the

of delegates

delegates' names. In

York, the opposite happened: voters knew the delegates' names, but not

New

whom they

49

would support

at the

convention.

candidate twenty-three primaries

The diverse and

made

it

intricate nature

of the multi-

difficult to predict the future

of the Democratic

Party in 1972.
In February 1972, several Democratic presidential candidates attended a meeting

of the

AFL-CIO

Executive Council in Miami Beach, hoping to

woo

the vote of their old

supporters in organized labor. Humphrey, "the darling of labor for 25 years," was

confident about the union leaders" backing, but the

AFL-CIO Council had

48

"Labor Leaders Try

to

Block Wallace," Business Week,

49

White, 72.
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1 1

March 1972,

decided not to

36.

endorse any Democratic candidate before the July party
convention. AFL^CIO hardliners
considered

Edmund Muskie, who appeared

Democratic candidates,

to

at the

time one of the most promising

be ^'dangerously soft" on the Vietnam War.

Two

other

hopefuls were also present: Indiana's Vance Hartke and Washington'
Henry Jackson.

Though considered

"friends of labor," these

two candidates' chances of success were

very slim.
Forty years before. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had transformed the Democratic
Party into a coalition that allowed

it

to

win seven of the next ten

presidential elections.

Roosevelt's coalition included the South, family farmers, blue-collar workers
cities,

minority groups and

liberals.

watershed year because George

would win

In the evolution

McGovem,

in the big

of the Democratic Party, 1972 was a

the Democratic candidate

who few

predicted

the nomination, channeled his energies into capturing the vote of the

intellectuals, the middle-class suburbanites

and the young.

focused directly on his antiwar constituency and then

In

tried to

most

states,

expand

McGovem

his appeal to the

discontented working class. During the Democratic Party primaries, the work of

McGovem' s

active followers

was

crucial in rallying support at the local level. Journalist

Jules Witcover described the senator's "grassroots leaders" as "independent and highly

motivated "cause people,"

who were

strongly committed to registration drives,

50

canvassing, and tund-raising.

In

May

McGovem was

1972, just before the California primary, a Gallup survey indicated that

in a

^^Jules Witcover,

three-way

tie for

the nomination with Hubert

Humphrey and George

"The Ultimate Test For McGovem," The Progressive, November 972,
1

12.
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Wallace. The South Dakota Senator had two advantages
over his
than the other Democratic candidates

among

independents, and he had more followers

These groups usually vote

voters.

win support during

among

in larger

He was

stronger

considered themselves

college-educated and higher income

numbers

in the primaries

and work harder

to

the elections. According to the Gallup poll, Democrats
and

independents with college background preferred

McGovem over Humphrey

by a 3

to

1

51

.

margm.
state's

who

voters

rivals.

The

California primary

was

crucial because the

winner would take

all

of the

271 delegates to the nominating convention.

The Democratic primaries highlighted
party in the spring of 1972.

votes, but lost to

was "an old

McGovem

face'' in

Humphrey won
in California

American

politics

the divisive forces that were tearing at the

four primaries, drawing 4 million popular

and thus

fell

behind

in delegates.

and voters often perceived

Humphrey

his attempts to cater to

both the liberal and conservative wings of the Democratic Party as "fence-sitting."

By

winning the Michigan and Maryland primaries, Alabama Governor George Wallace was
strengthening his position as a national rather than a regional candidate. Yet his race

ended abruptly on

managed
seemed

to

to

May

1

5

when he was

match Humphrey's delegate

shot and

total.

left

paralyzed. Wallace had almost

Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, who

be the leading candidate in national polls early in the year, abandoned his

candidacy after losing to

McGovem

in

Massachusetts and to Humphrey in Pennsylvania.
52

By

that time, he

had won

two primaries and captured over

1

.6

million popular votes.

^^The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N°84, June 1972, 9-11.

The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, "Special "Image" Study," Report N° 84, June 1972,
13-15; Rex Hardesty, "The 1972 Elections: Focus on the Conventions," The AFL-CIO

American Federationist, June 1972,

1-5.
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With the middle-income
Massachusetts and Oregon.

Wallace

in

He

vote,

McGovem won the primaries

lost to

Michigan, three industrial

Humphrey

states.

in

in

Wisconsin,

Pennsylvania and Ohio and to

These returns clearly indicated

Democrats would have a very difficuh time unifying

their party

and

that the

that the blu^collar

vote

was deeply

who

offered programmatic solutions to social problems. Wallace remained
the epitome

of the

racist

of "the

little

divided. Hubert

Humphrey was

Southerner

who blamed

man." By

late June,

largely perceived as a liberal

liberalism and

McGovem

its

social

had won the

programs

last six

for the

Democrat

problems

primaries and passed

the most critical test in California. T he South Dakotan had a potential total of over
1,300

delegate votes, fewer than 200 short of a

first

ballot victory at the

Democratic

Convention. As the 1972 National Convention approached, the Democrats were so
divided that

many

feared the party

would

splinter.

Although the South Dakotan had

neither a majority of delegates actually pledged to vote for

the nomination, he

Newsweek

was

him nor

sufficient votes to

win

clearly the front-runner.

stated that those

who

attended the Democratic convention "were as

unlikely and as unpredictable a group as ever assembled under the banner of a major

party to pick a candidate for president."

The

report's description of hundreds of

delegates as "hippies," "yippies," and "zippies"

media's bias against the
people,

left-liberal

wing of the

was a

clear indication of the mainstream

party. There

were certainly more young

more women, more African- Americans and more Mexican- Americans, but they

were not necessarily "hippies," "yippies," or "zippies." The young dissenters who

216

supported the South Dakota senator were matched by
a large number of old timers
rallied

round the "Anybody But

The

who

McGovem" (ABM) movement

ABM alliance was made up of Democrats who had traditionally controlled

the presidential nominations: labor leaders, city bosses,
veteran congressmen, and a

McGovem's

variety of southerners.

rivals

-Humphrey, Muskie and Wallace- joined

movement. Probably no one did more than Meany and other AFL-CIO labor
to stop

CIO

McGovem

the

politicians

from receiving the Democratic presidential nomination. The AFL-

delegates in the Credentials Committee objected to

California's 271 delegates.

primary so members of the

McGovem's

claiming

The South Dakotan had won 44 percent of the vote

all

of

in the

ABM movement contended that McGovem was entitled to

only 120 delegates. After submitting the issue to balloting, however, the Credentials

Committee seated

all

of McGovem's 271 votes Califomia delegates. Even with the

support of organized labor, the "old party" of city bosses, veteran congressmen and

Southerners was outnumbered. The

ABM movement failed and the setback had long-

lasting effects for both organized labor

McGovem might

and national

politics.

Some Democrats

feared that

54

lose horribly; others feared that he might win.

Ben Wattenberg, who thought Democrats might
the Social Issue, said of the

Their struggle

is

selling out their

lose the presidential election

on

McGovem-dominated Platform Committee:

between the wild wing and the mild wing; what they're doing
tme believers on things like pot, amnesty and abortion. There

"Showdown: The Democrats" DUQmrna,"" Newsweek,
White, 170-175.
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17 July 1972, 14.

is

wtm

any niA%

t

V

in

f .
-rn f j/Tftmixux
...

y

Miami because
.1

the convention's demographic breakdow n looked

the candidate

after

Chicago are on the

to one.

In 1968, 2.6 percent of the Democratic delegates were

miderlbirty; 5,5 ptro^. were African-American and

1

rioted in

.

.

-they outnumber us by three or four

t/rwai^ old party bofKS.

under thirty,

who

the people

,

3

1

% er^-

percent were

women.

In

1

972.

23 percent of delegates

different:

5 percent were African- American and 38 percent were female. In 1968.

mom acceptah\t to the regular organization

having entered

feu- primaries. In

organi/^ional support

1

leaders

972, the candidate

won the nomination

who

won

the nomination

lacked the part>

"s

thanks to the primaries and the aggressi\ e

campaign of hii followers. Yet the primaries had polarized

the Democratic Part> s

constituencies along ideological lines and eventuall} deprived

McGovem of the

organizational support necessary to win a presidential election.

After the conventkML
presidential race.

Meany

steered the

AFL-CIO

into a neutral course in the

The Democratic candidate was anathema

and the Cold War estabHalMnent.

McGovem was too

''soft"

to the federation's president

on communism

warriors to accepL The South Dakotan's attitude towards the So\
in 1948,

he had endoised

candidate. Ahliougfa

labor issues, that

fort>"

iet

Ikny Wallace, the communist-supported

McGovem had an almost perfect

was not enough for the AFL-CIO

for the cold

Union was not new:

Progressive Part>

congressional

\

oting record on

president. For the first time in almost

year? orgamzed laiMir dU not endorse a Democratic presidential ticket.

Meany

explained:

Under tbe circamstaDces.

the .AFL-CIO will refrain from endorsing either

candidate for tike office of President of the L'nited States. Fhose circumstances
calL rMher. for die maodmum concentration of effort upon the election of Senators

Ibid.. 101.

:i8

and Representatives whose records

commend them

to the

working people of

America.

The Executive Council's decision barred any
supporting

McGovem or Nixon,

position they wanted. This

AFL-CIO' s

political

but the

1 1

was hard blow

7

state or local

AFL-CIO

member unions were

for

McGovem since he

unit

from

free to adopt

lost the

arm, the Committee on Political Education, and

its

whatever

use of the

war

chest of

approximately $ 6 million.

Yet not

all

labor leaders turned their backs on

the Democratic candidate's strongest labor supporter

president of the United Automobile Workers.

switched to
race a

McGovem when the

month before

After the nomination,

was Leonard Woodcock,

Woodcock had

imtially

the

backed Muskie but

Senator from Maine virtually abandoned the presidential

the convention. In fact, Victor Reuther, the retiring director of

Intemational Affairs for the

Reuther was right

McGovem.

UAW,

was

the lonely voice for

in his prediction that substantial

students and workers-

would take

McGovem early

backing from the young -both college

McGovem to the nomination. "McGoven's record

pro-labor," Reuther insisted, "he only has to prove he can win."

election approached, the South

matter of controversy, and

in the year.

As

is

the presidential

Dakota Senator's voting record on labor issues became a

McGovem found

it

increasingly difficult to prove that he

could win.

George Meany's Statement, Folder
Affairs Office,

"sandy Grady.

4,

Box

9,

Rebhan

Collection,

UAW Intemational

WSUA.
Keeps Role Of Maverick," The Evening Bulletin, 13
Box 9, Rebhan Collection, UAW Intemational Affairs Office,

''Victor Reuther

April 1972, B3, Folder 4,

WSUA.
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McGovem's campaign
Senator

Thomas

F.

quickly fumbled.

after the

Miami Convention,

Eagleton of Missouri, the vice-presidential candidate,
revealed that he

had been hospitalized

for treatment of emotional exhaustion

qualifications for the vice presidency

McGovem pledged to
of emotional

Two weeks

illness

became

and depression. Eagleton'

the subject of nationwide debate.

support his running mate.

He

At

first,

believed that Eagleton' s past history

could not and would not be a political issue. Under political

pressure, however, the South Dakota senator persuaded Eagleton to
withdraw his

candidacy. R. Sargent Shriver,

who had been

director of the Peace

Corps under John

F.

Kennedy and head of Lyndon B. Johnson's war on poverty program, replaced Eagleton.
Shriver's appointment as vice-presidential candidate

some Democrat
however,

dissidents such as Chicago's

skillfully exploited the

won McGovem

Mayor Richard

in his party.

to Re-elect the President also did not

exploit the weaknesses in

Daley. Republicans,

Democratic candidate's indecisiveness as well as his

last-mmute attempts to appease the conservative elements

The Committee

the endorsement of

McGovem's

miss the opportunity to

labor record. In October 1972, a newspaper

revealed that a pamphlet denouncing the Democratic presidential candidate supposedly

published by a labor organization -Labor For America Committee- had been paid for by

Nixon's campaign committee. The document, which was
Support

McGovem," had

and then mailed

to

originally

been sent

entitled

to delegates to the

"Why Labor

Can't

Democratic Convention

union members across the country. The Committee

to Re-elect the

President had clearly violated the Corrupt Practices Act, which required that publications

58

Charles DeBenedetti,
(Syracuse.
Politics,"

New York:

An American

Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era

Syracuse University Press, 1990), 338; Erwin Knoll, "Practical

The Progressive, September 1972,

13.
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attacking or supporting a candidate must contain the
individuals responsible for

it.

Kirby Jones,

name of the

McGovem's

organizations and

press secretary, referred to the

publication as another act of sabotage by the Republicans,
similar to the bugging of the

Democratic headquarters

The document

at the

Watergate Hotel

in

stated that although Senator

Washington D.C.

McGovem had

earlier that year/^

embraced a "new

populism as a key campaign slogan/" he had "repeatedly voted wrong on
affecting

working people and the trade union movement."

legislation

McGovem had

supposedly

distanced himself from the pro-labor liberal bloc on a number of civil rights issues,
the

Landum-Griffin

compensation

bill

Summer Jobs

for

minimum wage

the 1960 and 1966

bill,

and health, education and welfare

Youth

bill,

bills,

(HEW)

the 1966

unemployment

appropriations, the 1968

and the repeal of 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Furthermore, the document stated, the Democratic candidate advocated wholesale
resistance to the draft, had no comprehensive

ambiguous position on

The pamphlet

program

to deal with

the legalization of marijuana.^^

also discussed

Democratic candidate, according

McGovem's

to the

position

on foreign policy

McGovem would

issues.

The

document, saw communism as just "another

economic system," so he would cut the defense budget by $ 33

Vietnam War,

crime and held an

billion.

As

for the

immediately withdraw the U.S. from Indochina: he

believed that "begging was better than bombing," the pamphlet said. The document

pointed to the Democratic candidate's supposed radicalism by discussing his position on

59

Stephen Green, "Labor Union Booklet

Was

Sent by

GOP," Washington

Post, 29

October 1972.

^°"A Response to

Meany

"A

Files, Office

Responsible Response," Folder 27, Box 032, Series

of the President,

GMMA.
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3,

George

the three A's of amnesty, acid and abortion.

amnesty

to all those

who had gone

"regulate marijuana along the

McGovern,

it

was

would extend

alleged,

to jail or left the country to avoid the draft,

same

lines as alcohol,"

would

and would legalize abortion."'

The Communications Workers oC America, which endorsed
McGovern, became
so upset over the "inaccumte and misleading charges" against
the Democratic candidate
that

it

published a pamphlet entitled

The "pamphlets war," however,
Support Mc(u)vern" issued
admitted

did not end there.

"A Response

that their Inst evaluation

instances.

"A Responsible Response

Yet " The Response

to

to

McGovern's

Critics."

The authors of "Why Labor Can't

"A Responsible Response." The document

of the McGovern's record had been inaccurate
Responsible Response" insisted

to "the

in a

few

that the

Democratic candidate's supporters "deliberately distorted McGovern's own
Statements."

In lact, the di (Terences in the appraisals

of McGovern's congressional

record often depended on which votes were regarded as "key" votes. At limes the

passage of a law was considered;

at

times a vote on an amendment was. The contending

groups obviously phrased the issues to
I'here

wrong

suit their political purposes.

were, however, a number of indisputable

in their evaluation

Landrun-Griffm

bill

of the candidate's votes on

and the repeal of 14(b) of the

opponents were partly

right.

It

was

final

McGovern's

facts.

civil rights issues.

faft-l lartley Act,

critics

As

were

regards the

McGovern's

unfair to cite the Democratic senator's vote for the

dnal passage of the Landrum-Griffm Act because the key vote was on an amendment and

"'"Why Labor Can't Support George McGovern," folder

4,

Box

6,

Labor foday

Colleelion,WSUA.
"'"A Response

Meany

files.

to

"A Responsible Response,"

Office of the President,

Folder 27, Box

(iMMA.
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().'^2,

Series

.1,

George

McGovem had voted labor's way.
Democratic candidate admitted

In the case of 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the

that he

had

failed to vote for repeal.

For almost twenty

years, labor leaders had tried to repeal the 14(b)
provision of the Taft-Hartley Act that
it

to state legislatures to permit or forbid unions to

contracts.

The AFL-CIO had

demand

already passed the repeal of 14(b). In the Senate,
to vote labor's

a union-shop proviso in their

several times intended to eliminate this restraint and
leave

the union-shop proviso to free bargaining. In 1966, the

had promised

left

House of Representatives had

McGovem' s

vote

was

crucial

and he

way. In the end, the Democratic senator did not honor his

commitment. This "wrong" vote was one of the issues

that the

AFL-CIO

president held

63

against

McGovem.
The

UAW also came out in defense of the South Dakota Senator.

In a detailed

discussion of McGovem' s pro-labor voting record during fourteen years in Congress.

UAW Solidarity contended that the Democratic candidate had supported UAW backed
issues 73 times out of 76 key votes.

became so

intricate that

it

The debate over McGovem's labor voting record

probably failed to go beyond the labor leadership circles and

reach the rank-and-file. His position on the "three A's," however, was more
controversial and better

woo

known

as the opposition had picked

on these issues

in order to

the vote of moderate Democrats.

During a Detroit

McGovem

rally in

October 1972 before thousands of

UAW members,

attempted to clarify his views on abortion, marijuana and amnesty. The

Democratic candidate considered abortion

63

White, 212; Ronnie Dugger, "George
Progressive,

November

'*a

state issue'' so a

McGovem: A

1972, 18.
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"McGovem

Jeffersonian for

Our Time,

77?^

administration," he insisted,

marijuana,

McGovem

"would take no action on

it."

As

for the legaHzation

of

affirmed: "I don't believe in legalized marijuana, but
neither do

believe in sending teen-agers to a penitentiary for
experimenting with this."

He

I

also

stressed his support for strict enforcement of laws against
commercial sale of marijuana,

especially to minors.

As

regards his amnesty program,

program would be similar
persons

to those ordered after other

who "on grounds of conscience

McGovern

insisted that his

American wars and would apply

to

[had] refused to take part in the [Vietnam]

war.

The

made

it

split in the

difficult for

ranks of organized labor over the presidential election campaign

McGovern

to capture the blue-collar vote.

The formation of the

National Labor Committee for the Election of McGovem-Shriver, a fund-raising agency
parallel to the

the

rift

AFL-ClO's Committee on

within labor. The

Education (COPE), further deepened

Political

new Committee was headed by one of Meany's

oldest and

closest collaborators, Joseph D. Keenan, secretary treasurer of the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. The
other

McGovem election

members of the AFL-CIO Executive

Council: Joseph A. Bicrne, the president of the

Communications Workers of America and Floyd
International Association of Machinists.

was a few labor
Meany's

The

E. Smith, the president of the

creation of this National Labor

leaders' desperate attempt to stop

Nixon and a

Committee

clear challenge to

political leadership.

In mid-August,

the

committee also included

Woodcock announced

that the

McGovem-Shriver campaign committee and

64

"McGovem

Hits,"

VAW Solidariy, October

UAW had contributed $ 75,000 to

that the

1972, 10.
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money came

entirely

from

UAW members.

Secret balloting by approximately 4,500 local

that 83.8 percent supported the

international unions

McGovem-Shriver

By

ticket.

UAW leaders indicated

October, thirty-eight

had endorsed the Democrats. With the exception of the
UE, the

United Auto Workers, the Distributive Workers of America
and the Longshoreman's and

Warehousemen's Union,

all

were

affiliates

of the AFL-CIO. The unions on the

committee represented over eight million working men and women.^^
After three years of Nixon policies,

McGovem expected

concerns of the American people to play a crucial role

Unemployment,

inflation

and tax inequities

still

commitment

community

was too

seemed

to

liberal to capture the vote

to redistribute both

exceed the worries expressed

McGovem' s economic and

of the "Middle American." His

income and the tax load had alienated the business

as well as the upper echelons of organized labor.

After the nominating convention,

McGovem

aids started to revise

most controversial programs. The Democratic candidate's

some of his

tax proposals were the

be modified: instead of immediately increasing corporate taxes by about $17

McGovem administration would postpone
$14

billion to corporate tax receipts.

billion, but

economic

in the voters' final decision.

over social issues such as crime, school busing, and abortion.
tax program, however,

the persistent

McGovem advisors

workers unemployed. As

"Demogrant" plan

that

far as

tax reforms until 1975 and

billion,

to

a

would add "only"

The defense budget would be slashed by $ 32

stressed that these cuts

income

redistribution

would have raised the

tax

^^News From UAW, \S August 18 1972, Folder
Intemational Affairs Office,

first

WSUA.
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bill

4,

would not leave displaced defense

was concemed,

for

Box

the original

eveiyone with an income above

9.

Rebhan

Collection,

UAW

$12,000 was modified. Instead of a $1,000 "Demogranf

to families

of four with an

annual income of up to $ 12,000, a tax credit would
be given to families of four with

incomes up

to $20,000, either

by cash payment or tax reduction.^^

This modification attempted to dispel the fears of middle-class
voters. The

initial

proposal for income redistribution overlooked the fact that about
forty percent of

American families had annual incomes of over $ 12,000 and McGovem's plan
would
have increased

their tax burden.

redistribution plan

In September, after additional changes, the

metamorphosed

would be expanded

into an

to cover 3 million

would otherwise be on welfare, and

"income insurance plan." Social Security

more aged, blind and disabled Americans who

the

minimum monthly

benefits

would be

$150. Families of four with no other income would receive an annual

McGovem appeared to

$4,000.

...

raised to

minimum of

have dropped altogether the idea of supplementing

workers' incomes up to $ 20,00 for a family of four. "The senator's

Week accurately pointed

income

out, "is difficult to distinguish

from

that

new

plan," Business

of the Nixon

67

.

Administration."

The Democratic Party

strategy during the presidential

number of contradictions. While

campaign contained a

McGovem advisors tried hard to take the

radical sting

out of the Democratic platform's economic proposals, their candidate continued to use

clearly anti-business rhetoric.

economic pyramid,"

^^"McGovern
^^"The

McGovem

revises his

latest edition

"The cynical manipulative

forces at the top of the

said at a political rally in the South, "are guiding the

economics

text,"

Business Week, 15 July 1972, 18-21.

of McGovem's economics," Business Week, 2 September 1972,14

15.
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destinies of those at the

McGovem

low end of the

scale."

In a similar vein, on

Meet

the Press,

described his proposals in the following way: he
was "for the blue-collar

worker, for individual farmers as against corporate farmers,
for small business as against
big corporations like ITT."^^

This kind of statements not only scared businessmen and
high-income earners but
led

McGovern's

critics to

compare him

to a nineteenth-century populist.

Fortune editor

A. James Reichley's appraisal was a clear example of such an
accusation.

McGovem
that really

fire

"When

attacks the depredations of the corporations -the only subject besides
the

seems

to excite

him," Reichley contended, "he

bums

war

with the old evangelical

of tum-of-the-century populists, such as Jennings Bryan and

Tom Watson of

Georgia." Although the Fortune editor's description was an over-simplification, there

was some

truth to

it.

Moreover,

McGovem

supporters in the labor

camp

often echoed the

Democratic candidate's populist and anti-business rhetoric as they assailed the
administration's economic policies.^^

In order to rally support for the

McGovem-Shriver

Committee's strategy focused on the economic issues

that

ticket, the

concemed

National Labor
blue-collar workers

most and portrayed Nixon as the candidate of the corporations and the wealthy. The
various pamphlets that the Committee distributed

laundry

list

among rank and

filers

presented a

of grievances against Nixon. Taxation was unfair because the administration

68

A. James Reichley, 'The

McGovem Wave

Is

No

Passing Ripple/' Fortune, September

1972, 117.
69

''McGovem

revises his

economics

text/'

Business Week, 15 July 1972, 20.

70

Reichley, 117.
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had approved corporate tax cuts worth $ 80
to

remedy

the

problem of soaring food

billion.

prices.

The

Wage-price controls had done

little

cost oiTiving had increased 17.6

percent during the Nixon years. Moreover, unemployment
continued to be a problem of

paramount importance among workers:
1972, the

number had reached

in 1969, there

4.7 million.

were 2.8 million unemployed;

iMnally, the administration's

in

new economic

policy had invalidated fairly negotiated contracts and put a 5 percent
ceiling on

wage

71

mcreases.

McGovern,

the National Labor

Committee

insi.sted,

was

a true supporter of the

American worker. The Democratic candidate was against compulsory

wage

and

controls which violated collective bargaining contracts and in favor of higher

minimum wages,
benciils.

higher employment compensation, Medicare and greater social security

Moreover, McGovern was aware of '"industrial carnage"

and had an eight-point program
safety

arbitration

to

"guarantee the American worker's right to health and

on the job." His proposal included,

safety in.spectors and

4,()()()

in the nation's plants

for instance, the addition

of

8,()()()

industrial

hygienists to enforce rights under the Occupational Safety

and Health Act of 1970.'^
If

woo
that

McGovern was such

a pro-labor candidate,

why

the blue-collar vote during the presidential election

did he

fmd

it

so dilficult to

campaign? McGovern hoped

economic hardship would turn working-class voters away from Nixon. But by

November

1972, the business cycle

7

Pamphlet,

Ad

I

loc

Dump Nixon

was

rising strongly, surveys indicated that

Committee, The Tamiment

Robert Wagner Labor Archives (Hereafter

^^George McGovern, "Let's

October 1972,

Make

Institute Library

consumer

and

RWLA).

the Health and Safety

3.
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Law Work!"

UAW Solidarity,

conlidcnce was increasing, and Ihc fourth quarter GN1>
was expected to
dollars over that of the third quarter/'

unemployment

picture

seemed

Moreover,

to brighten:

recession peak of over 6 percent and stayed

was

a high 9.7 percent but

still

it

rate

average ol 3.2 percent throughout 1971.

the

issue in

had come down

it

at that level.

had dropped

front but he

American

a half point

from

For nonwhite workers the

to 2.6 percent in

tirst

rate

quarter.

August from an

Nixon managed

to

reduce

Nixon's proposal

slow disengagement from Indochina while

a

hail

on

crilicisiu

had also neutralized the Vietnam War as the most

politics.

its

74

the time of the balloting, not only had

economic

second quarter of 1972, the

had decreased from the 10.6 percent of the

For married men, the unemployment

By

in the

by 10 billion

rise

di\ isi\ e

always been "peace with honor," a

peace settlement was negotiated.

Two

days

before the presidential election, Henry Kissinger called a news conference and

announced: "Peace

is at

hand." Newspapers reported on a possible accord between the

United States and Vietnam. The following day, however, negotiations halted when

Nguyen Van

Thieu, president of South Vietnam, denounced the settlement as a sell-out to

the communists.

I

here

was no fmal agreement between

the U.S.

election day, but the aiuiounccment of progress in negotiations

cynical, diplomatic triumph (or Nixon.

Business Outlook, Business Week,

1

1

November

1972, 37.

Buisness Outlook, Business IVcek, 9 September 1972, 29.

"Peace

is at

hand." Newsweek, 6

November

1972, 33.
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and Hanoi before the

amounted

to a timely, if

In contrast,

McGovem called

for

an immediate and complete withdrawal of

American forces from Indochina. Within 90 days of his
inauguration,

the Democratic

candidate promised, his administration would remove
remaining U.S. troops, stop

bombing North Vietnam and providing

military aid to South Vietnam.

McGovem'

peace platform was based on a far-reaching critique of excessive
defense spending and of
the

Cold War

in general.

election approached, as

If Vietnam

many

would not be an

political observers claimed, the

"Vietnam thinking" would surely be an

By "Vietnam

issue by the time the presidential

thinking"

I

issue.

McGovem

mean wasting our

South Dakotan claimed

that

explained:

strength on paranoic defense policies

while neglecting the needs of our own people [...] What propose is that we spend
all that is necessary for a prudent national defense, and no more. I propose
that
1

we

conserve our limited resources

by repudiating the false world of old
discredited myths, made up of blocs, puppets, and dominoes, facing instead a
[...]

world of today and the futures, with muUiple ideologies and
This was too

much

real

interests.

for the devout cold warriors within organized labor's ranks.

By September
and the labor leaders

1972, The

who have

New

York Times reported: ^The Nixon Administration

formally adopted a neutral position in the presidential

race are developing an increasingly cordial relationship.'' There were two cases in point:

The

International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the building and construction unions.

The Teamsters, who endorsed Nixon, were pleased by
anti-strike legislation in the transportation industry.

the administration's opposition to

The construction workers,

part, applauded the president for his opposition to racial quotas

George McGovem, Where

I

Stand,''

m hiring.

The Progressive, July 1972,

77

A

Democratic

16.

^^"GOP and Neutral Labor More Cordial," The New York Times. 24 September
Folder 14, Box 031, COPE Research Files, GMMA.
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for their

1972,

campaign

official

summarized Nixon's technique

in seeking labor support in the

following way:
r

Nixon gnaws around

the edges of a worker's

trade union part. But he

gnaws a

part, a little at the patriotic part

he has an awful

The 1972
The

successfiil.

lot

little at

and a

He

life.

hasn't touched the central

the Catholic part, a

little at

little at

the Polish

the anti-hippie part. After a while,

of that worker.

election returns

seemed

to indicate that

nation's blue-collar workers

Nixon"s labor strategy had been

-who made up a

third of the electorate

and

represented since the 1930s the core vote of all Democratic presidential
candidates- went
for

Nixon over

McGovem by

the ratio of 57 to 43 percent. Moreover, for the

time

first

since the early 1930s a majority (54 percent) of members of labor union families voted
79

the Republican ticket.

the votes,

.

Nixon had

Political analysts

succeeded

finally

concluded

that,

having captured 62 percent of

in his quest to create a

"New Republican

80

.

The Democratic

Majority."

coalition forged in the 1930s had finally collapsed.

president could safely claim that America's "Silent Majority" had risen.

As

The

sociologist

Jonathan Rieder contends:
In part, [the silent majority]

But

emerged out of the

center's

own

efforts to

name

itself.

emerged from the efforts of others to capture and beguile it, most
notably from the oratorical flourishes of Republicans, reactionaries, and
it

also

8

conservatives

who had

their

own

"Nixon Wooing of Labor Vote Dates
031,

COPE

Research

Files,

ideological projects in mind.

to 1970," 12

October 12 1972, Folder

14,

Box

GMMA.

79

The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, "Democratic Coalition
Presidential Voting," Report

N°

90,

December 1972,

Fell into Disarray in

1

972

8-10.

Jonathan Rieder, "The Rise of the "Silent Majority"," in Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle,
eds.. The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order. 1930-1980 (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 244.
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But, had America clearly

swung toward conservatism? Despite

the landslide, a

closer look at Nixon's presidential election campaign
indicates that the incumbent rallied
the voters to a safe and solid middle ground.

The 1972 Republican

Party's platform

stated:

This year the choice

between moderate goals historically sought by both major
parties and far-out goals of the far left.. .We invite our troubled
friends of other
is

political affiliations to join with us in a

It

was not

Many

difficult for

Nixon

to picture

new

McGovem

coalition for progress.**^

as the candidate of a small minority.

citizens probably shared the Democratic candidate's criticism of the
tax system,

the welfare system and

McGovem

policies, but his proposals did not

seem workable.

could never counter the charges that his economic plan would not only cause

inflation but also a

caught

economic

in a bind.

50 percent increase

in taxes.

After the

In order to build a truly national base,

Miami convention, he was

McGovem

needed

to

move

towards the center. Yet the Democratic candidate could not jettison those positions

had

rallied his ideological partisans.

In his post-convention campaign,

original proposals.

McGovem promised
In the course

McGovem

The South Dakotan revised

schemes, but he seldom brought them up

gradually tempered most of his

his tax reform

in his speeches.

As

and income distribution
for defense spending,
83

to

keep local military

facilities

open almost everywhere he went.

of the campaign, even his Vietnam policy underwent changes. During

convention week,

McGovem

issued a statement for Families for Immediate Release, an

82

"A
83

that

Platform Appeal to Democrats," Business Week, 26 August 26 1972, 20.

Tom

Oliphant, "The Selling Out of the Candidate," Ramparts, February 1973, 26,

232

organization of relatives of POW's and servicemen
missing in action. In order to

accommodate
immediate

their

demands,

cease-fire,

forces from Vietnam,

McGovem promised that,

end military aid

to

while he would order an

South Vietnam, and withdraw

Cambodia and Laos, he would maintain

the Gulf of Tonkin until

POWs were returned.

all

U.S. military

forces in Thailand and

on

The Thailand-Tonkin proviso was a

departure from his previous position, which clearly stated that withdrawal
of troops
•

•

mcluded Thailand and Tonkin, with no preconditions.
trusted

on Vietnam, what could he be

trusted

Democratic candidate did not come across as

on? In

responsible for his political downfall. The result

electorate

spite

said: "I

August 1972. President Nixon's instmction
'There will be no anti-labor plank in
in fact violated every single tenet

was

moved

largely

of the

to the center. In

political

1

947, on

smash the labor bosses." In

Republican Platform Committee was:

this platform/'

Over a two-year period, Nixon had

of the conservative dogma, particularly deep

deficits in

communist powers and non-intervention

economy. In 1972, a well-known conservative won the

his party as the as the party

Although the

landslide.

drifted to the right

elected to

to the

the federal budget, militant opposition to major

in the

of his good intentions, the

was a Nixon

had not necessarily

Nixon had

McGovem could not be

McGovem himself was

spectrum, but the Republican candidate had certainly
his first day in Congress,

If

sufficiently "presidential."

Republicans extensively exploited the three "A's",

The American

84

of reform While Nixon promised

re-election by presenting

to bring the country

84

Robert

Sam Anson,

''Reports and

Comments: Miami

Beach,'' The Atlantic

Monthly 230,

no. 2, September 1972, 6-10.
85

"Hard Hats-Key

to

Labor Switch,'"

New

York Times, 15 October 1972, Section A,
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18.

together under the banner of the

up

the rhetoric of class,

"New Majority^, McGovem's -new popuHsm"

which fostered division

rather than unity

picked

and consensus.

"Nixon's overwhelming victory," an AFL-CIO American
Federationist editor
pointed out, "was not a victory of party and only
peripherally a victory of person.

Although Nixon carried an unprecedented

total

of 49

states for president, the

Party lost two Senate seats and one governorship, and
while the G.O.P.
seats, the

Democrats retained

Meany argued

that the

concentrate

efforts

According

its

COPE,

to

its

AFL-CIO's decision

of

The AFL-CIO's decision not

for the

It

to

remain neutral

in the presidential race

in

.

listmg

was impossible

impeachment of the

among

...
major

their

off.

Senate contests, 16 of 29, and in gubernatorial elections,
to

back

McGovem had

deepened the

rift

president. In 1972, only 53 percent of the voters

would

important enough for

it

87

86

M^inddiXt,^''

AFL-CIO American

Ibid., 2.
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call

were

concerns.

Rex Hardesty, "^Elections' Mixed
December 1972, 1.

1

within the

to predict that a year later organized labor

familiar with the Watergate charges, and only 3 percent thought
,.

and

57.5 percent of the candidates the federation supported won: in

218 of 362,

labor leadership.

House

on the Congressional and gubernatorial elections had paid

races,

7.

13

majority in Congress. In view of the election results,

House
1

won

Republilean

Federationist,

CHAPTER 7
THE COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR PROSPERITY,

The American and world economies began
1960s came to a close and decline reached

its

1973-1974

sliding into sustained crisis as the

lowest point during the 1974-1975

economic recession, the deepest since the 1930s. By 1973, when about 4.7 million
workers were
capital

to negotiate

new

contracts, the post

World War

II

accord between labor and

had collapsed. The accord rested on a number of premises.

On the

one hand,

organized labor accepted that pricing and production decisions were management
prerogatives.

security,

On the

other hand, unions sought rising real wages, greater employment

and a safer work environment for

government - due

their

in large part to the pressure

membership. At the same time, the

of organized labor- developed social

welfare programs meant to improve the living standards of all workers, not only of

unionized workers. Economists David Gordon, Richard Edwards and Michael Reich
argue that "this accord effectively provided the framework,

at least

through the

late

1960s, within which stable conditions of production fueled prosperity and production."'

Beginning

in the late

1

960s, the long-term trend toward rising income, increasing

job security and improving working conditions began

to reverse.

As long

as the terms of

the labor-capital accord held, the relationship between unions and corporations

relatively peaceful.

As

the

economy

met. In the second half of the

1

started to falter, the workers' expectations

was
were not

960s, strike activity of all kinds -legal walkouts and

David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work, Divided
Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 216.
'
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wildcat strikes- increased dramatically, reaching
their climax in 1970. In that year,

according to the Board of Labor

Statistics,

66 million work days were

lost

due

to strikes.

This figure far exceeded the level of strike activity of the
1930s and the 1940s, with the
2

exception of 1946.

The 1969 UE-IUE

strike against

GE

as well as the 1970

GM were well under the control of the union leaders.

UAW walkout against

Workers achieved important

gains,

despite the declining economy. Wildcat activity, however, posed as
serious challenge to

union

officials, especially to the

UAW leadership.

In the early 1970s, wildcat strikes in

auto plants placed working conditions and the nature of industrial work
public debate. In 1973, the

strike.

Union

officials

UAW faced the

first

round of bargaining

at the

after the

center of

1970

were under the pressure of rank-and-file militants who demanded

not only higher wages and improved benefits but also dramatic changes on the shopfioor.

UAW leaders, meanwhile, felt restrained by the government's call for '"moderation" in
collective bargaining during Phase

III

of Richard Nixon's economic program.

The economic stimulation of 1972 allowed Nixon
run,

it

proved an absolute economic

disaster.

win

to

re-election.

There was undoubtedly

"political

calculation" in Nixon's economic measures. Nevertheless, as Robert

the president faced "the difficulty of framing policy at a volatile

In the long

M.

Collins claims,

moment when

the

business cycle intertwined with an elemental secular transformation of the national and
3

world economies

in

ways

that were, at the time, ditficult to discern."

^BLS, Handbook, 1980, 415, quoted in Kim Mood, An Injury
American Unionism (Verso: New York, 1988), 86.

to All:

3

Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 126.

236

in

Nixon's economic

The Decline of

Postwar America (New

advisors miscalculated the inflationary dangers of
economic stimulation and

overestimated the potential of economic growth. In
postwar America, economic growth

had become widely accepted as the foremost objective
of U.S. public policy. "Growth,"
Collins claims, "was pursued as a goal in
practical ways... Postwar liberals

its

saw growth

own

right in a variety

of theoretical and

as the vehicle for transformative social

change; Richard Nixon viewed growth as a way to overcome the ravages
of liberal
decay."'

Buoyed by

his landslide victory in the

1972 presidential election, Nixon told the

nation in his second inaugural address:

Above

the time has

come

renew our faith in ourselves and in
America... At every turn, we have been beset by those who find everything wrong
with America and little is right. But I am confident that this will not be the
all else,

for us to

judgment of history on these remarkable times
If Nixon's claims

sounded hollow

of the year. Just a few weeks

in

in

which we are privileged

January 1973, they lay in utter desolafion

after the president's speech, the Senate voted,

to live.^

at the

70 to

end

0, to

establish a committee to investigate the 1972 break-in of the Democratic National

Committee headquarters

at

the Watergate office

complex

in

Washington, DC.

A "third-

rate burglary" quickly turned into a national disaster that eventually caused the

president's resignation. In the course of 1973, moreover, a series of foreign policy crises

pushed the U.S. economy

into

its

worst recession in three decades. The economic

Vollins, 235.

Second Inaugural Address, quoted in Robert N. Bellah, "American
Civil Religion in the 1970s," in Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds., American
Civil Religion (New York: Haper and Row, Publishers, 1974), 259.
"^Richard Nixon's
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disaster, in turn, ushered in an

management

age of retrenchment that

in

time would shatter the labor-

accord.

Nixon

started his

second term launching what some analysts called a

"counterrevolution" against the general trend of social policy of the
previous thirty or

The

forty years.

Nixon
do

said, "let

for myself."

president's rephrased the

tenets.

lives,"

I

First, the federal

government could do

little

to

Second, revenue sharing returned power to the local governments

and avoided bureaucratic centralization
the government's commitment; if the

in

America.

And

economy needed

third, full

employment was not

stimulation, the uplift

would come

capital's investing power.*'

To avoid an
be reduced

own

At the onset of his second administration, the president reaffirmed the

social change.

by enlarging

slogan: 'In our

each of us ask not just what will government do for me, but what can

Republican Party's conservative

advance

Kennedy inaugural

in

increase in inflation and taxes,

1973 from $ 283 billion

inefficient Great Society

to $

269

Nixon argued,

billion.

By

federal spending

had

to

slashing the allegedly

programs of the 1960s, Nixon cut government expenditure and
7

furthered his conservative agenda.

employment, manpower
to cut these

Edward
Policy:

'^AUen

A
J.

cuts affected programs in housing, education,

training, health, pollution

programs by $ 6.5

C. Banfield,

The

et. al.,

billion in fiscal year 1973, $ 17 billion in 1974,

eds.,

's

and a $100

"Nixon, the Great Society, and the Future of Social

Symposium," Cowwew/ary

Matusow, Nixon

and poverty. The president proposed

55, no. 5

Economy: Booms,

(May

Busts, Dollars,

Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 216.
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1973): 49, 54.

and Votes (Lawrence,

billion over the following five years.^ In the

Nixon's claim

that

made

Decisions

view of most of his

political

opponents,

revenue sharing made social spending more efficient was
not accurate.

at the state,

municipal and county levels did not necessarily favor the

poor, minorifies or the working class. In his evaluation
of the president's economic plan
for

FY

74, Michael Harrington said:

He

[Nixon] pretends that he is simply attacking the inefficient and overly
lavish
innovations of Lyndon Johnson, but he really assaults the aging, the

poor, and, as

Meany

understands the working people.

Harrington understood the
relationship that

Peter Brennan, the

hat.

president's position.

Nixon enjoyed with George Meany during

deteriorated. First,

hard

AFL-CIO

friendly

the Fall of 1972 soon

Nixon antagonized Meany by appointing

New York Building

The

as his

new

secretary of labor

Trades leader and the nation's foremost hawkish

Brennan's appointment was widely linked to the

New

York construction

workers' pro-war demonstrations of May 1970. The Progressive columnist Patrick

Owens

claimed: "This

may be

said to constitute the first time anyone

a Cabinet job for perpetrating violence in the streets." Even

was rewarded with

AFL-CIO

leaders criticized

Brennan' s appointment. Industrial unions were outraged not only because Brennan was a
building tradesman but because he

chastised the

new

was widely known

Secretary of Labor for proposing a

that presented last year

Meany openly

for his mediocrity.

minimum wage

bill

"worse than

on behalt of the Admmistration."

8

Banfield

et. al., eds.,

44,

^Ibid.,41.

Patrick

Owens, "Peter

J.

Brennan: Nixon's Hard Hat," The Progressive,

28.
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May

1973, 27,

The fahering economy
the rapid expansion of the

further strained Nixon's relationship with

economy towards

or 4.4 million workers, were

still

Meany. Despite

the end of 1972, 5 percent of the labor force,

unemployed

in January 1973.

Moreover, an additional

2 million workers were employed on part-time bases because no full-time jobs
were
available." According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics

Phase

of the administration's economic plan increased

II

compared
at

summary, consumer
at

to a 3.8 percent increase in the pre-freeze period.

prices during

an annual rate of 3.4 percent,

Food

prices continued to rise

an annual rate of 5.0 percent. The president's evaluation of the economy, however,

was much more

optimistic:

was a very good year
be even better. They can,

In short [he said] 1972

973 and

1

1

974

to

has ever experienced.

I

for the

American economy.

in fact,

be the best year our economy

1

expect

have established as the overall goal of this program a

further reduction in the inflation rate to 2 Vi percent or less by the end of 1973.'^

After seventeen months of tight regulation, the Nixon administration decided that
the

economy needed more

flexibility in pricing

the president launched Phase

III

and wage bargaining. In January 1973,

of his economic plan, putting wage and price controls on

what analysts of his economic plan described as a
•

"self- voluntary or self-policing

,.'3

basis."

In an address to businessmen, treasury secretary George P. Shultz explained

voluntarism in the following way: '"We give you a reasonable standard and say to you,

"It's

up

to you.

""Labor Views

We will be

the

watching. ..We can

Economy,

1913,'"

come

out with our ball bat and swing

AFL-CIO American Federationist, March

1973,

10.

'^Allen Y. Zack, "Nixon's Credibility-The

Federationist, February 1974,

'^Editorial,

"Making Phase

III

Economic Record," American AFL-CIO

8.

work,'' Business Week, 20 January 1973, 102.
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it

if

we have

14

to."

Shultz thus offered no

strict

guidehnes for employers and unions

to

follow.

Phase

Ill's

complex enforcement machinery was

There were two important changes.

First, the Price

abolished; secondly, labor leaders were added as

Council's

different

from

Commission and

that

of Phase

the Pay Board

II.

were

members of the Cost of Living

new Labor-Management Advisory Committee. AFL-CIO

president George

Meany, Leonard Woodcock of the United Auto Workers, Frank Fitzsimmons of the
Teamsters and

I.

W. Abel of the

the implementation of Phase

decision to serve on the

III,

Steelworkers agreed to cooperate with the government

in

not as administrators but as advisors. Despite their

CLC's Labor- Advisory Board,

labor leaders warned that if food

prices spiraled out of control in a year of pattern-setting contract negotiations, they could

not guarantee labor's continued cooperation with Phase

III.

During 1973, unions representing about 4.7 million workers

in the transportation,

construction, electrical manufacturing, auto and farm equipment, apparel, food, and

rubber industries were to negotiate

new

contracts.

The Phase

percent, plus another 0.7 percent for fringe benefits,

Phase

III.

As

a

minimum, unions would

II

wage standard of 5.5

was supposed

try to settle for

to stay in effect during

what the guideline figures

allowed and would press hardest to catch up with the cost of living increases. Corporate
profits

and rising productivity were also important bargaining

however, widespread confusion as

to

factors.

There was,

whether or not the administration would "swing

bat" at union settlements that exceeded the 5.5 percent guideline for raises. The

International Executive

'''"The

Gamble

that

its

UAW

Board opposed the proposed one-year extension of the Economic

Phase

III

will

vjorkr Business Week, 30 January 1973,
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18.

Stabilization Act that

was

to expire

the hands of the Executive

on April

30. This act, the

Many

prices."

By mid-June

1973,

administration had built

unravel.

First,

it

AFL-CIO

was

when

food prices continued to

1

.9

impose controls on

to

Ifi

top

it

officers agreed.

clear that the fragile fabric of confidence that the

imposed wage-price controls

A number of economic

near-record

i

huge and largely unrestricted powers

15

wages and

UAW claimed, "placed in

Nixon

1971 was beginning to

in

developments shook Nixon's hopes for a "great year."

The increase became

rise.

month

percent increase that

critical in

January, reaching a

(2.3 percent in grocery stores).

unexpected devaluation of the dollar put pressure on import

prices.

Secondly, the

Finally, although

Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz claimed that the 5.5 percent wage guideline (6.2
percent with fringes) was
the vagueness of the

Committee issued

As
inflation,

still

new

businessmen were "clearly uncomfortable with

in effect,

approach." In

fact,

when

the

new Labor-Management Advisory
17

its first

policy statement,

the administration's Phase

American

citizens

became

III

it

wage

did not specify a

failed to free the nation

guideline number.

from the grip of

increasingly skeptical of the president's ability to

govern. Public clamor and political pressure for further action against inflation grew

more

intense each time a

new

retail

or wholesale price report

was

issued. In mid- 1973,

consequently, Nixon opted for a supposedly bolder approach to controls. His

"Memo,

UAW Position on Phase

International Office Department,

Affairs (Hereafter

'^"Phase

III

III,

16 January 1973, Folder 17,

Waynes

Box

State University Archives of

10,

new

UAW

Labor and urban

WSUA).

unsettles the truce with labor," Business Week, 10

'^"A foggier Phase

III

March 1973,

threatens the out\ook:' Business Week, 3
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39.

March 1973,

15.

economic policy, Phase IV, included a blanket 60-day
freeze on
wages, rents or dividends.

Raw agricultural

and other farm items were frozen.

retail prices

but not on

products escaped controls, but prices on food

Phase IV, government

officials said,

would

concentrate on industries that showed major inflationary
measures. For labor, the
standards remained essentially the same as under Phase

Nixon's major economic

III.

advisors stressed the flexibility of the sector by sector approach,
promised an active

exception policy and pledged to free the economy from controls by 1974. The
aim of

Phase IV, the White House announced, was "to moderate the
during the

first six

months of 1973 with minimum adverse

In his television

rate

effect

of inflation existing

on supply."'^

announcement of the new economic program, Nixon highlighted

what was "right" with the economy: higher wages and an increasing growth
after

mentioning the successes did the president refer

to the

reasons,"

in various parts

Nixon added, "every American family

problem of higher
.

And I have

prices.

1

"Nixon's Freeze

of the country. "But whatever the

confronted with a real and pressing

Economic observers regarded

of Nixon's Phase IV. The

and benefit gains totaling

home and

20

ettective action to deal with that problem."

talks as the "tesf

at

decided that the time has come to take strong and

.

.

is

6.

1

Only

runaway prices which,

according to the administration, were largely caused by increased demand

abroad and by crop failures abroad and

rate.

the

UAW

UAW strategists intended to negotiate wage

percent to 7.2 percent a year, a clear violation of the

— What comes next?," Newsweek, 25 June 1973,

62.

19

"Tougher but more selective controls/' Business Week, 23 June 1973,
20

Ibid.. 63.
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20,

administration's 5.5 percent guideline. Nevertheless,
a
started Business

and the

Week said: "There appears

to

be

less

week before

the negotiations

emotion over big issues

this year,

UAW and management have shown a willingness to engage in give-and-take

bargaining on these [issues] in the interest of peace."^'

United Auto Workers contract negotiations were expected to be among
the
toughest. "If we can't get

it

in the

paycheck because of wage controls," a
22

stated, "we'll get

regarded Phase

it

III

in

some

other way."

The

UAW official

UAW International Executive Board

as "a step in the right direction," but insisted that the measures did

"not go nearly far enough."

The union's main objection

to controls

was

that they

had

increased economic inequities. In the second half of 1972,

UAW president Woodcock

pointed out, productivity in American industry increased

a rate of 5.6 percent, while

the purchasing

power of the country's hourly workers

at

23

rose by only 2.2 percent.

The

UAW leaders underscored the tremendous profits that the major auto manufacturers had
made under

the administration's

game

plan. In the first nine

months of 1972, General

Motors' profits rose 14.2 percent, Ford's 39.2 percent and Chrysler's 180.5 percent. In

view of this, the union's leadership expected the Big Three
their profit targets.

Woodcock

insisted, ''...should

to continue their past irresponsible

'''UAW

talks will test

Phase

III

to stabilize prices

and lower

permit the auto corporations

and inflationary conduct with respect

to prices, there

Phase IV," Business Week, 14 July 1973, 25.

2

"Militancy

is

the bargaining tactic for 1913,^^ Business Week, 6 January 1973, 64.

^'•UAW on Phase

III,"

UAW Solidarity, Jan-Feb, 3.
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would be no sound or equitable

basis for the Administration to restrict the
gains of auto

24

workers."

In

March 1973,

the

UAW held a Production Workers Conference in Atlanta,

preceding the Special Convention in Detroit that was to outline
bargaining goals for the

upcoming contract
table this year

negotiations.

on things

that are

delegates presented a long

list

"We've

got to

make

a strong impact at the bargaining

non-economic," Woodcock declared. Conference

of grievances. Most expressed their dissatisfaction with

the Occupational Safety and Health Act

(OSHA).

It

was not uncommon

for

OSHA

inspections to follow immediately upon the companies' clean-ups of violations.
Health

and safety hazards were undoubtedly some of the worst problems

membership

faced. During the

Americans had died

Vietnam War

that the

union

years, union officials claimed,

more

25

in factories

than fighting in Indochina.

Conference participants also stressed the need to shorten the time on the job and
to

make overtime

voluntary. Production workers also w^anted improved retirement

benefits, cleaner production to

combat speed-ups,

better dental insurance

discrimination provisions to protect ethnic and racial minorities and
also touched

on the issue of ''morale": ''We're losing

this

union

and

anti-

women. Delegates

at the

bottom. ..Young

people in the shops are dissatisfied, they are concerned about working conditions and
26

safety.''

A year earlier, the

7,800

UAW Local

1112 had made the national newspaper

"ibid.

^^'Troduction Workers '-Sound Off,"

UAW Solidary, March

26

Ibid., 9.
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1973,

8,

headlines during a strike against the General Motors
Assembly Division

(GMAD)

in

Lordstown, Ohio. Gary Bryner, the union president, received
extensive publicity during
the stoppage by describing not only the mind-dulling
character of the work, but the ear-

damaging noise

levels, the heat, the archaic

young union president

called

average age of the rank and

shop

file in

the plant

was

discipline.

The

twenty-five.^^

at

Lordstown became a symbol of the

alienation. This 24-day strike, however,

walkouts that had occurred since 1968, when
rise in

and the petty

Lordstown 'Ihe Woodstock of the working man:" the

The 1972 stoppage over GM's speed-ups

young autoworker's

rules,

was just one of many

GM's management

decided to push for a

production standards. The corporation's Lordstown "super planf was designed to
"

meet the challenge of low-priced imported

The

cars.

plant

was equipped with

the

most

sophisticated machinery in order to increase the production of the Chevrolet Vega,

answer

to the imported

facility

was expected

conventional plants.

GM's

compacts of Volkswagen, Toyota and Datsun. The Lordstown

to turn out 101

To

the rank and

operation up to 800 times a day.

By

Vegas an hour
file, this

as

meant

compared with

thirty-six

sixty an

hour

in

seconds to do a job

GMAD ran eighteen plants, employing

1972, the

91,000 workers. The division was responsible for about 75 percent of the corporation's
production. "The division's policies," the

New

York Times reported, "have brought labor

28

unrest to almost every plant

it

has taken over."

In 1971

27

Studs Terkel, Working: People Talk About What They

About What They Do (Pantheon Book:

New

,

the

GMAD not only assumed

Do All Day and How They Feel

York, 1972), 187.

28

"The Excessive Example of Lordstown," The Enquirer, 7 February 1972; James Toms,
"Disassembling the Assembly Line," Folder 1, Box 1, Guthridge Collection, WSUA;

"GM's Toughest
Collection,

Division,"

New

York Times, 10 April 1972, Folder

WSUA.
246

1,

Box

1,

Guthridge

control of the Lordstown facility, but also plants in

Michigan, and

St.

Norwood, Ohio, Willow Run,

Louis, Missouri. Walkouts occurred at three of the
four locations; only

Willow Run avoided a

strike.

Joseph E. Godfrey, the general manager of the

GMAD, claimed that the

corporation had to "compete with the foreigner" and to do so the division
would have to

continue to cut costs in

ranked

its

plants, with

all its plants.

improvement

In order to

in

measure efficiency,

GM continually

one factory pushing another down the

scale.

Bryner explained the process:

They [GMAD] have an audit of their eighteen assembly plants to determine how
they stand on a scale of one to eighteen in efficiency, cost wise. The eighteenth
plant

is

then paid a

eighteen on the
Plant

why

and instructed as to why they shouldn't be number
Local management then explains to the Supervisor in the

visit

list.

they canT be eighteenth on the

the worker. This system

is

list

and then the pressure

is

applied to

repeated each time the audit comes out and in turn,

perpetuates the alienation of the workers, profits before people.'^

During the Lordstown walkout, the

UAW International supported the rank and

This widely publicized strike revealed that management was launching a
organized labor and that the

changed work

rules.

UAW could

The Lordstown

still

fight

strike cost

Following the stoppages over speed-ups
debated the "blue-collar

and

May

Reuther

Local 1112

blues."* In April 1973,

new

filers.

assault

back when corporations unilaterally

GM about $

30

150 million

in auto plants,

in lost sales.

UAW officials thoroughly

during a symposium held

at the

Walter

UAW Family Education Center, vice-president Irving Bluestone

Memo,

Polifical Materials,

30

"GM's Toughest

New
WSUA.

Division,"

Guthridge Collection,

1969-1977, Guthridge Collection,

York Times, 10 April 1972, Folder

247

on

1,

WSUA.

Box

1,

assailed the corporations for not caring about their
workers' job satisfaction.

the

The head of

UAW GM Department explained the rank and file's situation:
One very

serious problem

created by the fact that the worker has no control or
voice over the workplace. As a free citizen in society, he
can make things chang

democratically, but the

is

moment he

enjoys as a free citizen, no longer

enters the workplace, the

democracy

that

e

he

exists.

Bluestone's words seemed to echo those of the radicals. There was
a key difference,

however, Bluestone wanted to humanize the workplace, whereas the dissidents
sought
transform

Radicals usually referred to assembly line work as the epitome of

it.

tediousness. Yet only about

Work

1

5 percent

of the

in

stamping plants,

in forges

alienating than

on the assembly

line.

lines.

to

"boredom on

and

UAW membership worked on assembly
in foundries

Some union

officials

the assembly line" received extensive

was no

less routine or

were troubled by the way

media coverage, while equally

important issues were largely ignored.
In the early 1970s, there

was

a flurry of research papers and mainstream

publications examining workers" changed attitudes towards their jobs. Most studies
indicated that blue collars were

workers had been and were

more

dissatisfied with their jobs than past generations

less willing to accept the authoritarian rule

of

of the work place.

Newsweek reported:
They [American workers] are bored, rebellious, frustrated; sometimes they are
drunk on the job or spaced out on drugs. And though they are the newest darlings
of the sociologists and industrial psychologists, they're
the people

who

still

a mystery to

should understand them best: their bosses and their labor

32

leaders.

^'"Do the "Blue Collar Blues" Really Exist?,"

^^"The Job Blahs:

Who Wants to Work?"

UAW Solidarity, April

1973, 2

Newsweek, March 26, 1973,
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79.

many of

In

November

satisfaction,

1973.

1973, the Monthly Labor Review also addressed the issue
of job

comparing data from two national surveys of workers taken

The research had been designed

attitudes

toward

to

in

1969 and

measure working conditions and workers'

their jobs. In 1973, the authors pointed out, the

two major

variables in

determining the quality of working conditions were occupational group
and collar color,

followed in decreasing order of association by education, age and race. The
poorest

working conditions were reported by wage earners under 21 years
school education or

less,

old, with a grade

by African-American operatives, and non-farm laborers. These

findings confirmed that, as the wildcat strikes on various auto plants seemed to indicate,

young workers tended

to

remamed an important

variable.

Over

have more grievances than older employees and

that race

33

the three-year period of the study, rank and filers had

with their unions. In 1969,

1

8 percent

become

less satisfied

of union members reported problems with how

democratically their unions were run, and

1

7 percent reported dissatisfaction with

how

well their unions were managed. In 1973 these figures had increased to 29 and 23
percent, respectively. In sum, the percentage of union

either with union

members

reporting a problem

democracy or union management was 35 percent

in 1973, representing

34

an mcrease ot 9 percentage from

"Job Satisfaction:

A New

1

969.

Survey

-No More, No

less,""

A FL-CIO American

Federationist, January 1974, 22. Article excerpted from "Evaluating
in

America,"

Monthly Labor Review. Written by Robert
Baldi de Mandilovitch and Thomas W. Mangione.

in the

Quinn, Martha

S.

Working Conditions

November

issue of the

34

Ibid., 23.
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P.

A

1

973 Gallup survey indicated

that the

downward

trend in job satisfaction

paralleled the downtrend in workers' satisfaction in
other areas, such as income, housing

and education. According

to a

nationwide

dissatisfied with their jobs because the

poll,

34 percent of American workers were

wages were poor. Twenty percent of those

interviewed considered their job boring and 17 percent said that they
were not doing what
they wanted

to.

Ten percent claimed

to be

working too hard; 8 percent complained

the hours were too long and 5 percent regarded their fringe benefits as insufficient.

that

As

regards labor unions, the Oallup findings coincided with the trend identified by
the

Monthly Review: labor unions had declined

in

public esteem to the lowest point in four

decades. While a majority of U.S. citizens continued to approve of labor unions, the

approval figure in

A

1

973 -sixty-percent- was down ten points since

widely publicized study entitled "Where

condueted by Harold Sheppard of the Upjohn

problem

of

II avc

Institute

35
1

965

All the Robots Gone?,"

and Neal

llerrick,

dramatized the

Job dissatisfaelion. After an in-depth analysis of 400 male union workers,

Sheppard and Herrick eoncluded

that

one

third

of them -partieularly the young wage

earners- were alienated from their jobs and dissatisfied with the typical rewards of higher

pay, shorter hours or longer vacations.

I

lerrick's study

confirmed

that,

blue collars were concerned with the nature of their work. Rank and

above

filers,

1

all else,

lerrick

claimed, expected their work to be interesting and called for enough equipment and help

to get the

job done, enough information about and enough authority over the labor

process. Other aspects of work that blue collars regarded as important were the

^*\lec Gallup and George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index: Public Opinion,
1935-1975. \)ob Satisfaction and Productivity,^^ Report No. 94, April 1973, 1-16.
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opportiinily to develop speeial abilities aiul see the
result of their

reeeive good pay and job seeurity.''

Ignored work

problems

ol

itsell

More

as a soiiree of workers" iVustralion by havini^ loensed
exelusivelv on

o the unit>n leadership, however, these

l

eonehisions betrayeil a snperlieial know ledge of the nature

and

1

lerriek,

rhe

likely to

1

Hluestone

lAW

bow

among them.

In a series

of papers. Bluestone diseussed the

improving the

|>layeil in

ipiality

of work

viee-president admitted that belter edueated workers were probably less

to the authoritarianism ol the slu)p lloor than

pointed out that this was "a healthy sign

i\o{

ei>neeileil that there

was

unrest

among

one presented by Sheppard and

I

were

their |iarents.

Ulueslone

a |>hent>menon to be ile|)lored." sinee the

workers" demands were eonsistent with the prineiples

the

ol et>lleetive bargaining.

oC union oflleials and labor relations seholars took issue with Sheppard

nature offaelory work and the role that unions

lile.

as well as to

importantly J lerriek aeeiised unions oIlKuing

job seeurity and wage inereases.

A number

work

ol ilemoeraey.

Althouj'ii Bluestone

younj-ei woikeis, his interpretation dilleied iVom

lerriek.

^

BIuestiMie useil the l.ordstown walkout lo

present his view of the relationship belween workers" disgust over Iheir jobs antl their

sjieeil'ie

grievanees.

U) eonsoli(.lale its

In the mid-l'>(>()s.

assembly work

Bluestone e\|ilained, (IM's management deeided

in the Cleneral

Motors Assembly Division. Obviously,

sueh eousolidation aehieveil manpower savings, but (he et)mpany went beyonil the

''V'onunents by Neil

I

lerriek

of the U.S. Department

oi

l

abor on

a l*)7() stutly

published

by the Survey Researeh Center ol the Inixersity olMiehigan, in Wiliam ( ioKlberg"s ".lob
/'7,-(
l/;/(77V</;/ luu/cnifionist, .lune 1^)7.^,
Satisl'aetion: Sorting Out the Nonsense,""
I

,

I

,

14.

'^Irving Bluesti)ue,
("hieagt) Illinois, 10

UAW-OM

"The System
1.'

ol

Wtxk

Deeember 1972,

Deparlmeul, Part

II.

,\

New

7, I'older

WSDA.
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1

l,

ook Needed.'" I'almer
\

I

louse,

>h, Irving Bluestone I'iles.

expected cut backs and reduced manpower on the assembly
lines and off-line operations
as well.

Management

changing the
out the

down on the number of workers

also drastically cut

line speed. After the consolidation,

same number of units

fewer employees were expected to turn

as had been produced under

GM's previous

This strike wave, Bluestone admitted, was related to the rank and

towards their jobs;

assembly

line

strikers vividly

without

system.

filers" attitude

expressed their concerns about the drudgery of

work. Nevertheless, the

UAW vice-president claimed:

The workers did not go on strike, saying to themselves, "I'm alienated, Fm
striking to make our jobs more meaningful and satisfying. They went on strike
over particular complaints and abuses which they wanted corrected, such as

speedup or working conditions or the denial of negotiated

There were basically two arguments

that

38

rights

angered Bluestone and other

and privileges.

UAW union

leaders. First, they rejected the social scientists' suggestion that the unions^ collective

bargaining would never provide solutions to the blue collars^ alienation.

And

secondly,

they disagreed that the younger workers' rebelliousness was radically different from that

which had taken place

in the

American auto

plants in the past.

William W. Winpisinger, vice-president of the International Association of
Machinists, also assailed those government officials, intellectuals and academics
not only discovered "an interesting

''provided

it

new malady' -i.e.

the blue-collar blues- but had also

with a name, a diagnosis, and even a cure."

Bluestone' s assessment of the Lordstown

same kind of grievances,

in the

same way,

strike:

who had

Winpisinger shared

young workers were

reacting against the

as had generations of workers before them.

38

Ibid., 12.

39

William W. Winpsinger,

''Job Satisfaction:

A Union Response," AFL-CIO American

Federalionist, 9.
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They were

rebelling against speed-ups; protesting safety
violations; and resisting working

conditions that had been unilaterally imposed by
management in the
efficiency.

Winpsinger concluded: "Anyone who thinks wildcats or slowdowns
or even

sabotage started
I

name of increased

at

Lordstown doesn't know much about the history of the American

40

1

labor

movement."
Union

officials insisted that they did not

industrial psychologists to

Labor leaders contended
could do so again

make assembly

that unions

To

in the 1970s.

oppose

line less

efforts

by management or

monotonous and more

had addressed job dissatisfaction

fulfilling.

in the past

and

the defenders of trade unionism, higher pay, leisure

and fringe benefits, on which union bargainers concentrated, were not peripheral

to the

quality of work. In sum, union officials argued, collective bargaining had always sought

maximum

benefits and the best conditions for workers.

would be a

difficult test for

of a downward economic

Although the
Detroit

file

was not

militancy

Kim Moody

at

as

The 1973 contract negotiations

unions facing the demands of their membership

in the

midst

spiral.

UAW expected the upcoming bargaining sessions to be "peaceful,"

calm as

it

appeared.

As

talks with the

several Chrysler plants worried the

Big Three approached, rank and

UAW leaders.

"The 1973 wildcats,"

argues, "symbolized the whole unresolved problem of the shopfloor

41

regime."

The grievances of the

Lordstown

militants'.

Yet the

Detroit wildcatters were not that ditferent from the

UAW leadership did not support the Chrysler workers.

40

Ibid.

^'Kim Moody, An Injury

to All:

The Decline of American Unionism (London and

York: Verso, 1988), 93.
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New

Indeed, they broke one of their strikes. The Lordstown
strikers articulated their demands
in a language familiar to the

framework of labor-capital

UAW leaders and sought solutions within the existing

relations.

The Detroit

language of black power, which union
dangerous. In a

Mazey

memo to

militants, in contrast,

officials regarded as destabilizing

...as it

publications, literature, press releases, or other types of activities."

relates to

Among the

most

were the Workers Action Movement (WAM), the National Caucus of

Labor Committees, and the Progressive Labor Party (PLP). They
with following

and even

union officers and board members. Secretary Treasurer Emil

requested "any informadon on the activities of these groups

militant dissidents

spoke the

'^sellout policies"

all

UAW

charged the

with the Big Three and using strong-arm tactics to block

the radicals" efforts to organize autoworkers.

Racism and
plants.

safety hazards remained largely unresolved issues in Detroit auto

These grievances undoubtedly radicalized large numbers of workers

1960s and early 1970s.

made

local

On

July 24, 1973, a wildcat strike

newspaper headlines.

the Chrysler Jefferson plant

Two African-American workers, Larry

Isaac Shorter, took over an electrical control booth, shut

ouster of a superintendent

at

who had made

in the late

down

Carter and

the lines and

won

the

repeated racist threats. The workers had

apparently filed grievances against the supervisor but management had refused to

After thirteen hours and a half of negotiations, the corporation agreed to

fire

listen.

the

superintendent and promised that no worker would suffer reprisals from the sit-down.
Carter and Shorter resented the fact that

Memo on Radical

UAW officials had tried to persuade them to

Groups, 1973, Folder 14,

Scholossberg Collection,

Box

WSUA.
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7,

UAW Washington Office, Steve

come

out before their

demands had been met, arguing

had already made a

that the strikers

43

.

pomt.

On August

14, less than a

month

after the sit-down at the Chrysler Jefferson plant,

a small group of dissidents held the corporation's
hours: Bill Gilbreth, a

line

conveyor

demand

belt.

Mack Avenue Stamping

Plant for 30

WAM leader, started the wildcat strike by sitting on an assembly

Gilbreth had been fired a

The shut down

reinstatement.

Gilbreth from the plant.

He

sat

started

down and

hundred workers who supported the

week before and had

when

a

returned to the plant to

company guard

refused to leave.

tried to

remove

The approximately two

WAM leader demanded the re-hiring of

all fired

workers, improved safety conditions, and amnesty for the people involved in the

down. Over a thirty-hour period, the number of wildcatters dwindled

The

strike

strikers

ended

from the

mobilized

after

two days when riot-equipped

plant.

at the plant

entering the facility

Moreover, about 1,000

around

forty.

Detroit police ousted thirty-six

officials

from twenty

UAW locals

gates to assure that dissidents did not prevent workers from

when

the situation: "For the

to

sit-

it

first

reopened. Local newscaster Bill Bonds captured the irony of

time

in the history

of UAW, the union mobilized

to

keep a

plant open."

This was not true, but the statement presented the union officials

worst possible

light.

in the

43

Rank and File Workers Fight For a Decent Contract, August 1973, UAW
Rank and File, The Tamiment Institute Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives,
Contract 73:

(Hereafter

RWLA).

44

A Newsletter by and for the Rank and File of UAW Local 235, 1973,
File, RWLA; "Radicals to demonstrate against GM and Chrysler,"' The

Shifting Gears,

UAW Rank and

Detroit Press, September 1973;

"UAW Leaders Panic," Fifth Estate, September

WSUA.
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1-14,

1,

Union

officials' actions

during the

controversy over the extent to which the
leadership argued that the shut

group

UAW defended

wildcat strike ignited a

its

down had been planned by

that intended to take over the

members of UAW Local

Mack Avenue

members. The

UA

WAM, a communist splinter

union and the companies. In a

leaflet

handed

to

140, union officials urged workers not to be "misled by outside

agitators or dissident groups forming inside the plant." Radicals, for their
part, said of the

supposedly "tiny cells of communists:"

They

are the autoworkers, both black

and white, the 20-30 year old Vietnam
veterans who learned class oppression in the military and who realized they are
stuck in the plants until they retire. These workers are serious about changing the
conditions in the plants.

Radical dissidents such as the Workers Action

claimed

that,

Movement

or the

Newsletter, the

boredom and drudgery of factory work.

Ann Arbor New

on how things could be

In their first

Unionists stated that workers' ultimate goal should be

"democratic management of production" and called on the rank and

all

Unionists

besides the basic quesfions of wages and working conditions, workers were

especially concerned about the

union for

New

different." Their

file to

"provide ideas

program proposed the creation of one

industrial

workers of each industry, including the unemployed; company management

by elected workers instead of bosses; and replacement of "high-paid bureaucrats" with
moderately paid union delegates. The
the

New

Unionists chastised Leonard

Woodcock and

UAW for not discussing the workers' job dissatisfaction or for simply regarding them
46

as "solutionless."

45

Ibid.

"^^"UAW Can't Deliver," The New Unionists' Newsletter, August 1973,
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1-7.

The

UAW leaders thus had to confront the issue of job satisfaction during the

1973 contract negotiations.

By

late

September,

after a

week long

strike, the

UAW

completed contract negotiations with the Chrysler Corporation.
As Leonard Woodcock

viewed

it,

the

UAW had made a number of breakthroughs on old problems:

When

those plants go back into operation, they'll be just like they were
Friday, except that we have now created the mechanism for the union

last

and its
begin to change those health and safety conditions, to begin to
humanize the workplace, to tackle the question of compulsory overtime and give

members

to

the individual worker the right to have a greater control over his

The

own

life.^^

UAW leadership considered restrictions on the corporation's right to demand

overtime as one of the most substantial gains. Workers could only be scheduled nine
hours a day, six days a week. Moreover, no employee could be forced to work Sundays
or

more than two consecutive Saturdays. To

became

"virtually meaningless" because

it

radical critics, however, this provision

did not go into effect until January

1,

1974.

This meant that between October and Christmas of 1973, when production rates were
highest and workers were required to

.48

provision would not be in effect.

Under

the

new

contract, a

work longer

The

UAW also won changes in retirement provisions.

worker with 30 years of service could

62 with a pension of $ 550 a month. The
October 1978. Critics responded
increase in pension might

that,

full

with continuing inflation,

become meaningless.

48

new

Chrsyler contract,"

retire

before the age of

pension of $ 700 did not go into effect
in five years'

until

time the

In a similar vein, the radicals argued that

''^"From Slogans to Reality: Victory at Chrysler,"

"Highlights of the

hours, the voluntary overtime

UAW Solidarity, October

UAW Solidarity, October

1973,

3.

1973, 4;

Jim Jacobs and Tom Wucetich, "Details of auto contract show few gains: UAW pact sets
back workers," Guardian, 10 October 1973, Folder 7, Box 52, Leonard Woodcock Files,

UAW President's Office, WSUA.
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the Cost of Living Allowance

claimed. Under the

consumer

new

(COLA)

tbrnuila had not been improved, as the

COLA would

contract,

pay

1

cent tor every .35 increase in the

price index, instead of the .4 of the previous agreement.

admitted, however, that one penny of the

UAW

UAW

leaders

COLA payable each quarter between

March

1974 and June 1976 would be diverted "to help pay for the very costly new fringe
benefits,

such as 30 and out

at

any age, the dental plan, the additional holidays and so

49

on."

To

tackle the problem of working conditions, the

and safety

joint

union-management committees

would not have enforcement powers,

fhe

new

critics

contract established healtii

in the plants, but (he

new committees

contract also formally sanctioned section

502 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
over safety issues. Lven the harshest

new

that permitted

workers

of the 1973 agreement regarded

to strike

this as

"an

advance from previous contracts." finally, the wage increase of 3 percent each >ear o\er
a three-year contract,

industry,"

which the union considered "the highest ever negotiated

was well within

the

Nixon administration's Phase IV wage

auto

in the

control

guidelmes.

fhe increasing moderation of organized labor's demands over the 1968-1974
period might account for the decline in the unions" approval

analysis of the unions' behavior in the

Nixon years

among

rank and fders.

indicates that organized labor

An

was

tougher during the 1969-70 recession than during (he inllation of 1973-1974. Contrary

4')

"Highlights of the

^".Hm .lacobs and
sets

lom Wucetich,

back workers,"

Liles,

UAW

new Chrysler

Gmmlimh

President's Office,

contract,"

UAW Solidarity, October

"Details of auto contract

10 October 1973, Folder

WSUA.
258

7.

1973, 4.

show few gains: UAW pact
Box 52, Leonard Woodcock

to

the conventional

wisdom

that unions

were tough

in times

of prosperity but moderate in

times of recession, during the 1969-70 economic downturn,
as Fortune reporter Irwin

Ross claimed, "unions seemed

to bargain

more aggressively than

ever.""^'

During the

1969-70 recession, consumer prices rose by 5.5 percent and unions were
determined

keep abreast or stay ahead of inflation. Strike
late

1960s, reaching

its

In 1973, unions

Even though

inflation.

to

activity also increased dramatically in the

climax in 1970.

were

relatively restrained, perhaps because of the savage

the wage-control apparatus

and IV, labor" s wage gains

fell

behind the inflation

rose and employer resistance stiffened, the

was much weaker under Phases

III

Moreover, as unemployment

rate.

number of both wildcat and

legal strikes

declined. Unauthorized walkouts staged by radical workers virtually disappeared after
the

summer of

their part,

The high

1973, as did the rank-and-file organizations of that period. Unions, for

became more concerned with
spirits that

retaining

members than with

increasing their pay.

accompanied the settlement of the major auto contracts

1973 soon disappeared. In a few months,

in

September

UAW president Leonard Woodcock gloomily

admitted that the contracts had been dampened by the recession in the auto industry and
52

in the

economy

at large.

Watergate would have finished Nixon sooner or

undoubtedly accelerated the president's

later,

political demise.

but the

oil crisis

The United

States had suffered

energy problems for several months but, as historian Alan Matusow explains,

Arab

^'

oil

boycott of October

Irwin Ross,

"How to

tell

1

973

was

the

that "turned energy into a full-fledged crisis, featuring

when unions

^^"The State of Our Union,"

it

will be tough," Fortune, July 1975, 100.

UA W Solidarity,

June

259

1

974,

1

panic, pessimism, gas lines, a plethora of conspiracy
theories, accelerating inflation, and
,.53

The United

a recession."

had made

it

States

was passing from a long period of cheap energy

the world's leading industrial nation into an era in

which

it

that

could not meet

its

energy demands. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the country had
become increasingly

dependent on foreign sources and foreign-flag shipping of crude

oil

and petroleum

products. Furthermore, the U.S. had lagged in the development of alternative
energy

sources and

oil

companies, with the help of lavish U.S. tax breaks, had emphasized crude

oil

and refinery investments abroad. In 1973, 35 percent of U.S.

sources,

1

8 percent

of Saudi Arabian

from the Middle East.

oil

points out. ''energy

was

ridiculously cheap and getting cheaper

East.

On

political issue

October

6,

was

from companies

to a

the Organization of Petroleum

exports in the 1970s. Oil undoubtedly affected

not only the economic but also the political relations

paramount

Hobsbawm

the time."^^

oil shifted

few producer government. This change allowed
restrict

all

foreign

the price of a barrel

cost less than $ 2; in this "golden age," as historian Eric

Exporting Countries (OPEC) to

the

came from

Between 1950 and 1973,

During the Nixon years, the ownership of world's
relatively

oil

Israel, the

among

nations.

United States" closest

1973, Egyptian President

Anwar

occupied Sinai Peninsula while Syria, Egypt's

ally,

el

To

the

ally in the

Arab

states

Middle

Sadat sent troops into the

Israeli-

captured the Golan Heights. Sadat"

53

Matusow, 24
54

DOE, Energy

Information Administration, 1980 Annual Report, 49, Table 21, quoted in

Matusow, 255.
55

Eric

Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the

Books:

New York,

1996), 262.
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World, 1914-1991{WintagQ

aim was

to recover territory that his country

had

lost

during the six-day war of 1967. The

Soviet Union suppHed the forces of Egypt and Syria, while
a hard-pressed

Israel, short

of

planes and ammunition, appealed to the U.S. to rush supplies.
The Arab countries

countered that they would use

Nixon paid scant

oil as

weapon

against any country that aided Israel.

attention to the threat, sending to Congress a $ 2.2 billion emergency

aid

package

oil

exports to the United States.

As

a

On

to re-supply Israel.

October 20, Saudi Arabia placed a

total

embargo on

the crisis in the Middle East escalated, the Watergate scandal reached

its

climax. "Watergate," journalist Jonathan Schell noted, "that uncontrollably spreading

thing,

had become entangled with the apocalypse."^^

Middle East took a dramatic

turn.

October 24, the

crisis in the

Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev urged the

United States to join the Soviet Union
to enforce the cease-tire agreed

On

in

sending peacekeeping forces to the Middle East

upon a few days

earlier.

Brezhnev also

stated that if the

United States did not reply, the Soviet Union would consider acting alone. Taking the
statement as a threat of unilateral intervention in the Middle East, Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger placed American
worldwide
crisis

alert,

the

first

On

on

time American officials had done so since the Cuban Missile

of 1962. The Soviets,

not respond.

forces

who

October 27,

and the war was over. The

apparently had never intended to act unilaterally, did

after intense negotiations, a

oil

UN cease-fire went into effect

embargo, however, continued

until

March 1 974, when

57

most Arab governments canceled

it.

^^Jonathan Schell, Observing the Nixon Years (Vintage Books:
57

Matusow, 258-262.
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New York,

1990), 196,

The Middle East

crisis electrified the

George Meany a golden opportunity

1

973 AFL-CIO Convention and offered

Cold War rhetoric and urge American

to revive his

politicians not to confuse detente with "unilateral concessions."

leadership called on the U.S. government to ship Israel

the

all

The AFL-CIO

war materiel necessary

to

maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. Secretary of Defense James
R.
Schelinger,

who spoke

Convention, reassured union

at the

officials

by stating

that the

United States would guarantee continuing security for the State of Israel and equity for
neighbors. For his part, the

We are determined
is

our members

AFL-CIO

the international field.

wars

Meany was

because

we have

It

the taxes to sustain our government's programs in

the sons of workers

It is

a real stake in foreign policy.

who

are called

upon

to fight the

58

that result

from

failure to contain aggression

right in claiming that

an international

were oblivious

The

president contended:

to speak out

who must pay

its

it

crisis erupted, but

to the

AFL-CIO's

oil crisis that the

living standards of

was

it

the "sons of workers''

was evident

quintessential

Yom

and subversion.

who

that the lessons

did the fighting

of the Vietnam

when

War

Cold Warrior.

Kippur War unleashed had a tremendous impact on the

low and middle-income

December 1972 and December 1973,

families. In the twelve

retail prices

of fuel

oil

months between

and gasoline skyrocketed

46.8 percent and 19.7 percent respectively. Shortages resulted in widespread plant

shutdowns, production cutbacks, layoffs, shorter working hours and economic
dislocation.

The

in January 1974.

rate

of unemployment jumped from 4.6 percent

An AFL-CIO

AFL-CIO American

in

October 1973

to 5.2

Executive Council Report stated that ^^most Americans

Federatiomst.

November

262

1973, 28.
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I

oil,

ils

companies

m

llic r;ill

hilhoii lo ci>nsnnK-rs'

.M)

inailc lalMilons piofils.

crmlc

ami Ihe

oil puHliiclii>n

Ihc ci>nihineil allcr lax prollls of Iwenly-lwo

inereaseil S.\7 percent

rcpoiiecl lhal

$

Irom

Ofllu-

l')7.\

c larrcsl oil

li\

afler-tax profits in l')7^ had inereaseil 50.2 percent;

companies,

MohiPs

prollls increased 16. H percent; Texaco's, 45.4 percent; Standard Oil of Caliloinia's,
54.2

percent; and

prollls

was

(

70 percent. More

inlTs,

the ic\ elation in .lannary 1074 that $ >

was

raised lor his 107.' cainpaij-n

I

in

1074.

i>utraget)ns than the cxi>rhilanl

oil

nnlhon

ol lhc $

(>()

nnlhon

that

Nixon

mt>ncy.

he economic situation was hicak indeed In Ihe eiul

twelve months period from .lannary

In the

oU imlnstry's

1

07

to l)eeeinher

^,

||

did not impro\ e

107 ^ inllation

increased S.S percent -Ihe highest one-year rate since I0.|7- whereas Nixon's goal had

been 2.5 percent or
soareil al a rate

less,

i'ood |>rices, one of Ihe major concerns ol vvoi king peo|4e, had

0121.1 percent dnring IMiase IV.

I

he hnying power of ihe average

wage

(.1

earnei had declined

(lary

M. link,

^

ed.,

,

l/'7.

CIO. I'wciifivc

((ireenwood IMcss: West|iorl,

""l ink,

'

'Allen

2452-245^;

ll

The

percent in Ihc conisc ol Ihe \cai.

(

nsliiiii^fon

/ack, "Nixon's

(

(

icdihility

.lannary 1074,

I

soon iook

mul Rtporls.

'oiimil Sdilcnicnfs

onnedicnt, 10/7), Vol.

PoM, 2

oil crisis

5,
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>

/<>75,

2452-245J.

I.

he l'et>nomic Kcconl,"

lu'dcralionisf, IVhiiiary 1074, 10.

/'>

ils h)ll

.I/-/. (

.l/m'/7(<//;

on the auto industry and, consequently, on autoworkers. The
shock of gasoHne shortages
and skyrocketing prices caused a decHne

in

more

The changes threw

fuel-efficient imported small cars.

depression. Industry

employment

that

consumer demand and triggered a

had peaked

at

shift to

the industry into a near

750,000

September 1973

in

declined to 684,000 by January 1974.^^

Nixon

insisted in his

1974 State of the Union address

recession in the United States." In fact, what followed

that "there will

was not a

be no

recession, but the Greal

Recession, in Matusow's phrase: "the low point on the roller coaster ride of booms and
busts that began in 1969 and lasted into the 1980s;'
traced back to the

American

63

The

inflationary spiral could be

The Vietnam War

military intervention in Indochina.

machine used vast quantities of material and caused massive increases
goods and services, thus

setting an inflationary

boom

in

The

pump up

initial

the

to offset increasing

boom ended

economy before

in the

artificially

low

II

price and

level.

The relaxed Phase

disaster: the administration

made a

years- with the

controls

dampened

III

program

unpopularity-

lasting impact

in the

Auto Industry,"

^^Matusow, 302.
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on

started to

prices.

in prices.

the nation's inflation to an

that

began

in

closet'' that

January 1973 proved a
Treasury Secretary

George Shultz had proclaimed as the administration's back-up weapon.

"Economic Conditions

would

it

accompanying increase

never used the "stick in the

62

for

govemment demand.

the deflationary forces

wage

its

1969-1970 recession, but the govemment

Then came 1972 and 1973 -both boom
In 1972, Phase

demand

motion. If the war had been

financed with higher taxes -something unlikely considering

have reduced private demand

in

UAW Solidarity, June

In the

1974, 12

view of

the

UAW leadership, "war, 'engineered slump', profit-gouging, and wasted energy" had

started the inflationary spiral.

Moreover, the government economists were "deeply

confused" and proposed "strategies for fighting only inflation while
ignoring
64

recession."

By
crisis

late

October 1973 collective bargaining became

dominated organized labor's policy discussions. In

AFL-CIO's Tenth Convention, George Meany
the preceding months. Vice-President Spiro

listed the

Agnew,

of an issue and the Nixon

less

his

key

opening address to the
political

developments of

"the strong law and order man," had

resigned and had been convicted of a felony. Former Attorney General John Mitchell

and former Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans were under indictment for conspiracy,
perjury and obstruction of justice. Four

indicted,

among them

members of the White House

staff had

been

the president's chief domestic affairs advisor, John D. Ehrlichman.

A dozen more officials had either resigned or been fired in connection with the White
House

scandal. Finally, the president of the United States had been accused of tax

avoidance, shady real estate deals and criminal abuse of presidential power.

During the biennial convention of the AFL-CIO, about
supported the federation's

call for

inflation

of a serious recession

,000 labor leaders

Nixon's resignation or impeachment. The unionists

found Nixon responsible for the problems
possibility

1

that affected organized labor most: the

in 1974, the

deepening energy

crisis,

and the loss of U.S. jobs to imports. The president did not even receive the

traditional invitation to speak at the convention in 1973, nor did his

Peter,

J.

the continuing

Labor Secretary

Brennan. Although the economy continued to worsen, union leaders did not

64

Inflation!

How did we get

into this

mess?"

UAW Solidarity, December

265

1974,

4.

discuss whether or not organized labor should continue
to support the administration's

economic program. Organized labor
given. "There

president

I.

W.

is

participation in Nixon's Phase

a realization on the part of

Abel, "that

we have

some people,"

to bring a bit

IV was taken

as a

stated the Steelworkers

of order into the economy ."^^

After adopting a strongly worded resolution calling for Nixon's
resignation or

immediate impeachment, the AFL-CIO launched what the Washington Star News called
"the biggest and potentially most influential informational campaign" in the federation's
history.

The AFL-CIO News published a nineteen-point

grounds for Nixon's impeachment and

editorials

of affiliated unions.

On

Woodcock, with

unanimous approval of the

the

the

same day

also called for Nixon's impeachment.

In calling

upon

impeachment.

that

the Congress to act,

We need unity

by Meany appeared

Meany launched

The

of particulars outlining

bill

in the publications

his attack

upon

the president.

UAW International Executive Board,

UAW president stated:
I

am

of the gravity of

fully cognizant

and leadership, but

we

can afford neither unity

won

through cowardice and immorality, nor leadership stained by perfidy and
66

tyranny.

The economic downturn exacerbated Nixon's problems
Watergate

affair that

quarters of the

destroyed his administration.

As

year's end.

it

was

the

early as June 1973, about three

American public believed Nixon was involved

Sentiment for his impeachment grew slowly, from 19 percent

at

in office, but

With the revelations of early 1974, support

for

in the

in

Watergate cover-up.

mid- 1973 to 35 percent

impeachment increased.

Business Week, October 27, 1973, 35-36.

'^Impeachment of the President," Folder 27, Box

266

12,

UAW Washington Office, WSUA.

reaching 65 percent

at the

time of his resignation in August 1974.

A smaller majority,

57

percent, favored his removal from office.^^

On

July 24, 1974, the

Supreme Court,

ruling 8-0 that

Nixon had no

right to

withhold evidence in criminal proceedings, ordered the president to turn over
sixty-four

White House tapes of Watergate discussions. Three days

Committee recommended

that

later,

Nixon be impeached because

the

House

Judiciary

his actions constituted a

"course of conduct or plan'" to obstruct the investigation of the Watergate break-in and to

cover up other unlawful
tapes revealed that

Watergate six days

activities.

On August

three

5,

new transcripts of White House

Nixon personally had ordered a cover-up of the
after the illegal entry into the

tapes, argues historian Michael

investigation of

Democrats' national headquarters. The

Genovese, "showed a dark side of Nixon never before

68

seen by the public."

Few now

believed the president's assertion that he was "not a

crook." Facing sure impeachment, the president resigned on August
In the

government's

months

that followed, the recession

ability to

manage

the

economy

8,

1974.

deepened and public confidence

in the

collapsed. President Gerald Ford,

furthering Nixon's conservative agenda, offered no measures to halt the recession. Faced

with economic disaster, both the

UAW and the AFL-CIO leadership directed their efforts

towards the 1974 congressional elections.
to vote:

"Congress

is

UAW advertisements encouraged

members

only as able as the people you vote for," the union officials claimed.

The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Report N°

^

its

Vichael A. Genovese, The Watergate

1 1

1,

September 1974,

Crisis (Westport, Connecticut:

1999), 46-55, 50.
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7.

Greenwood

Press,

Organi/cd
"to

make

-now decidedly

labor,

the system work/^

We can

j^el

It

1

saw

in the o(T-year elections

an opportunity

AW pamphlet entiuisiastically staled:
get a strong plant-closing bilk

rising prices,

we can

and we can get national health

put a

security.

iialt

to

We can

on lUeclion Day 1974.'

this

is

1

we can

tax reform,

unemployment and
do

One

in retreat-

unlikely that

many

rank and

lilers

believed (\>ngress could do so much.

Nevertheless, union leaders viewed the 1974 electoral returns as encouraging.
The

1

)emocrats

made

governorships.

explain

picking up

si/.able gains,

4.^

I

louse seats, four Senate seats and four

The disastrous state of the economy and the widespread job insecurity

why Republicans

AFL-CK) American

lost

so

many

votes.

"The

liberal victories in 1974/^ said the

FcderaHofiisf^ ^culminated the trend started in 1970

"southern strategy'' was

in

bloom and predictions of a conservative

l\ill

when Nixon's

era were

70

widespread.''

The AI'I,-(M() was probably too optimistic, but surveys indicated that Nixon's

Middle America had not turned
deteriorating

Social Issue.

economy and
As

as conservative as Republicans had hoped.

the Watergate scandal had almost totally

the 1974-olf year election

campaign came

\\y 1974, the

submerged

the

to a close, (ki11u|) carried a

public opinion referendum on a numlxM* of issues. According to the survey's fmdings,

there

was conservative support on questions such

resisters, the

as unconditional amnesty for dralt

death penalty, busing and marijuana legalization.

The majority of those

interviewed, however, called for wage-price controls and defense budget cuts and

UAlVS(>li(/arif}\ October 1974, 3.
70

Kcx

llarilcsty, "Tlic

\

^)74

!•

lections:

FcdcralionisL December 1974,

The

New

2.
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\\){cnUi\\"

AI'IA'K) American

opposed limiting federal spending
added, "includes a

for social programs.

call for stronger

problem uppermost

in the

'The public's mandate," Gallup

economic measures

minds of voters when they

to deal

with inflation, the

cast their ballots in the recent

congressional elections."^'

The 1973-1975 recession signaled
prosperity. In April 1975, Fortune

the end of the postwar golden era of economic

announced

of a sure thing." Between 1945 and 1974.

that "ever increasing affluence"

labor-capital relations rested

assumption of economic growth. Unions were successful

was

"less

on the

in gaining higher real

wages,

increased job security and better working conditions for their members. At the same
time, the

more progressive union

leaders pushed for a broader social agenda that resulted

both in the expansion of social welfare programs and the reduction of labor-capital
72

"Work," Fortune pointed

conflict.

[was] smaller that [was]

inflation

out,

"became more rewarding, but

commonly supposed."

In the late 1960s

and taxes canceled out workers' gains

amid generally favorable economic

in

the

bonanza

and early 1970s,

nominal pay. In the 1963-1973 period,

conditions, blue collars' spendable earnings climbed
73

only

1

2 percent, an annual rate of

The widely discussed

was a

clear indication of the

recession, large

^Whe Gallup

1

.

1

percent.

"blue-collar blues" -often trivialized by the

downward

mass media-

trend in economic gains. During the 1969-1970

numbers of industrial workers

still

channeled their protest through their

Poll Comulative Index, Report No. 113,

November

1974, 1-2.

72

Gordon,

et. al.,

216.

^^Edmund Faltermayer, "Ever Increasing Affluence
April 1975,92, 96.
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Is

Less of a Sure Thing," For/wwe,

unions. Cases in point were the electrical workers strike
against

workers walkout against General Motors

in

1070.

Two years

GE

1%9

in

later, the

and the auto

l.ordstown strike

of 1972 became the epitome of the young workers' rebellion against
technology and the
rank and

file's rising

concern over working conditions. There were wildcat strikes

Detroit auto plants in 1973 at the time of the

UAW negotiations with the Big Three.

they did not signal permanent escalation in rank-and-file militance.
the

summer of

in

1973, the leaders and the rank and

filers

On

both went into

the contrary, alter

retreat.

From

1974 onvvarcK the number of strikes diminished considerably: higher iineniploynient

and the growing

threat ofhiyolTs

hi 1974, Irving Rluestone

relations.

The

and plant shutdowns had a strong "disciplinary^^

was

still

Yet

rates

elTect.

optimistic about the future of labor-capital

UAW vice-president contended that the

1973 auto contract negotiations

had been an important step towards improving the quality of worklile. Chrysler, lord

and General Motors had responded positively

and implement programs directed toward
in the

United States

to

I he first steps

engage

may

in

If

it

'"job

tlrst

industry

such an endeavor. Rluestone concluded:

all

the answers and no

successluK however,

is

enrichment." Auto was the

develop

be halting and careful; considerable trying and testing

necessaiy, tor no one has
identical.

to the union's proposal to jointly

it

two

may

be

industrial situations are

could alter intrinsically the decades old

shop worn system of management- worker

relations

and the philosophy spawned

,74

by the concept ot

By
to

change

''scientific

the mid-197()s, as

Kim Moody

an accelerating

as

at

rate''

Irving Bluestone, "Decision

Worklile,

management/'

Box

it

says, 'nhe contours of the U.S.

became

''part

of an internationally integrated

Making By Workers," 20 June

156, Irving Bluestone Files,

UAW-CJM
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economy began

1974, 8-9, holder Quality of

Department,

WSUA.

economy."

Drastic changes in the structure of industry as well
as the workforce soon

followed. Rather than improve the quality of worklife, as
Bluestone expected,

management adopted
of supervisory

move

a

more aggressive

to non-supervisory

their fixed capital in

attitude

towards their workers. In 1974, the

workers began

ratio

to increase. Corporations started to

manufacturing to regions where wages were lower and unions

less influential. Anti-union activity also intensified

and organized labor's bargaining

76

leverage began to decline.

The

future of blue-collar workers

depended largely on the

vision and initiative of their unions to negotiate the terms of labor-capital relations in

America

in a

new economic

Kim Moody, An

era.

Injury to All: The Decline ofAmerican Unionism (Verso:

1988), 95.

^^Gordon,

et. al.,

216-219.
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New York,

KPIL()(aiF: FROIM

Nineteen sixty-eight has gone
year

in

down

whieh "denioeraey" was "in the

eleetion

C IIIC

ACiO

!

()

in history as

SF.A

"the year oftiie barrieailes;" the

streets;" the year in

beeame an "Aineriean melodrama." Those who

H LK

whieh

the presidential

lived through the sensatii)nal

events of 1968 pereeived that Ameriean society was undergoing profound changes,
i-rom
the vantage point ol the twenty-first century, there

is

no doubt

that

l%8 was

a turning

point in U.S. history. Although then probably not obvious, that year's swift

developments ushered

in a

new

end of the economic spectrum,
result

era for Americans, and especially for those at the lower

fhc labor-liberal coalition was seriously weakened. As a

of the widely reported Tet offensive, anti-war .sentiment grew significantly and

opposition to the conllict, reaching

Moratorium Day demonstrations.

its

The

highest point in

rift

that the

1%9, during

the October 15

Vietnam War provoked within

the

ranks of labor would never be bridged. At the .same time, an increasing number ol

Americans no longer took
granted,

the

economic prosperity of the immediate postwar period

fhc American blue-collar worker was not so afllueni after

all

and long strikes

against major U.S. industries were not a thing of the past. Yet rank-and

alike hardly imagined that the political and

economic ground

that they

for

filers

and leaders

were losing would

never be recovered.

I'hirty

years

later, blue-

and white-collar workers

live

layoffs and plant shut-downs. Since the late 196()s, unions'

members has

under the constant threat of

power

to protect their

dramatically declined and their numbers have been reduced to almost half

what they had been three decades ago.

In 1968,

272

unions represented 23 percent of the

work

force. In 1998, organized labor represented only
13.9 percent, leaving six out

of

seven workers without union representation.' Gregory Mantsios,
director of worker
education

at

Queens College, observes:

Why

[...]

richest

There

has the working class, which

and most powerful nation

is

workplace, the voting booth, or the

in the

way

is

less in the

in history, failed to use its collective force, either

in the

this

working more and making

country distributes

its

streets, to

weahh and

demand fundamental changes

resources?

abundant evidence to prove that the American working class has

failed to use

its

collective force, but the explanations for such failure in the last thirty years have tended
to be simplistic.

Most

historical accounts

of the

late

1960s portray blue-collar workers as

considerably affluent, generally supportive of the president's Vietnam policy and
increasingly concerned about the Social Issue.

Union

leaders fare even worse.

They

are

accused of failing to oppose the Vietnam War, organize the unorganized, capitalize on
rank-and-file militancy, confront corporate

strategies.

on the shoulders of the workers, the union

acknowledge the impact

that

between a Republican administration, a
radicalized student

Gitlin,

for

leaders, or both fail to

domestic and world economic changes had on the American

force in the manufacturing sector.

'Todd

effective political

These accusations are well grounded. Yet scholars who place the blame

labor's failure squarely

work

power and develop

movement and

^Trom Chicago

As

the present study shows, the relationship

traditionally

Democratic labor leadership, a

a volatile rank and

to Seattle,"

file

was highly complex.

Newsweek, 13 December 1999,

Gregory Mantsios, ed.. The New Labor Movement for the
Monthly Review Press, 1998), xiii.
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New

2.

Century (New York:

In the

Nixon

years, unionized workers attempted to use their
"collective force... in

the workplace, the voting booth, and the

fundamental changes

Mantios points
both legal and

many

out.

in the

way

streets,''

though certainly not "to demand

[the U.S.] distributes its wealth

and resources," as

In the second half of the 1960s, the sharp increase in strike
activity

illegal-

-

revealed that the labor-capital relations were not as friendly as

analysts described them.

On

the shopfloor, there were a

number of unresolved

problems, such as safety hazards, poor working conditions, and racial and gender
discrimination. Outside the workplace, blue-collar workers found
to

make ends meet. Despite

the rise in the

number of wildcat

it

increasingly difficult

strikes,

most workers

supported union sanctioned strikes as well as their leaders' collective bargaining

The

still

efforts.

969

strike against

walkout, the

first

against the corporation since 1946, put an end to the rivalry between the

independent

UE and the AFL-CIO affiliated lUE and resulted in the

1

settlement for

GE workers

in

General Electric was significant for several reasons. The

many viewed

A year later, the autoworkers'

"blue-collar blues" back on the national agenda.

largest

negotiated

twenty years. Beyond wage increases, cost-of-living

adjustments and health insurance gains,

organized labor.

first

and most profitable corporation

in the

the strike itself as a

good omen

strike against

General Motors put the

UAW's

decision to take on the

The

world had important economic and

implications. After a nine-week stoppage, the union

won back

for

political

cost of living protection

without a ceiling, obtained decent wage increases and established the "30-and-ouf

principle.

The walkout

collar vote during the

also significantly reduced Nixon's ability to capture the blue-

1970 congressional election, as

not old fashioned.
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it

proved that economic issues were

In the early

1

970s, speed-ups at a

the quality of industrial

work

number of GM

The 1972 Lordstown

life.

resistance of a younger generation of workers to the

standards and

work

rules.

Yet

after the

summer of

The deepening economic recession took

its toll

decline in blue-collar militancy shattered the

plants also ignited the debate

strike

came

company's

to epitomize the

arbitrary production

1973, strike activity began to subside.

on the rank and

new

and

tile

their unions.

blue-collar blues

interests.

the

In 1968, the

the autoworkers'

to the voting

booth

to protect

Political

and advance

their

members'

Education (COPE) as well as
districts

with flyers

and Nixon's anti-labor records. Organized labor eventually

comeback

to the unions' campaign,

which focused

largely

on bread and

butter concerns. In the 1970-off year elections, labor leaders also revived the

campaign issue and thus disrupted Nixon's blue-collar

up the Social

The

plants.

Hubert Humphrey to the White House, but the Democratic candidate owed

his miraculous

a

gains,

discourse.

Action Program (CAP) flooded industrial

that revealed both Wallace's

economic

improve working conditions on the

AFL-ClO's Committee on

UAW's Community

failed to take

failed to

away

would soon disappear from public

Unions also resorted

The 1973

moderate wage increases and in the creation of

in

health and safety committees. Inflation soon ate

however, and the committees

The

hopes for a worker-student

leftists'

alliance that, in the activists' view, could radically alter labor-capital relations.

round of auto negotiations resulted

on

Issue.

The Democratic Party gained nine

strategy

economy

and his attempts

seats in the

as

to play

House of

Representatives, a majority of state governorships and kept control of the Senate. The

weakened

labor-liberal coalition,

however, did not survive the 1972 presidential

George McGovem, the Democratic candidate, was

275

election.

enthusiastically supported by the left

liberal

a

wing of the party but lacked

the endorsement of the "old" labor bosses. Although

number of progressive unions campaigned

steer the

AFL-CIO

for

McGovem, George Meany's

decision to

ground deprived the Democratic candidate of crucial

into neutral

organizational support. While the country seemed to be on the path of economic

recovery,

Nixon

neutralized the

Vietnam War as a campaign

as a reformer, a candidate of the political center.

presidential election

was an unprecedented

Though

political

In the postwar period, blue-collars did not

workplace or

in the voting booth.

1960s and early 1970s,

and

filers certainly

streets

issue and presented himself

short-lived, the

triumph for Nixon.

abandon

their struggles either in the

Yet workers seldom took

belonged to the peace

to the streets. In the late

activists

and college

were not as outspoken on foreign policy issues

but organized labor's opposition to the Vietnam

1972

War has

radicals.

as the students

Rank

were

often been underestimated.

Left-leaning unions joined anti-war protests as early as in 1965. The National Assembly
for Peace

was fonned months before

Americans change

their

the Tet Offensive, which

minds about U.S. intervention

would make many

in Southeast Asia.

of a large number of unions with the Moratorium played a significant role

of the October

15, 1969, anti-war demonstrations. Nevertheless, the

captured the media's attention were the

demonstrators in

American

May

New York

The alignment
in the success

workers

who

"hard hats" that attacked peace

1970. The construction worker soon became the symbol of

labor: affluent, conservative,

and hawkish. In 1973, the biggest economic

downturn since the Great Depression as well

as the Watergate scandal

undermined such

image. Blue collars were neither complacent middle-class citizens nor unwavering

members of the

so-called

new Republican

majority.
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The voting behavior theory

Benjamin Wattenberg and Richard Scammon

that

presented in The Real Majority has been extremely influential
in the scholarly work that
deals with

cultural

American

and

politics in the

social issues

postwar

era.

have driven politics

A large number of analysts agree that

in the

United States since the

late

1960s.

Robert Collins, however, has recently reassessed the importance of political
economy.
Collins observes:

One wonders

...whether [Wattenberg's and

embraced too

fervently, leaving us with a one-dimensional

public affairs that

now overemphasizes

and loses sight of the enduring,

albeit

Scammon"s]

insight has not

been

way of thinking about

the cultural determinants of political

life

never exclusive, significance of such

"traditional concerns as political economy.
"Traditional" economic problems have continued to afflict American blue-and whitecollar workers in the last three decades.

A wave of plant closings followed the recession

of 1973 as foreign competition and inflation eroded workers" wages. For the American
blue-and white-collar, the 1980s turned out to be worse than the 1970s. President Ronald

Reagan introduced aggressive

wage demands. The

anti-labor policies and accused workers of making selfish

administration endorsed anti-union methods that included

"replacing" strikers, firing those

transferring

work

who

to other locations

unions was successful. In the

first

favored unionization, closing unionized plants,

and obstructing union

elections.

two years of the Reagan

The

assault

on the

administration, organized

4

labor lost three million members.

Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth

in

Postwar America (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 235.
4

"Lessons from Our Past. Business and Politicians Team
and Bush Presidencies, 1981-1992." Online. Available:

http://www.aflcio.org/cse/mod3/mod_3_22.htm
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Up

Against Labor: The Reagan

In

1

995, the winds of change reached the

AFL-CIO

top echelons. John Sweeny,

head of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), was
elected president of the

Sweeny's campaign slogan was "A

federation.

ticket included

unionist,

for

American Labor." His

Richard Trumka of the United Mineworkers, a well-known militant

and Linda Chavez-Thompson, a staunch representative of women and

ethnic minorities.

claims,

New Voice

"Sweeny

"No George Meany-style-bread and
is

racial

and

butter unionist," Joel Kotkin

an advocate of European-style Democratic Socialism." The SEUI

leader's ascendancy

marked an important power

shift

within organized labor. In the early

1970s, the traditional industrial unions -which rose as the vanguard of the labor

movement

in the 1930s-

began

to decline.

At the same time, the public sector unions

representing government workers and teachers increased their numbers dramatically.

Since 1975, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees

(AFSCME)

has grown from a quarter million to 1.2 million members. Forty-two percent

of union members nowadays are public employees.

The economic

signaled the beginning of "de-unionization" of the American

work

crisis

of 1973

force as well as the

replacement of industrial jobs with service and information-based jobs.

At the onset of the twenty-first century, wage earners' grievances have not
diminished. In

fact,

many

In the Internet era, the

AFL-CIO" s website echoes

publications such as the

News voiced

^Joel Kotkin,

On

working-class Americans are worse off than thirty years ago.
the workers' complaints that labor

AFL-CIO American Federationist,

three decades ago. ""Real earnings," the

"The

the

AFL-CIO webpage

New Left Takes Over American Unions,"

Line. Politics, Business,

and Culture, 4 August

states,

"have

The American Enterprise

1999. Online. Available:

http://www.theamericanenterprise.org/taemj97b.htm
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UAW Solidarity or the UE

been declining steadily since the early 1970s;'
Unionists

fear the loss

gains, such as the 40-hour week, prevailing
wages. Medicare
security, student grants

similarities

and loans, job

safety,

and the right

of hard

and Medicaid,

won

social

to organize. Despite the

between past and present worker grievances, the domestic
and world

environments have radically changed. The global economy has
altered the rules of the

economic game. "More and more unionized companies
claim, "are based in Europe and Asia and

move

capital

in the

US," AFL-CIO leaders

and resources across

political

boundaries, seeking the highest profits, the lowest labor costs and the
fewest

environmental restrictions."
In

November

How

can labor get back into the game?

1999, organized labor seemed to find a way. In Seattle, union

members joined anti-sweatshop

activists, environmentalists,

small business people and anarchists,

among

indigenous groups, farmers,

others, in their demonstrations against the

World Trade Organization (WTO). Tens of thousands of men and women
streets

of the

city

the demonstrators

filled the

and halted the normal fiow of business. The overwhelming majority of

were peaceful. Yet, the media focused on the violent

fringe that

destroyed private property. Reporters immediately drew parallels between the 1968
Battle of Chicago and the 1999 Battle of Seattle.

enough, the images on

Todd

TV -marauding street types,

Gittlin observes,

"To those old

brutal cops, surreal chaos in clouds

6

"Unions and the Economy.

It's

up

to us. Collective Bargaining." Online. Available:

http://www.aficio.org/cse/mod6/uniongoals
7

"Today's Unions-

On

the

High Road

to

Global Fairness." Online. Available:

http://www.aficio.org/globaleconomy
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of gas -were reminiscent of footage from Chicago and
Paris

in 1968."^

There

are,

however, important differences between the two movements.
In Chicago, there was a
single

and unifying

Seattle, the

issue:

immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. In

concerns were varied and numerous: demonstrators protested
against

corporate power and consumerism, against sweatshops, against unfair
trade accords,
against the destruction of the environment, against genetically modified
food.

The

difference between Chicago '68 and Seattle '99, however, does not stop there.
In 1968,
the

AFL-CIO

marched

side

leaders sided with the Chicago police. In Seattle 1999, organized labor

by side with students and

On November
Memorial Stadium
states

intellectuals.

30, an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 participants overflowed

Workers from more than 50 unions, 25

in Seattle for the labor rally.

and 144 countries gathered

to protest against global injustice.

The

list

of

participating unions included the Machinists, the Steelworkers, the United Autoworkers

(UA W),

the

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees

(AFSCME),

Union of Electrical Workers (lUE),

the International

the Airline Pilots, the International Ladies Garments Workers

the Transport Workers,

Union (ILGWU) and

the

9

International

Longshore and Warehouse union.

Journalist

and

activist Janet

Thomas

vividly described the marchers:

The people who grow stuff, make stuff, move stuff,
places. The people who rely on a union to preserve

fix stuff, teach us,

and take us

the values of daily

life

-time

for the kids, for leisure, health benefits. Values that fly in the face of "virtual"

g

Todd

Gittlin,

"From Chicago

to SeattlQ,'"

Newsweek, 13 December 1999,

2.

9

"Working Families Take

their

Message

to the

WTO."

http://aflcio.org/globaleconomy/mobilize_message
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Online. Available:

reality

with

its

fifteen-hour high-tech, high-paying workdays, and
easy dismissal

of the deep core issues of social justice.

The AFL-CIO's
working
streets

rallying slogan for the

families,

it

doesn't work."'

march was: "WTO.

If

it

doesn't work for

Blue-and white-collar workers

'

who marched

in the

of Seattle demanded that the rules of the global economy protect people
rather

than property.

Reformers and progressives regarded Seattle as a milestone for a new kind of
politics

and became excited about the "Sweeny-Greenie'"

between student

activists

and union people seemed

beautiful thing in the world

from Spokane who walked
added,

"Fm

was a redwood
at the front

old-growth

trees.

be closing.

deck,'" said

'1

used to say the most

Cory McKinley, a

streel worker

of the Seattle labor march. "Now," McKinley

hanging out with these green kids,

We can preserve the

to

The 1960s divide

alliance.

1

know

there's another

We can have sustainability.

way

to

do

this.

guess I'm an

I

12

environmentalist now."

Icons of the sixties such as

praised organized labor's participation in the

Tom Hayden

WTO demonstrations.

and Todd Gitlin
Gitlin highlighted

the "unions' centrality" in the Seattle protest and pointed out that "the U.S. labor
13

movement

[was] at a make-or-break point."

For his

part,

Hayden

stated, "It is pretty

10

Janet Thomas, The Battle in Seattle: The Story Behind

and Beyond the

WTO

Demonstrations (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 2000), 139.
II

Ibid., 9.

12

Marc Cooper, et. al., "Democracy
December 1999,3-4.

Bites the

WTO,"

13

Gitlin, 2.
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amazing

to see the

AFL-CIO head up

SDSers and people from
something

like that.""*

there

on the podium talking with a bunch of

the gay and lesbian

Yet

it

is

community.

I

never thought

premature to predict whether or not

this

Fd

see

brand

new

coalition will fare better than the short-lived student-worker
collaboration of the late

1960s and early 1970s.

There

is

no doubt

that the

years has been "an injury to
for social change, the

in a global

all."

AFL-CIO

American unions' abrupt
For unionized workers

will

loss

of power

in the last thirty

to recover their role as agents

have to revise the meaning of collective bargaining

economy, the effectiveness of its

tactics

workers' needs and interests, and the unconditional

and

strategies, its definition

faith in

economic growth

that

characterized unions in the postwar period. At onset of the twenty-first century,

American workers
It is

up

to the

are

still

discontented and organized labor

workers themselves and to their leaders

is

to decide

once again

at

of

many

cross roads.

which way they

are

willing to go.

Joel Kotkin,

On

"The

New Left Takes Over American Unions,"

Line. Politics, Business,

and Culture, 4 August

1999. Online. Available:

http://www.theamericanenterprise.org/taemj97b.htm
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